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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW




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
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
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IMAGINE YOUR SON TEACHING SCIENCE TO ARISTOTLE!

Your son—let's call him Johnny—could teach Aristotle a lot. Because any Johnny twelve grades old knows more science facts than the venerable Greek ever did. More chemistry. More physics. Yes, even more medicine. Johnny could tell Aristotle, and perhaps you, about reagents and relativity, viruses and vaccines. And he can tell you science facts that weren't even science fiction until Jules Verne came along.

Johnny knows more because science knows more. And that's because a lot of people like Johnny took thousands of years to learn one small fact after another. In ancient days all learning, science included, was philosophy. Aristotle, in fact, was the first person to separate the two. By classifying and relating all the small bits of information, he established as distinct disciplines the first scientific specialties. Among them were anatomy, biology, meteorology, physics and physiology. In addition, he invented logic and psychology.

Even so, scientific progress was pretty haphazard. But in the early 1900's there were enough scientists to produce what might be called a "critical mass of ideas." Then, with the help of improved communications, these ideas interacted to form new ones. A chain reaction began. Today, science is literally exploding with new ideas and attacking a lot of ignorance, poverty and disease in the process. It happened none too soon. For example, it is estimated the world population will increase from its present 3 billion to 50 billion in fewer than 70 years. Think of the food and energy we'll

need. Fortunately, science is already beginning to produce it.

Science takes these great strides with the help of specialization. But if specialization is the seven-league boot, industry is the cobbler. For just as the cobbler fits the boot to the foot, companies like Cyanamid fit knowledge to human needs. Today, for example, 33 different scientific specialties are represented at Cyanamid alone. They range from analytical chemists, who find out what things are made of, to zoologists who determine which animals help man, which ones hurt him, and how.

Between these alphabetical extremes are bacteriologists, electrical engineers, mycologists, pharmacologists, textile engineers and virologists and others. They work in such diverse areas as health, industrial chemicals, dyes and pigments, fibers, resins and plastics.

Today, the scientist is finding that he must know a lot about several specialties to avoid duplicating the work of others. This has led to another alphabet soup of "interdisciplines" starting with astrophysics and biochemistry.

Now where does Johnny fit into science? Everywhere. He can't escape it. As medicine it touches him at the very moment of birth. Under other names, it affects him every day of his life. He studies it in school, and we at Cyanamid hope he will at least consider it as a career. It's exciting, rewarding work and we want to help make sure that Johnny knows it.

It is obvious that whatever benefit Johnny derives from Cyanamid comes primarily from its products and the knowledge generated in their

development. But we're not content to leave it at that. To help Johnny get acquainted with science, with its excitement and humanity as well as its career potential, we ask educators: "Where can Cyanamid help?" In answer, teachers and students sent 12,000 requests for information last year. And Cyanamid sent 12,000 replies.

In addition, Cyanamid has hosted over 200 visits by local schools and college groups to its Central Research Laboratories at Stamford, Connecticut. After visits like these, some students even get to "shadow" a scientist during a half-day's work.

To bring science to the classroom several hundred Cyanamid people visit science clubs and classes to talk with students about science and engineering, and to counsel them if they show an interest.

And like most responsible companies, Cyanamid also comes across with cold cash, three quarters of a million dollars a year to university departments of agriculture, chemistry, chemical engineering and medicine.

Finally, a number of Cyanamid's top scientists have returned to the colleges full time. As professors, department heads and deans, they can draw upon their practical experience in industrial chemistry and administration.

Thanks to scientists and scholars like these, all of us know more than the ancients did. Our knowledge is paying off in greater productivity, less suffering, a longer life. To make sure that Johnny's son enjoys this too, we at Cyanamid are doing our best to see that Johnny knows more than we do.



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


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


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What is it that can travel over water, land, mud and ice and may make the wheel obsolete?

It's been called a "GEM" (for Ground Effect Machine). It's been called a "Hovercraft." It's been called an "Air Cushion Vehicle." And it's a little hard to say whether it flies low or rides high.

But Republic Aviation has just concluded a licensing agreement to develop, produce and sell these revolutionary machines that travel on a cushion of air over any kind of surface, wet or dry.

Gas turbine engines provide air cushion

One of the most publicized GEM's already built has done commuter service on a test basis, carrying 24 passengers across Dee Estuary on Britain's North Wales coast, over sandbars and shoals where no boat could operate. Called the VA-3, it's a 4-engine 12-ton version that can handle about 2 tons of cargo. It

hovers 12 inches over the surface on a cushion of air provided by two of its gas turbine engines, while the other two provide propulsion.

A variety of high-speed go-anywhere craft for industry and the military

Similar but more advanced versions of the GEM are expected to operate easily at speeds over 150 mph. Republic's prototype model will be equipped to ride three feet off the surface to clear waves or obstacles, and further development will produce models that can clear six to eight-foot obstacles. Consider then, what the GEM's capabilities might be . . .


- ☐ As a military landing craft, thundering in from over the horizon and right up onto the beach to park and unload—
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- ☐ As an airport or harbor vehicle for police and rescue work—
- ☐ As a high-speed arctic exploration craft, unhampered by snow or thin ice—
- ☐ As a general-purpose carrier for underdeveloped countries where good roads are few and far too costly.

How big a future

As yet, nobody is entirely sure what the GEM's total potential for the future really is. Finding out is a big part of Republic's job. Considering that it took man some millions of years to discover the wheel—and another 7,000 to learn how to do without it—that could be a pretty sizeable order.



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
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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW



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The Editors.

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POLYCENTRISM AND WESTERN POLICY

By George F. Kennan

MUCH of the discussion in Western countries today of the problem of relations with world Communism centers around the recent disintegration of that extreme concentration of power in Moscow which characterized the Communist bloc in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, and the emergence in its place of a plurality of independent or partially independent centers of political authority within the bloc: the growth, in other words, of what has come to be described as "polycentrism." There is widespread recognition that this process represents a fundamental change in the nature of world Communism as a political force on the world scene; and there is an instinctive awareness throughout Western opinion that no change of this order could fail to have important connotations for Western policy. But just what these connotations are is a question on which much uncertainty and confusion still prevail.

The historical development of the process of polycentrism, particularly as it has manifested itself in the growing differences between the Russian and Chinese Communists, is a subject to which a great deal of careful study has recently been devoted and on which there is already an excellent body of analytical literature. There is no need to attempt to recapitulate here the conclusions—remarkably unanimous, in the circumstances—at which leading scholars have arrived concerning the causes and course of this process. Suffice it to recall that it had its origins, generally speaking, in two great events of the year 1948: the forced defection of the Yugoslavs, and the Communist seizure of power in China. The unity of the bloc never fully recovered from the shock of the Yugoslav defection. Had the Yugoslavs undergone something like a counterrevolution—had they shaken off their own

Communist dictatorship, adopted a form of government which permitted democratic freedoms, and relaxed the governmental hold on the economy to a point where the system would have been no longer classifiable as a Leninist-Marxist one—the effect on bloc unity would have been less; for then the defection could have been regarded simply as the loss of a position to the capitalist world: a regrettable setback but not unprecedented, and no fit cause of doubt or questioning for a movement which had always prided itself on its ability to pocket losses and to recover from them. But when the Yugoslavs failed to do any of these things—when the Yugoslav Communist Party remained in power, and Yugoslavia did not go over to the capitalist camp but carried on much as before, claiming to be a Communist state and talking like one but not recognizing the discipline of the bloc or accepting any political obligations toward it—this was really unsettling for those who had remained faithful; for it raised the appalling question whether monolithic unity and discipline were essential at all to the development of Marxian socialism: whether one could not be a perfectly good Communist without taking orders blindly from Moscow and without following slavishly the pattern of institutions and methods established by the Soviet Union.

And since the strains of Stalinist rule were greater in the more Westernized states of the satellite area of Eastern Europe than in Russia itself, this suggestion—that there might be more than one path to socialism—was particularly insidious in its effect on the satellite régimes. Many were the satellite Communists who, in the years following Tito's break with Stalin, groaned under the necessity of pursuing Stalinist policies obviously unfitted to the traditions and psychology of their country and stole envious looks at the Yugoslavs, who could now cut their cloth to suit their own figure and yet maintain the claim to be good Marxian socialists. It is instructive to reflect that precisely that feature of Yugoslav behavior which so many Americans today find it impossible to forgive, namely, that the Yugoslavs did not, so to speak, "go capitalist," but carried on as a Marxian-socialist state, was the factor which more than any other proved disrupting in its effect on bloc unity.

So long as Stalin remained alive, the effects of the Yugoslav defection could be reasonably well contained by the Moscow headquarters. But after his death, this proved no longer possible. The de-Stalinization campaign of the mid-fifties implied at least

a partial justification of Tito's earlier defiance of Stalin's authority. It was awkward, in these circumstances, to leave the Yugoslavs wholly outside the camp; and Khrushchev felt it necessary to try to draw them back again—something which could be done only by conciliatory means. But this, implying as it did at least a willingness to forgive the earlier Yugoslav defiance of bloc discipline, proved unsettling in its effect on the other satellites, particularly the Poles and Hungarians, and had a good deal to do with the events of 1956 in those two countries. For the Polish and Hungarian Communists had to ask themselves: if Tito is to be forgiven and treated with deference, where are the rewards of obedience? Why should not we, too, select our own path?

As for China, rivalry between the Soviet and Chinese Communist régimes was latent from the beginning, but it began to appear on the surface only after Stalin's death; and it was not until 1957 that it began to assume forms which threatened seriously to disturb bloc unity. It is interesting to reflect that it was in part differing reactions to these same events of 1956 that caused the Chinese-Soviet disagreements to become acute. For what the Russians found necessary in absorbing the shock and the lessons of Hungary proved intolerable to the Chinese, whose revolution was in a different stage and who had different political needs. Here is seen how one thing leads to another, how the threads of causality lead on from the original Yugoslav disaffection and the Chinese Communist conquest of China in 1948—the one considered at the time a loss to world Communism, the other a victory—to the polycentrism of today. If there is any lesson in this, it is the demonstration of how poor we all are, even the Communists, at knowing what is a victory and what is a defeat.

We are now confronted with a situation in which what was once a unified and disciplined bloc has disintegrated into something more like an uneasy alliance between two ideologically similar commonwealths: one grouped around the Soviet Union, the other around China. But even that element of order and symmetry which this description would suggest is not complete, because one nominally Communist country, Yugoslavia, is not embraced in either of these alliances, and another, Albania, is nominally and formally embraced in the one (it still belongs to the Warsaw Pact) but is politically closer to the other. And beyond this framework, there are a large number of Communist parties not in power which are greatly torn and bewildered by this divi-

sion; and some of these parties have an important voice in bloc affairs, even though they lack the prestige that comes of being in power in their respective countries.

Barring unforeseen disturbances in international affairs, I think this state of affairs should be expected to endure, in its essential aspects, for a long time. Efforts will be made, of course, at one point or another, to patch up Soviet-Chinese differences and to restore something like the previous unity. The Poles, who have always had a special hankering for close relations with the Chinese Communists, are apt to be particularly assiduous in trying to assuage the Chinese-Soviet differences. Perhaps at some point changes of personalities in Moscow and Peking will help. But such tendencies can scarcely go beyond a point. An attempt to establish either Moscow or Peking as the unchallenged center of the movement would today involve prohibitive strains. Communism has now come to embrace so wide a spectrum of requirements and compulsions on the part of the respective parties and régimes that any determined attempt to re-impose unity on the movement would merely cause it to break violently apart at one point or another. There can scarcely be any meeting ground today between, say, the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of Italy that would not be disastrous to one or the other.

A complete restoration of unity seems therefore to be out. But a total break, to the point of all-out hostilities and the alliance of one or the other faction with parts of the non-Communist world, seems equally improbable. Excruciating as are the differences which have now developed within the world Communist camp, all of the disputants are aware that they have nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by tearing themselves to pieces. Chinese and Russians, furthermore, are both highly skilled at the delicate gradating of hostilities of every sort; and while it would not be surprising to see at some point the development of armed conflicts along the Soviet-Chinese frontier comparable in seriousness to those that developed between the Russians and the Japanese along the same frontier in 1938, it would be surprising to see them develop, any more than did those of 1938, into a full-fledged state of war between the disputants.

II

While this state of affairs is, then, likely to last for some time in its major outlines, it allows of considerable variation and evolu-

tion in terms of the relations between various Communist countries and the non-Communist world. This is a point of great flux and uncertainty throughout the bloc. Not only do the Chinese-Soviet differences center around disagreements over this point, and not only are there further differences on this score between the Russians and individual satellite states of Eastern Europe, but almost every Communist party in the world is afflicted by sharp internal differences or gradations of opinion along these lines. It is not too much to say that the entire bloc is caught today in a great crisis of indecision over the basic question of the proper attitude of a Communist country toward non-Communist ones. The question is whether to think of the world in terms of an irreconcilable and deadly struggle between all that calls itself Communist and all that does not, a struggle bound to end in the relatively near future with the total destruction of one or both, or to recognize that the world socialist cause can be advanced by more complicated, more gradual, less dramatic and less immediate forms, not necessitating any effort to destroy all that is not Communist within our time, and even permitting, in the meanwhile, reasonably extensive and profitable and durable relations with individual non-Communist countries.

The lines of division of opinion over this issue are by no means clean; very often both viewpoints struggle against each other in the same troubled Communist breast. But this is in essence the question. It is this which is buried under the long ideological arguments as to whether socialism could conceivably, or could not conceivably, be achieved by means that did not involve violent revolution. It is this that underlies the arguments about the inevitability or non-inevitability of war. This is the explosive substance with which the controversial concept of "peaceful co-existence" is charged. And none of us, I am sure, can fail to note that this is only the mirror-replica of the similar question which divides Western public opinion and tortures the policy-makers of the Western countries.

It is important to recognize that the degree to which polycentrism has already advanced means that individual Communist countries now have a far wider area of choice than was the case some years ago in shaping not only their own relationship to the non-Communist world but also their internal institutions and policies. These two things are, in fact, closely connected; for the more internal institutions and policies come to resemble those

that once prevailed in Stalin's Russia and/or prevail today in China, the more one needs a state of apparent tension and danger in external relations, as a means of justifying them. And in both these fields, as I say, the smaller Communist countries, and particularly the Eastern European satellites, now enjoy a far wider range of independent decision than was once the case. At one time there was only one model; today there are a number of them: the Soviet, the Chinese, the Polish, the Yugoslav, etc. And the fact that Moscow and Peking both need the political support of the satellite parties, and are therefore obligated to compete for their favor, means that neither can afford to discipline them, beyond a point, if the paths they choose are not ones that meet with full approval on either side.

On the other hand, the area within which this freedom of choice exists is not unlimited; it has, in fact, certain very sharp limits, and it is important to bear these in mind.

The satellite régimes of Eastern Europe cannot, first of all, sever the bonds of military alliance which united them with the Russians. Jugoslavia, it is true, did this in effect; but one must remember that when this occurred, the Warsaw Pact did not yet exist—nor did the Atlantic Alliance. Further, the Yugoslavs had a very special geographic and political position.

Secondly, the satellite régimes cannot abandon the profession of fidelity to Marxist ideals or the monopoly of power which those ideals imply and purport to justify. To do anything like this would be to destroy the very theoretical basis on which their power rests, and to commit, in effect, political suicide.

What the satellite régimes *can* do, and are doing to some extent, is to shape their own internal economic and social institutions along more liberal lines, or at least individualistic lines. They can, furthermore, ease the restraints—as the Yugoslavs have done—on all forms of contact and dealings with non-Communist countries and their citizens. As a part of this process, they can resist—as the Rumanians are doing—efforts to pull them into a tight and exclusive trading association with other Communist countries; and they can insist on the right to expand their trade with non-Communist nations to a point where it constitutes an important element in their economic development.

Finally, while they cannot leave the Communist military alliance, the satellite régimes could, conceivably, if conditions were right, help to deëmphasize the military factor to a point where it

would not stand in the way of at least a partial political rapprochement with some of their Western neighbors.

Altogether, then, the choices open to the satellite régimes cover a range which lies somewhere between the extremes of the full independence of the Yugoslavs on the one hand, and a slavish, timid clinging to Soviet patterns and authority on the other. This is a circumscribed range of choice; but what they do within it is by no means unimportant. It could, conceivably, make all the difference between a Communist orbit with which the West could coexist peacefully and without catastrophe over an indefinite time, and one with which it could not.

III

Now the West has it in its power, ideally speaking, to influence extensively, by its own policies and behavior, the choices that the satellite régimes make in this connection. It can reciprocate or fail to reciprocate moves to relax tensions and to facilitate collaboration in various fields. It can shape its policies in such a way as to create advantages and premiums for efforts on the part of the satellite governments to extend their relations with Western countries; or it can decline to create such advantages. It can exert itself to deëmphasize the military factor in the mutual relationship; or it can take the opposite course. Finally, and of overriding significance, it can show itself reconciled to the existence of these régimes, without accepting responsibility for them; and it can convey to them that they have nothing to fear from it if they will only refrain, themselves, from hostile and subversive policies; or it can hold to the thesis that its object is to overthrow them, and permit them to conclude that any concessions they may make will only be exploited, ultimately, to their disadvantage.

Obviously, in the totality of these choices, the West is confronted by a pervasive and fundamental problem of policy: whether to promote a trend toward further polycentrism, in the hope that there might prove to be a portion of the Communist world with which one could, in the long run, contrive to live, and that living with it and encouraging it to see advantages in a situation of coexistence might tend at least to narrow the area and power of that other portion with which one could not live, or could not *yet* live; or whether to discourage that trend, on the theory that a differentiation of outlook and authority among Communist powers does not materially affect their status as a

threat to the security of the Western peoples, and that the impression of such a differentiation serves merely to disorient and demoralize Western resistance to the phenomenon of world Communism as a whole. This is the question facing Western policymakers; and there can in my opinion be no doubt that the trend of political decision within the Communist world will be importantly influenced by the answers they find to it. It could well be argued, in fact, that if the major Western powers had full freedom of movement in devising their own policies, it would be within their power to determine whether the Chinese view, or the Soviet view, or perhaps a view more liberal than either, would ultimately prevail within the Communist camp.

Fortunately, or unfortunately, the major Western powers do not enjoy this full freedom of movement. In the case particularly of the United States and Western Germany, but also to some extent of the NATO powers in general, the area in which they could conceivably meet the problem of policy posed by the trend toward Communist polycentrism has been severely circumscribed in recent years either by engagements they have undertaken to one another or to parties outside of Europe or by policies to which they have so deeply committed themselves that any early renunciation of them would scarcely be feasible. A glance at their position with relation to the various points of flexibility in the position of the satellite régimes will suffice to demonstrate this.

If it is a question of alteration of the internal institutions and policies of the satellite régimes, it is evident, on the example of Yugoslavia, that neither the United States Congress nor the West German Government is inclined to attach importance to this factor. The Yugoslavs have abolished forced collectivization. They have adopted a system of management in industry fundamentally different from that prevailing in the Soviet Union. They have practically abandoned the active application of police terror. They have adopted policies on travel, contacts with foreigners and access to foreign informational media which seem closer to those of most Western countries than to those prevalent in the bloc. It is evident that none of this constitutes, in the eyes of our own Congress or of a great part of our public, any reason to treat Yugoslavia greatly differently from any other Communist country. A similar disposition seems to prevail in Bonn, if only as a reflection of the Hallstein doctrine, which bars diplomatic relations with any country recognizing the present East German

régime. Since all of the satellites do recognize it, they are obliged to see in this doctrine at least a limitation to the possibilities of any future political rapprochement between themselves and the German Federal Republic.

When it comes to economic policy, a similar situation prevails. There are the NATO arrangements for economic controls. There are the various legislative restrictions prevailing in this country. There is, finally, the Common Market, established and being developed on principles that appear to leave no room for anything like the eventual economic reunification of the European Continent. It will be recalled that in the original Marshall Plan concept, American policy-makers were careful to leave open the possibility of the extension of the respective arrangements to the entire Continent, and to phrase the proposals in such a way that if the Eastern European régimes were to be excluded, they would have to exclude themselves, which, in effect, they then did. But the European Common Market has failed to include this feature either in letter or in spirit; and the impression is being given to the Eastern Europeans, including the Yugoslavs, that whatever may be the future of this novel and important entity, they are to have no place in it.

When it comes to the military factor and the question of its emphasis or deëmphasis, the bald fact is that the Western powers, over a period that now runs back for several years, have committed themselves more and more deeply against anything in the nature of a military disengagement in Europe. Not only do they reject the possibility of any extensive withdrawal of foreign troops from the Western part of the Continent, even if this were to be by way of reciprocation for a similar withdrawal of Soviet forces, but they appear to have set their face, in present circumstances, against anything in the nature of a European pact or a nonaggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact members. They are also averse to any sort of arrangement for the de-nuclearization of the European area, even, again, if this were to be on a reciprocal basis. Finally, they have exhibited no very convincing evidence of any disposition to place effective limits on the rearmament of Western Germany, where one restriction after the other, established in earlier years, has quietly gone by the board, and where the Germans are now, in the view of everybody in Eastern Europe, well on the way to becoming in all essential respects a full-fledged nuclear power. Yet at the

same time the Western powers, with the exception of the French, have been unwilling to recognize the finality of Germany's eastern frontiers; and the West German Government, with the blessing of the others, still pursues a policy of total irreconcilability toward the East German state.

These aspects of Western policy are not mentioned for the purpose of taking issue with them. Opinions can differ on the degree of their justification, individually or collectively. But even those who are enthusiastic about them should remember that there is a price to be paid for them in terms of their political effect on the Communist bloc. To the East European satellite leaders, faced with these attitudes, and noting the extreme rigidity with which they are adhered to by the Western governments, anything like a deëmphasis of the military factor in East-West relations can only appear today as discouragingly remote. In present circumstances, they can hope neither for the removal of Soviet forces from those Eastern European positions which they now occupy, nor for any further East-West agreements that could take the heat off military tensions. Particularly discouraging and disturbing to them is the progressive rearmament of Western Germany against the background of a West German commitment to the liberation of Eastern Germany, even though that commitment professes to envisage only peaceful means. The effect which the combination of these two things has had on the feelings of people in Eastern Europe cannot be emphasized too strongly. Either one without the other might have been less unacceptable. A strong commitment to the reunification of Germany might have been tolerable if it had not been supported by a military policy designed to make Western Germany into one of the two strongest states in Western Europe. Or a rearmament of Western Germany, while never fully defensible in East European eyes, might have been more tolerable if it had been coupled with a greater readiness on the part of West German political leaders to *faire bonne mine à mauvais jeu*, to accept the existence of a Communist Germany at least as a regrettable necessity of the present epoch, and to regard the cause of German unification less as a programmatical commitment and more as an historical inevitability, to be left to the healing hand of time. But the spectre of the violent liberation of Eastern Germany, by means not resting on any agreement with the Russians, and coming either against the background of, or by means of, a revived German military ascendancy, unites both

governments and peoples in Eastern Europe in a common reaction of horror and apprehension; for the Communist leaders there, however little they may like or respect Ulbricht, know that their own stability would not easily withstand the shock of the sudden and violent overthrow of his régime; and the peoples of Eastern Europe, including the Yugoslavs, see in this eventuality only the beginning of a reëstablishment of the German military ascendancy of unhappy memory throughout Eastern Europe, and 18 years have not been sufficient to allow the horror of this prospect to fade in their minds.

Behind all this, and connected with all of it, is the heavy extent of the Western commitment, and particularly the American and German commitment, to the eventual destruction of Communism generally. We have our Captive Nations Resolution; and the satellite régimes of Eastern Europe and Asia are specifically listed there as ones we have committed ourselves in effect to destroy. In the Far East, there is our similar commitment to the Nationalist Government on Taiwan, with all its far-reaching political ambitions. And Western opinion, not just in the NATO countries but in certain of the neutral European countries as well, is heavily affected by attitudes which are at least skeptical toward, and in some cases strongly averse to, any thought of an accommodation to the permanency of Communist power anywhere.

It is true that the West European NATO governments are in a somewhat better position to face this problem than is the United States. They are not committed to the Captive Nations Resolution. There is no formal reason why they should not, if they wished, shape the policies of the Common Market in such a way as to give to the Eastern European peoples a more reassuring impression of the prospects for their future relation to Western Europe in the economic field. In the case of export controls and other restrictive measures, the degree of their responsibility is obviously smaller than ours; and it would, presumably, be easier for them to take a more conciliatory line. Particularly is all this true of the Italians, whose understanding attitude has already helped to ease Yugoslavia's delicate relations with the West, and who, more than any other Western people, have possibilities for exerting a reassuring and helpful influence on the East European satellites. But further north, the German problem and the aversion to any discussion of disengagement still

loom up on the horizon of the Eastern Europeans as impassable barriers to anything like such a lowering of tensions as would make it possible for them to create a basically new political relationship with the West; and for both of these situations, as they well know, Western Europeans are as responsible as ourselves.

It is clear, in these circumstances, that the West has, as of today, only limited possibilities for reciprocating any disposition the satellite countries might evince to reduce the dichotomy of the two worlds and to bridge the gap that divides present attitudes on both sides from the possibility of truly peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence. It is in a sense tragic that this should be the case just at a time when there is so great a longing for a better East-West relationship in the hearts of tens of millions of ordinary people in the East European area, and so important a willingness to move tentatively in this direction even on the part of certain of their Communist leaders. And the fact that things are this way is something which should give pause for thought not just to those who would like to find ways of living peacefully with Communist neighbors but even to those who can contemplate no permanent reconciliation with world Communism; for to deny to the East even the possibility of the development of a better framework for coexistence is to affect the terms of the argument which goes on within the Communist camp and to forego the advantage which a division of opinion there provides. If there is really strength in unity, Communist leaders can only be grateful for a Western policy which slights the values of polycentrism and declines to encourage them; for a rigidly unreceptive Western attitude may eventually enforce upon the bloc a measure of unity which, by their own unaided effort, they could never have achieved.

To say that the West is in a poor position to encourage polycentrism is not, of course, to say that it will not continue to develop. There are instances in which, as in the case of Yugoslavia, the desire for national independence may be so strong that governments will wish for, and seek, relief from the disciplinary strictures of the bloc even if there is no apparent place for them, or even for good relations with them, in the Western scheme of things; and it is not to be assumed that they will find no means of achieving that relief. The West, after all, does not represent the entirety of the non-Communist world. There are other areas where the trauma of the conflict with world Communism have

struck less deeply and where both the readiness to forget or ignore ideological differences and the willingness to look at international relations in terms other than those of military conflict will be greater; and people who feel the need of more independence of policy but see no place for themselves in the vision of Western statesmanship can look, as the Yugoslavs are already doing, in other directions for the alternative to isolation.

Polycentrism may thus continue to develop, in spite of, if not because of, the face which the West turns to the troubled and vacillating world of Communism. But there are risks involved here. There is a relatively short-term risk, from the standpoint of the danger of war and of the effect which an absence of polycentrism could have in increasing that danger. But even if military complications do not ensue, there is still the long-term question of the effect on the minds of those tens of millions of people in Communist countries who still look to the West with longing and with hope and who expect from it policies which take account of all the subtlety and contradiction of their position. If such a response on the Western side is not forthcoming, who can say how this will affect their attitudes in the more distant future? Will they be best influenced by a Western policy which, through its quixotic commitment to a highly unlikely violent liberation, appears to condemn them by implication either to the miseries of a new world war or to an indefinite further period of languishing under oppressive Communist régimes? Or will they be better influenced by a Western policy which accepts as its goal the less ambitious but more promising prospect of a relaxation of the severity of those régimes and, by the same token, of the barriers that separate their peoples from contact with the outside world? This is a question which Western policy-makers will do well to look at all over again, as the Chinese-Soviet conflict proceeds and as its effects continue to make themselves felt.

In the nineteenth century, the colonial mother-countries of the West alienated many millions of people in other parts of the world through lack of imagination and feeling toward those who were in effect within their power. There is, surely, a danger lest history record that Westerners of the twentieth century alienated just as many more through lack of imagination and feeling toward those who were in the power of their ideological adversaries.

DÉTENTE THROUGH FIRMNESS

By Kai-Uwe von Hassel

SOME 15 years ago the editor of this journal wrote that “the present risk of war seems to me to come chiefly from allowing the world to continue in a twilight zone where one side assumes that collective security exists and the other counts on taking advantage of the fact that it does not.”¹ At that time, the United Nations had disappointed many people in their belief that the provisions of the Charter, and in particular the powers attributed to the Security Council, would not only be a means of bringing the world powers together around the conference table but would also help to create the collective instrument of a U.N. Force which would be able to bring to bear the wish of all mankind for peace.

At that time—some 15 years ago and three years after the establishment of the United Nations—the possible failure of such effort was already the subject of discussion. The essential element of the measures envisaged to ensure peace, the establishment of an effective system of collective security capable of taking rapid and unanimous action, has remained a field without crop. Since this fact was generally recognized, nations reverted to the means of individual self-defense with no collective concept. The abuse of the right of veto by the Soviet Union within the Security Council gave rise to those considerations which eventually resulted in regional military alliances. Under these alliances, NATO has since outgrown the framework of a purely military assistance pact and has given birth to a political community. It has succeeded in eliminating the twilight with regard to the problem of security, has maintained peace in Europe and established close links across the Atlantic.

Nevertheless, an uneasiness similar to that of 15 years ago can now be observed among the public. Questions are being asked as to whether we may continue to rely on the idea of an Atlantic Defense Community for the next 15 years. People no longer seem to listen to President John F. Kennedy’s words: “Our commitment to Europe is indispensable—in our interest as well as yours.” They are questioning the value of further defense efforts, now that the door seems to be open for a policy of détente over years

¹ “Coalition for Peace,” by Hamilton Fish Armstrong. *Foreign Affairs*, October 1948, p. 13.

to come. All warnings against illusions concerning the importance of the first steps made in the direction of a détente would appear to be thrown to the wind—steps which on the way to assured peace without armament may in fact be compared to the depth of a furrow in relation to the distance to the center of the earth. There is a risk that the withdrawal of one single American soldier from NATO's front in Central Europe may be judged equal in importance to the withdrawal of a full battalion. The possibility of flying a full division with all its personnel in five days from Texas to Heidelberg is considered merely as a preliminary to re-deploying five divisions back from Heidelberg to Texas.

It stands to reason that mankind's ardent desire for peace by détente and its fear of war caused by weakness raise questions of security and freedom at a time when it is neither possible as yet to satisfy that desire nor to remove the fear. The governments will have to ensure that the instrument of collective security forged by the free world is not only keen-edged but also recognized as such by the enemy. No doubt whatsoever must remain as to our determination to defend ourselves.

The German Federal Government's position with regard to the problems of détente and security was outlined once more, last October, in a programmatic statement by the new Federal Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, and his government. It can be summarized in three theses, as follows:

1. For the foreseeable future, and as long as controlled general disarmament is mere wishful thinking, the NATO Alliance will remain the basis of all efforts to maintain freedom and territorial integrity. The geographical situation of the Federal Republic of Germany and her outpost, Berlin, in the heart of Europe precludes any policy of isolation. In view of the magnitude of the threat, this is especially true in the field of defense, but it also applies to political, cultural and economic life as a whole. The high density of population and the economic structure of the Federal Republic necessitate a close and firm association with her neighbors and her participation in world trade, in order to ensure prosperity and set free the resources required for the execution of important tasks such as development aid.

2. The promotion of solidarity of the free peoples is of vital importance to the Federal Republic. Germany's partial renunciation of sovereignty in the establishment of a European Market or in the integration of all her operational military formations under

NATO command are in keeping with the mandate of the German Constitution and are based on the conviction that policy should proceed ahead of human emotions wherever science and the evolution of technology have already marked a wider sphere for coöperation among peoples. Consequently, the Federal Government considers it to be its mission to promote close links between North America and Europe, between Great Britain and the European continent and—as a basis for the political integration of Europe—close friendship between France and Germany.

3. All efforts to improve the political structure of the world and to strengthen security in Europe must proceed from the recognition of the fact that the division of Germany is one of the most serious causes of tension and insecurity. If a détente in the relations between East and West is to be more than a mere pause in the cold war, that particular cause of tension must be removed.

II

On the occasion of the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, President Kennedy said: "It will not resolve all conflicts or cause the Communists to forget their ambitions or eliminate the dangers of war. It will not reduce our need for arms or allies, our programs of assistance to others." The Test Ban Treaty may prove to be a step—an initial step—toward world-wide peace. But experience gained to date in dealings with the Soviets shows that they have held out a gleam of hope for a world of peace without armament only when the West appeared resolved to make sacrifices in order to safeguard its future and not to rely on promises. During the past 11 years, we have seen that whenever free Europe was about to take decisive steps in the interest of its integration and defense, a note from the Soviets was received by which the Kremlin attempted to dissuade free Europe from this course of action, one which, apparently, was disagreeable to the Soviets. This may be illustrated by two examples.

First: On February 8, 1952, the German Bundestag had approved, in principle, a German defense contribution within the framework of a European Community in order to enhance decisively the European defense capability. Only four weeks later, on March 10, 1952, the Soviet Union offered negotiations on a German peace treaty. This offer, the first since the end of the war, was designed to dissuade us from joining a European Community and, indeed, to prevent the creation of a European Defense Com-

munity as such. As soon as the E.D.C. Treaty had been turned down by the French Parliament at the end of August 1954, Moscow saw no reason to dispatch any further notes dealing with the fate of Europe. From their point of view, the danger was over.

Second: On June 6, 1956, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. dispatched messages on the disarmament problem to the Western governments, informing them of the Soviet decision to reduce the personnel strength of their forces by 1.2 million. This happened precisely at the moment when a law introducing compulsory military service in the Federal Republic of Germany, intended to serve as a basis for a German defense contribution, was the subject of heated discussions among the German political parties. In spite of the Soviet overtures, this law was passed by the Bundestag on July 7, 1956.

Soviet policy was never designed to promote peace in Europe by reconciliation and agreement. The thesis that an adversary's weakness calls for a policy of strength is not typically a Soviet concept; on the other hand, there is no reason to assume that Moscow is in the habit of acting on the opposite principle and that, according to normal human experience, it must be possible for the West to obtain Soviet concessions by submitting a series of offers of appeasement. Whoever attempts to eliminate or at least restrict the trouble spots throughout the world must be vigilant and able to reject decisively any abuse of good will. This is especially true as far as we are concerned. In a time of peace and with bureaucratic arbitrariness or cold deliberation, the Soviets obstruct the free movement of Allied troops to West Berlin; within their sphere of influence, they tolerate a régime which prevents people from traveling from one part of Germany to the other and which erects a wall through the midst of a city. The Soviets demonstrate in Germany that they attach greater importance to the expansion of the Communist system than to the establishment of normal conditions under which a people would be free to choose its own political and social structure. As long as this attitude remains unchanged, we cannot relax our vigilance.

III

In the past 15 years, the most important change in the balance among the world powers has been brought about by the development of nuclear weapons. Today security and stability throughout the world depend primarily on the extent and characteristics

of both the American and the Soviet nuclear capabilities. The Test Ban Treaty may well slow down the race for new and still newer rockets and warheads. However, it will not reverse an evolution by which the fate of the world has been placed in the hands of those powers who are in possession of nuclear weapons.

Thus the security of the partners to the Atlantic Alliance is inseparably linked to the security of the Great Nuclear Power on the North American Continent. Defense in Western Europe will only be credible, today and in future, if it is supported by the strength of the United States. On the other hand, the national defense of the United States will fulfill its mission, today and in the future, only if it can rely on the determined will of its partners for defense. Europe cannot accept the loss of America any more than America will be able to survive, uninjured, a conflict with the Communist world should Europe be abandoned.

The rational realization that war should no longer be a means of policy must not obscure recognition of the fact that the balance of horror, with its deterrence from military risks and adventures, has hitherto assured peace and will probably have to assure peace in the future as well. It was a wise decision on the part of the United States to propose to its European Allies the establishment of a nuclear force on a truly multilateral basis as regards the possession and control of nuclear weapons. This proposal has repeatedly been interpreted as an attempt to meet the German wish for participation in consultations and decisions on the use of nuclear weapons, but to refuse Germany the right of actually using such weapons under her own national responsibility. These comments are well known in Germany, but they reflect a very narrow outlook. The decisive aspect of the project for a Multilateral Force is the chance it offers to make the use of nuclear weapons a common Allied responsibility. This objective may be remote at present. But the negotiations indicate wider possibilities of political and military coöperation within the Alliance.

Of course, the Multilateral Force concept does not solve all the problems encountered as regards the solidarity of the Alliance and the defense of Europe and North America, but it was never intended to do so. NATO, for instance, has not yet found an answer to the question how the increasing threat to Europe posed by Soviet M.R.B.M.s can be countered. Although the Multilateral Force alone could not cope with this military problem, it could well satisfy part of the military requirements for

M.R.B.M.s. The Multilateral Force as a whole would constitute a substantial military capacity. Its major importance, however, would be its political aspect. It would provide an additional political link between the European and American partners to the Alliance. Its close interlacing with the nuclear potential of the United States would result in strengthening the deterrent on the one hand, and establishing strong ties between Europe and America on the other. This is its definite advantage as compared to other concepts which envisage a European nuclear force. In my opinion, the establishment of a European nuclear force of this kind would be more likely to slacken than to strengthen the ties between Europe and the United States. It has become apparent, with greater clarity than a few years ago, that Western Europe cannot assume a truly European responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons before it has become a political entity; in other words, it can assume this responsibility only after unification, *i.e.* after the careful and gradual integration of national sovereignty in a political community. Today there is no alternative to the American proposal of a multilateral force which would take into account the present possibilities of nuclear partnership while leaving the door open to political development into a partnership on a more comprehensive basis.

The existence of nuclear weapons has confronted the Alliance with a political task. It is true the Soviet protests against even mere negotiations on the Multilateral Force are not sufficient evidence, in themselves, that the Multilateral Force constitutes an appropriate solution. One thing, however, is quite clear: the policy of establishing even closer links between the interests of the nuclear powers and those of the other partners to the Alliance will strengthen the Alliance as a whole. Although nuclear weapons, due to their very nature, make it rather difficult to overcome the disparity of interests, the solidarity of the Alliance and its firmly integrated defense system leave the Soviet Union no room for a policy of *divide et impera*. This solidarity forms the basis of military stability in Central Europe. The ability to deter an enemy from making an attack must not be reduced by the creation of a twilight zone in which he might doubt whether the collective security system would actually operate.

It must remain the aim of any type of defense policy to maintain deterrence from military aggression of any kind whatsoever. This should be borne in mind whenever the West considers the

problem of how its future burden of defense could be borne efficiently, shared justly and nevertheless kept to a minimum. Deterrence requires not only determination to meet any type of aggression—small-scale or full-scale, limited or general—with the appropriate means; it requires not only that suitable military means be available; it also requires a flexibility which prevents the enemy from calculating our reaction in advance. NATO must be capable of employing nuclear weapons under conditions where their use is not a sign of despair, but is governed by military and political considerations. This does not mean to say that the employment of nuclear weapons should be the rule. But any evident lack of resolution on the part of the West might prove disastrous and signify complete failure of the deterrent.

On the other hand, flexibility presupposes the capability of settling minor local conflicts without recourse to nuclear weapons, and of reacting adequately even in those stages of a conflict where the aggressor's ultimate aims cannot as yet be clearly recognized. According to the opinion apparently prevailing today, a comprehensive Soviet attack against North America and Europe may be considered rather unlikely in present conditions, since NATO's nuclear retaliation would constitute too great a risk for the aggressor. Hence, correspondingly greater importance attaches to the problem of ensuring the deterrence against other types of aggression, such as regional aggression.

Deterrence must be credible against any kind and type of attack. The enemy must be fully aware that he cannot escape from the deterrent effect of large nuclear weapons by employing limited means to achieve limited objectives, and that any attempt to do so is just as certain to fail as a full-scale attack. The scale of deterrence will be complete only if the enemy knows that he has no chance of success at any level of combat, that is to say, regardless of whether his attack is on an infantry battalion on the Elbe or against the full nuclear capacity of the United States. He must know that he—and not the West—is the one who has to fear the scale of deterrence.

The theoretic concept of the "trip-wire strategy" is certainly a method of illustrating the coöperation and interdependence of the conventional and nuclear components of the Allied armed forces. It indicates that strategic nuclear weapons are either sufficient to deter an enemy from any kind of aggression whatsoever or, at least, to put an end to a conflict where the deterrent effect

fails due to lack of credibility that heavy weapons will be employed in a minor conflict. However, the assumptions on which this theory is based are not in keeping with the actual situation in Europe, which demonstrates with particular clarity that territorial integrity is of vital importance to every member of the Alliance. The philosophy of defense, therefore, must not be based on the mobilization or moving forward of troops over large distances during the initial stages of an armed conflict, but must provide a means of countering any type of aggression immediately. Our combat area is too limited in depth to permit the strategic deployment of land and air forces over large areas, whereas the enemy's position in Europe in this respect is unfortunately far superior to ours. The only means of effectively compensating for this shortcoming consists in the presence of sufficiently strong military forces, if the necessary flexibility of decision in the fields of politics and defense is to be ensured.

Operations such as the air transport manoeuvre "Big Lift" have, of course, given rise to speculation as to whether modern means of transport would make it possible to react so quickly in the event of tension or aggression that the permanent stationing of substantial United States forces on the European continent might become superfluous. Nevertheless—however impressive this increase in mobility of the U.S. forces, however important this augmentation of over-all defense readiness may be—solutions of this kind will never be able to overcome some of their inherent weaknesses. Air transport, too, requires time. This time factor will grow in proportion to the distance to be bridged and the number of units and equipment to be transported. Today, one hour may have the same importance for the outcome of an armed conflict as a full day had in former times, since the progress of technology will support not only the defender but the aggressor as well. The air transport capacity will depend both on the availability of suitable airfields and on weather conditions. Air transport, therefore, is less mobile and flexible than might be suggested by the sight of a transport squadron taking to the air. The practical value of air transport is, unfortunately, further reduced by its vulnerability not only to adverse weather conditions but also to enemy activities. All in all, air transport is a very suitable complement to the instruments of politics and strategy in times of tension, but it is unable to replace operational formations, ready for action. The enemy's plans might be designed to start an attack at the very

moment when air transport encounters the greatest difficulties and when the weather, although favorable to the enemy, is adverse to the reinforcement by air of the NATO forces in Europe.

The strategic consequences resulting from the actual situation in Europe have led to the development of the so-called "Forward Strategy," designed to cover the entire spectrum of possible enemy aggressions. It calls for highly mobile forces which will conduct the defense as near as possible to the Iron Curtain, with means commensurate to the attack and able to smash very limited enemy actions in the area without resort to nuclear weapons. This concept is conclusive evidence of the fact that the defense capability in Europe has been strengthened. Even in cases where genuine integration was not possible, permanent coöperation in the military field has been beneficial to the Alliance. Due to the increasing defense contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany, the concept of forward defense can now be realized. For the Federal Republic, this means that 50 percent more of its population and 60 percent more of its territory will be directly protected by NATO. The plans for the establishment of a German Territorial Reserve are also incorporated in the over-all concept of forward strategy.

In this context, due account is taken of the fundamental fact that reserves in the European theater can be of value in the decisive initial phase of a conflict only if they can be rapidly brought to maximum readiness in advance during periods of tension. Within the framework of territorial defense, the Territorial Reserve is designed to relieve the NATO-assigned forces of combat missions in the rear area. The reserve units will consist of fully trained soldiers assigned as reservists—in the manner of a militia—to the Territorial Reserve for a period of three years. The tasks devolving upon these units will be contingent upon the operations of the NATO forces. No operations will, therefore, be conducted on a national basis, independent of NATO.

IV

During the past 15 years, the problem of collective security has become more and more complicated and has called for ever-increasing personal and financial sacrifices. However, the outlook on future problems and burdens should not prevent us from recognizing that collective security within NATO has become more credible. We have every reason to recall the achievements

of the past, especially the immense common efforts which have been successful in maintaining peace in Europe; and there is no indication whatsoever that the best means of securing peace for the future would be to give up the concept of military vigilance and replace it by an easygoing political attitude. One of the main difficulties in discussing publicly the ways and means to secure a better future is the fact that the terms "détente" and "relaxation of the political atmosphere" are not clear and lack substance. Each side can attribute a different meaning to the terms.

A détente is not of value *per se*; it will be of value only if it helps facilitate the solution of political problems which have cropped up in a network of jealousy, suspicion and conflicting interests. Only if we succeed in disentangling this intricate complex of factors can the détente be ensured. In other words, a large number of agreements signed by an even larger number of leading political personalities is, in itself, no guarantee for the stabilization and maintenance of peace. Anyone attempting to formulate already existing commitments—*e.g.* that of nonaggression—into new agreements or declarations will not prepare the ground for a substantial strengthening of security. The mere attempt to formulate offers which may satisfy the other side will never open the door for peace.

Projects for a nonaggression pact between NATO and the member states of the Warsaw Pact or for the exchange of nonaggression declarations are of questionable practical value. They cannot promote a genuine détente. NATO is a defensive alliance; and it would be paradox if the value of NATO's basic defensive concept, which has been incorporated in the respective agreements and put into practice in the organization of the armed forces, were diminished by the conclusion of special arrangements on nonaggression. Arrangements of that kind would introduce altogether new aspects. The very idea of connecting the two terms "NATO" and "Warsaw Pact" implies a distortion of perspective. The North Atlantic Alliance was the answer to a Soviet policy of aggression in the years following the war. An instrument of collective security had to be created because the hopes for peace had been frustrated when Soviet policy had recourse to violence to extend the Communist sphere of influence. The reasons underlying the creation of the Warsaw Pact were entirely different. It was concluded on May 14, 1955, one day before Austria was given the treaty terminating Soviet military occupation. The

underlying purpose was to establish a new legal basis for the stationing of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, since the old legal basis no longer existed once the Austrian Treaty became effective.

It is easy to understand why the Soviets foster the project of a nonaggression pact as a political argument. They hope that there might be potent powers in the West which would consider a nonaggression pact sufficient evidence that the danger of a military conflict was thereby banished. This could confer the impression that the aims of Soviet policy had changed and that, therefore, a reduction of defense efforts was justifiable.

Any attempt to arrive at a *détente* by concluding a nonaggression pact would probably only result in Moscow winning the next round in world politics. The Soviets have recognized that they will not achieve a permanent expansion of the Communist system and eventually world domination by a policy of brandishing shoes, threatening Berlin and using Cuba to provoke a crisis. In fact, all they achieved with their "policy of strength" was to increase the efforts of the West; the defense capacity of the U.S. forces in Germany and of the German armed forces was doubled during the last three years. This is probably the reason why Moscow is now advocating a *détente*, friendly relations, exchanges of notes and conferences. The West is to be persuaded to feel secure on the assumption that the world is free of threats. That is one side of world politics of today. The other side, however, consists of insults and threats against those who are willing to make sacrifices for their freedom and incomprehensible incidents provoked by stopping convoys on the Autobahn. This second aspect is the one we are faced with in everyday life.

If a *détente* is to pave the way for peace, it must be more than a mere pause in the clash of interests. For more than ten years, Soviet policy has relentlessly insisted on its postulate to recognize the status quo of a Europe under Communist auspices: two German states, an Iron Curtain through the middle of Europe and permanent disharmony in Western Europe. None of these objectives has been abandoned. A *détente* can be achieved once the reasons for tension have been eliminated. As far as Europe is concerned, these reasons are the division of Berlin, the division of Germany and the division of Europe as a whole.

THE PAKISTAN-AMERICAN ALLIANCE

STRESSES AND STRAINS

By Mohammed Ayub Khan

IT is nearly ten years since Pakistan became an ally of the West. In May 1954, Pakistan signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States. Later in that year it became a member of SEATO along with the United States, Britain, France, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. A year later, it joined the Baghdad Pact, another mutual defense organization, with Britain, Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The United States has not joined this organization, but has remained closely associated with it since its inception. In 1958, when Iraq left this pact, it was renamed CENTO (Central Treaty Organization): it continued to comprise Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as its regional members. Early in 1959, Pakistan signed (as did Turkey and Iran) a bilateral Agreement of Coöperation with the United States, which was designed further to reinforce the defensive purposes of CENTO.

Thus Pakistan is associated with the United States through not one, but four mutual security arrangements. In this sense, it has been sometimes termed "America's most allied ally in Asia." It is the only Asian country which is a member both of SEATO and CENTO.

The strategic location of Pakistan is of some significance in this connection. West Pakistan borders on the Middle East, is close to Soviet Russia's southern frontier and shares a common border with China. It stands across the great mountain passes through which all land invasions of the Indian sub-continent have taken place in recorded history. East Pakistan, on the other hand, borders on Burma. Thus West Pakistan and East Pakistan flank India on her northwest and on her northeast. So situated, Pakistan virtually constitutes a defensive shield for India. It constitutes also the gateway to South Asia. It should therefore be in the interest of world peace, particularly of India's security, that Pakistan remain strong and stable.

Nevertheless, Pakistan came in for bitter criticism from India when she joined these purely defensive alliances. India charged that by so doing "Pakistan had brought the cold war to the sub-

continent." The real purpose of this Indian outcry became clearer, however, as time advanced, and more particularly when in 1959 Pakistan signed the bilateral Agreement of Coöperation. According to this agreement, the United States would under certain circumstances assist Pakistan if she became the victim of aggression. India demanded and, according to Mr. Nehru, received a "specific assurance" from Washington that this pact "could not be used against India."¹ Shorn of sophistry, this demand amounted to seeking an assurance that if India should commit aggression against Pakistan or threatened Pakistan's security, the United States would not come to the assistance of Pakistan under this pact. There could not be a more illuminating commentary on India's historic attitude toward Pakistan.

This attitude also explains why India has throughout opposed the grant of military aid to Pakistan. It is not that she feared that Pakistan—a fifth her size and with armed forces a quarter the size of hers—would, through the kind of military aid program the United States contemplated, become a serious military threat to India. In actual fact the military aid to Pakistan was designed to give it merely a deterrent force. Even with the aid, the armed forces of Pakistan were not to be more than one-third of India's strength before her border clashes with China. Therefore, Pakistan could not possibly pose any threat to India.

The real reason behind India's opposition to Pakistan's receiving military aid was a combination of several factors, including the bitter opposition of the Hindu community to the very creation of Pakistan, India's refusal to honor her solemn pledges in respect of Jammu and Kashmir, and India's desire to dominate what she considers to be her own sphere of influence in Asia.

I have spoken of India's hostility to Pakistan's alliance with the United States. She resorted also to direct pressure to prevent Pakistan from joining it. In August 1953, after bilateral negotiations lasting over some months, Mr. Nehru and Mr. Mohammad Ali, Pakistan's Prime Minister at that time, issued a joint communiqué on Kashmir. In it, they agreed, *inter alia*, that: "It was their firm opinion that this [Kashmir dispute] should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State. . . . The most feasible way of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by fair and impartial plebiscite." Further, "it was decided that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed by the end of April

¹ Speaking in the Indian Parliament, March 14, 1959.

1954. . . . He will then make such proposals as he thinks proper for preparations to be made for the holding of a fair and impartial plebiscite in the entire State and take such other steps as may be considered necessary therefor."

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Nehru got wind of the fact that Pakistan was likely to enter into an alliance with the United States and receive military aid from that country. In a protracted correspondence with Mr. Mohammad Ali, he protested strongly and indicated that if Pakistan went ahead with that project, their agreement on Kashmir would lapse.² Mr. Mohammad Ali replied that he did not see why any military assistance that Pakistan might receive from the United States for purely defensive purposes should make it less imperative for them to improve India-Pakistan relations by settling the Kashmir dispute. In particular, he did not see why, if Pakistan joined an alliance with the United States, this would disqualify the people of Kashmir from exercising their right—which the United Nations, India and Pakistan had acknowledged—to a free vote to decide whether their state should accede to India or Pakistan.

In December of that year—although Pakistan had not by then either entered into any pact with the United States or received any military assistance—Mr. Nehru indicated that he could not go forward with the agreements set out in the joint communiqué on Kashmir, because "the whole context in which these agreements were made will change if military aid comes [to Pakistan] from America."³ Obviously Pakistan could not allow Mr. Nehru to dictate her foreign policy. In May 1954, Pakistan went ahead with the signing of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States. From that point on, the fact that the Indian Prime Minister would repudiate the joint communiqué on Kashmir became a foregone conclusion. Pakistan's efforts to save it eventually collapsed when the Prime Ministers met for the last time in May 1955.

In that same year the alliance with the United States came

² "We, in India, have endeavored to follow a foreign policy which we feel is not only in the interests of world peace but is particularly indicated for the countries of Asia. That policy is an independent one and of non-alignment with any power bloc. It is clear that the policy which Pakistan intends to pursue is different. . . . It means that Pakistan is tied up in a military sense with the U.S.A. and is aligned to that particular group of powers. . . . This produces a qualitative change in the existing situation and, therefore, it affects Indo-Pakistan relations, and, more especially, the Kashmir problem." (Mr. Nehru's letter of December 21, 1953, to the Pakistan Prime Minister.)

³ Statement in the Indian Parliament, December 23, 1953.

under heavier pressure. The Soviet Union reacted when, in 1955, Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact (now called CENTO). Up to that time, the Soviet Union had maintained a neutral stand on the Kashmir dispute. Its representatives had abstained from voting whenever this issue came up in the Security Council. The Soviet Union charged that by joining the Baghdad Pact, Pakistan had become a member of "an aggressive Western alliance," and it responded by radically altering its stand on Kashmir. Thenceforth, the Soviet Union began to subscribe to India's claim that no plebiscite was possible or necessary in Kashmir and that Kashmir was an "integral part" of India. In pursuance of this new stand, the Soviet Union has, since then, vetoed every resolution of the Security Council on Kashmir to which India has objected—regardless of its merits. For some time, the Soviet Union's stand was that the Kashmir dispute was being exploited by the Western powers for their own ends and that it would prefer to see it decided through direct negotiations between India and Pakistan, without the intervention of those powers. Last year, the Soviet Union went further. Obviously at the instance of India, it even vetoed the Security Council resolution of June 22, 1962, which, in essence, merely called upon India and Pakistan to settle this dispute through bilateral negotiations.

In contrast, over the last decade, the policies of the United States have undergone a change which has operated progressively to the disadvantage of her ally, Pakistan, vis-à-vis neutral India.

When we first joined the alliance with the United States, neutralism—"non-alignment" as India prefers to call it—was suspect in American eyes. It was in fact regarded as "immoral." It was another name for "playing both sides of the street." Over the years, it has come to assume a mantle of respectability in American eyes. Indeed, some four years ago it gradually began to occupy, in American estimation, a privileged position. The favor of neutral countries began to be actively sought, in some cases in competition against the Soviet Union. In particular, influential American circles began to advocate "massive aid" to India.

At the same time, there grew a feeling among the allies of the United States—not in Pakistan only—that, in a variety of ways, they were being increasingly taken for granted. Gradually, as a result of this change in American thinking, neutral India became the largest recipient by far of American economic aid, while she

continued freely to castigate the United States in the United Nations and outside whenever opportunity offered. Pakistan watched this transformation in American foreign policy with increasing perplexity and dismay.

India regards herself as a big power in Asia. Her eventual aim has been, and still is, to have her sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. The Indian leaders have often stated that their true border extends from the Hindu Kush mountains to the Mekong River, that is to say, wherever the influence of Hinduism has existed in the past. Their earlier friendly overtures to China were based on the hope that there would be an understanding between them and China over their respective spheres of influence in Asia, and that China would recognize and endorse India's claim. They moreover felt that as long as the American influence existed in Asia, the achievement of any such objective would not be possible. That was the reason why India, although accepting aid from the United States, made strenuous efforts to oppose the United States on every major issue in the world forum and elsewhere in order to belittle its prestige and influence. If America lost face before the whole world it did not matter so long as her influence was reduced, if not eliminated altogether, in Asia.

It follows that as soon as India arrives at some sort of settlement with China, she will revert to the traditional policy of eliminating United States influence from Asia. It is for this reason that India's façade of neutrality is still maintained in spite of massive arms aid from the West and close collaboration in the military field. She has retained sufficient flexibility and political freedom to revert to her traditional anti-American policy as soon as circumstances permit. The receipt of arms and economic aid now is not going to make any more difference than the previous supply of military and economic aid made in India's open hostility to the United States.

In the past, if the United States gave economic aid to India we were not against it as such. We were concerned rather over its massiveness and scale. It enabled India to divert her own resources very substantially to the strengthening of her armed forces; she was, in effect, receiving indirect military aid. Our concern arose from the fact that the Indian military build-up was aimed solely against Pakistan. The pronouncements of Indian leaders and the continued massing of India's army on Pakistan's borders clearly suggested this.

Until last fall, however, the policy of the United States continued to distinguish somewhat between a "non-aligned" India and the American ally, Pakistan. Although under a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed in 1951 (reaffirmed in 1958), India also was receiving certain military aid from the United States—without accepting any of the obligations that devolve on an ally—American policy continued generally to maintain, in the matter of *direct* military aid, a substantial difference between an ally and a neutral. An ally was qualified to receive military assistance on a scale that the United States considered justified in the light of that country's obligations under the alliance; a neutral, by and large, was not entitled to receive military aid on any commensurate scale. However, this remaining distinction between Pakistan and "non-aligned" India also disappeared last fall when the border disputes between India and China flared up into an armed clash.

Despite the fact that over the decade the distinction in American eyes between an ally and a neutral had become increasingly blurred to a vanishing point, Pakistan continued steadily to stand by the alliance. Our view has been that, so long as we are in this alliance, we must continue honorably to discharge so far as we can whatever obligations devolve on us as a member.

Last fall, however, Pakistan received a new cause for disillusionment with American foreign policy. Following the India-China border clash, the United States proceeded to rush arms to India on a scale which to us seemed totally unjustified by the requirements of the situation. Since then, arms aid has been flowing into India continuously on a very substantial scale, not only from the United States but also in almost equal measure from Britain and, to a small extent, from some other members of the Commonwealth. We are profoundly concerned over this new development. We consider that this continued arming of India, in which the Soviet Union has also, for reasons of its own, joined, poses a serious threat to Pakistan's security.

It is possible that some of our friends abroad are perplexed by this reaction. They may ask: Is not the military assistance given to India by Pakistan's allies meant exclusively for fighting Communist China? Has not India pledged that she will not use these arms against Pakistan? Have not the United States and Great Britain also given assurances that if India employed these weapons in an aggression against Pakistan, they would act to thwart

the aggression? Are not these assurances, they may ask, sufficient to protect Pakistan against the possible misuse of Western arms against her? Why then, they may inquire, are the Pakistanis alarmed?

Before I proceed to answer this question, let me briefly recapitulate the facts leading up to the current Western policy of arming India in a major war.

On October 20 of last year, fighting flared up between China and India at a number of points along their disputed border, in Ladakh (Kashmir) and in the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) area lying east of the state of Bhutan. A week earlier, Mr. Nehru announced that he had ordered the troops to throw the Chinese "out of our territory" in the NEFA area, and then left for Ceylon on a state visit.⁴ There is some independent evidence also to the effect that the Indians opened the first attack. Why Mr. Nehru chose that particular time to make that announcement has been the subject of considerable conjecture. What prompted him to do so is, at any rate at this point, immaterial. What happened subsequently is, however, fairly generally known. During two brief bouts of fighting—the first in October and the second in November—the Indian army met with serious reverses. By November 20, the Indians had surrendered another 2,000 square miles of disputed territory in Ladakh, thus putting the Chinese in control of almost the entire 15,000 square miles of territory which they claim in that part of Kashmir. In the NEFA area, the rout of the Indian forces assumed even more serious proportions. By November 20, not only the entire disputed NEFA territory but even Assam lay at the mercy of the rapidly advancing Chinese forces. Then, suddenly, on November 21, the Chinese declared a cease-fire and offered unilaterally to withdraw to points behind the MacMahon Line from the entire territory they had overrun. This undertaking they subsequently fully carried out, offering at the same time to negotiate their border differences with India peacefully. Since then, there has been no significant military incident on any part of the entire disputed border.

It was after the first India-China clash in October that the United States Government decided to rush military equipment to India. The British and to a minor extent some other countries also joined in what was called emergency assistance to India.

⁴ *Times of India*, October 13, 1962.

At Nassau on December 29, long after the cease-fire on the India-China border, the United States and Britain decided to continue to supply India on an emergency basis with up to \$120,000,000 worth of military aid. The program included a variety of military equipment, but its central feature was the arming of six Indian divisions for mountain warfare. Arising also from the Nassau decision, a United States-British-Canadian Air Mission visited India to examine into what would be India's air needs should China attack again. And another U.S. Mission went out to India to study the question of how to expand India's arms production capacity.

Subsequently, on June 30, at Birch Grove, the United States and Britain decided on a further substantial program of military aid to India, over and above that agreed to at Nassau. Apart from additional arms, this program provides for extensive radar, communications, air transport and training facilities as well as for American and British assistance to expand greatly India's own armament production. India has also been assured that there is no need for her to enter an alliance with the West in order to continue to qualify for military assistance against China. Indeed, she has been given to understand that it is in the Western interest that she should continue to remain "non-aligned" and receive military aid from the Soviet Union as well. Taking advantage of this favorable Western response, India has decided to raise her standing army from 11 to 22 divisions as rapidly as possible and to expand substantially her air force and navy as well—all ostensibly for use against China.

Let us first examine briefly whether the arming of India on this extensive scale is necessary or justified. It may be recalled that the American-British military aid program to India was originally put in motion at a time when the West feared that the India-China conflict might escalate into a major war. From the very outset it has been our view that the fighting last fall was only in the nature of a border conflict. On November 5, after the first India-China clash, I made a statement to that effect, and expressed concern over the Western decision to rush military aid to India on a scale based apparently on an assumption that India was faced with a major war with China. There was no valid basis for this assumption. It made no sense militarily, I said, that China should have decided to launch an invasion of India over the Himalayas in the depth of winter. Under the circumstances it

seemed logical to conclude that the Chinese objectives were limited.

This, I consider, has been borne out by subsequent events. The unilateral declaration of a cease-fire by the Chinese forces at a time when not only the disputed territory but the whole of north-eastern India, including Assam, lay within their easy grasp, their withdrawal from the entire NEFA territory which they had overrun, and their offer to settle the dispute peacefully—none of this supports the thesis that the Chinese had planned to embark on a major attack on India. Since then, the Chinese military threat to India has, it is now generally recognized, receded. The Chinese have demonstrated their willingness to settle the dispute peacefully. The Indians, on their part, are anxious to avoid any further fighting with China and have been working steadily for a peaceful settlement. Yet India continues to demand—and receive—military assistance from the United States and Great Britain on a large scale and has embarked upon a massive increase and re-equipment of her land, air and naval forces. Considering the terms on which neutralist India is receiving this assistance—terms which amount virtually to a gift—the inducement to do so must be very strong.

India currently presents three faces to the world: one to the West, simulating a resolve to fight China in order to secure the maximum of Western arms assistance; a second to Russia, stressing her resolve nevertheless to remain “non-aligned”; and a third to China, seeking a peaceful settlement of the dispute by secret peace overtures through neutral emissaries.

The hope is held in certain quarters in the United States and Britain that the military assistance given or proposed would enable India to fight the Communist threat in South Asia. Some people in those countries fondly imagine that a “newly awakened” India would act as a rallying point for South Asian nations against Communist expansionism. In actual fact, India has no such intention.

Mr. Nehru himself has been at pains to explain that the India-China conflict has nothing to do with Communism but is the result of Chinese “imperialist expansionism.”⁵

Last April a well-informed Indian journalist threw interesting light on the objectives of New Delhi’s policy toward China. He had, among other things, this to say:

⁵ Philip Potter, in the *Baltimore Sun*, November 10, 1962.

Some of the truths of Mr. Nehru's earlier utterances need to be repeated. One of these is that China, Communist or otherwise, aggressive or peaceful, is a neighbor with which somehow India must learn to live. It is a geographical truth that cannot be wished away. . . .

Visions of a devious and infinitely cunning Chinese plot to dominate India or Asia, thrilling theories of an Indian "way of life" threatened by an aggressive ideology from the north, interesting academic parallels between the Indian and Chinese race for economic development—all this sounds plausible but is liable to turn into so much fluff when thoroughly examined.

New Delhi's policy is, very rightly, to work for an understanding with a powerful neighbor. If this is not possible soon, as it probably is not, the alternative is patience, vigilance, adaptability and calm determination. It is most certainly not to set an ideological example for other Asian States to follow or to lead them in any kind of crusade or to interpret the Chinese aggression in the "perspective" most palatable to the United States.*

It is our belief that the Sino-Indian dispute can and will be resolved peacefully. In our view, therefore, the continuance of military aid to India is unjustified. Furthermore, it poses a grave threat to Pakistan's security. We apprehend that after India has settled her dispute with China, she will revert to her traditional policy of intimidation of Pakistan. And she may even turn her newly acquired might against Pakistan when a suitable opportunity occurs, particularly at a time when the Western countries are so preoccupied with their own internal and external problems that they cannot undertake military commitments in this sub-continent or they find it inadvisable to do so for fear of provoking a world conflict.

Even in the unlikely event of a recrudescence of border fighting between China and India, India could not, considering the mountain terrain, deploy more than 3 to 4 divisions against the Chinese. One may justifiably ask, then, why India is doubling the size of her standing army to 22 divisions. Even allowing for the necessary reserves, what are the remaining divisions aimed against? The fact of the matter is that, taking advantage of the favorable Western response to her demands for arms, India is planning to raise two armies, one with which to face China and the other to use against Pakistan and her other smaller neighbors in pursuance of her expansionist objectives. It should also be noted that any army meant for China would by the nature of things be so positioned as to be able to wheel round swiftly to attack East Pakistan. Thus both the armies pose a grave threat to this country.

* Nanpuri, Editor of the *Times of India*, April 8, 1963.

Having built up this enormous war machine, India's leadership would need to justify the great hardships it has imposed on the Indian people in that process. It might also want to regain face which India has lost in the fighting with China. It is possible, therefore, that India might decide to do so—as soon as a suitable opportunity offers itself—by throwing its massive armor against Pakistan, and possibly striking, in the first instance, against that part of Kashmir which is under Pakistan's control but which India claims to be "Indian territory."

It may be recalled in this connection that in the Security Council last year, India, while claiming "sovereignty" over the whole of Kashmir, charged that Pakistan was guilty of "continuing aggression" against India so long as she remained in possession of any part of Kashmir. Several prominent Indian leaders have, from time to time, openly urged the use of force to drive Pakistan out of Kashmir.⁷ That this demand is not at variance with the official view is apparent from a White Paper, "Kashmir and the United Nations," which was issued by the Government of India when the Kashmir dispute came up before the Security Council in 1962. After stating that "Pakistan continues to occupy half of the Indian Union territory of Jammu and Kashmir," the White Paper goes on to say, "Pakistan should vacate this aggression on Indian territory." It then proceeds to warn: "India is prepared to be patient and tolerant and not resort to force to remove Pakistan aggression, but it is obvious that there is a limit to patience and tolerance." Such a warning is open to only one interpretation.

There are other reasons why we apprehend India may launch an aggressive venture against Pakistan. It is well known to students of the sub-continent's history that the Hindus of India were against the creation of a separate homeland for Muslims in the form of Pakistan and, after opposing it tooth and nail for years, gave in because they could not otherwise get rid of the British. Thereafter, while consolidating and building up their own strength, the Indians have let no opportunity pass of weakening and neutralizing Pakistan. The present Indian leadership makes no secret of the fact that it regards Pakistan as "India's enemy

⁷ Sanjiva Reddy, President of India's ruling party, the Congress, inaugurating its Annual Session on January 4, 1962, stated: "Cease-fire could not be accepted as a permanent solution of the Kashmir problem. The whole country is behind the Government in liberating the one-third of Kashmir which is under Pakistan's illegal occupation." He added: "We hope that within a short period the Government will take steps to liberate that part of Kashmir."

number one." It is therefore the height of naïveté to say, as one State Department official in Washington said recently, that there is nothing in Pakistan which India wants.

Until the outbreak of fighting with China, and even during most of that fighting, more than three-fourths of India's best-equipped forces remained massed on Pakistan's borders. In December 1962, Mr. Nehru himself admitted that Indian military preparedness had been directed primarily against Pakistan.⁸ This still remains India's basic position, and although there have been some changes in the disposition of the Indian forces, the collective strength of those massed on the borders of West Pakistan and East Pakistan remains formidable.

Nor, indeed, would an act of aggression by India be unusual. India has used force time and again to settle her territorial disputes. Let me recall some of these instances. Immediately after independence in 1947, Junagarh, a state with a Muslim ruler, acceded to Pakistan. India strongly protested when she learnt that the ruler contemplated this. In a telegram to the Pakistan Prime Minister, the Indian Prime Minister said that since the population of Junagarh was 80 percent Hindu and was opposed to accession to Pakistan, the Government of India could not acquiesce in the ruler's decision to accede to Pakistan. They would, however, be willing to accept the verdict of the people of the state on this question, provided the plebiscite was held under the joint supervision of the Indian and Junagarh Governments.⁹ Since Pakistan would not agree to this proposition, Indian troops marched into Junagarh and seized it by force.

In the case of Kashmir, on the other hand, Indian logic was conveniently reversed. There, the Indian army marched into the state on the strength of an instrument of "accession" signed by the Hindu Maharaja against the known wishes of the 80 percent of the people of Kashmir who are Muslims. In fact, at the time the Maharaja signed this document his armies were in retreat against the popular forces and he himself had fled the state capital, Srinagar, and taken refuge in Jammu. It was at that time, when his writ had practically ceased to run in Kashmir, that the Maharaja sought the help of the Indian armed forces. This was promptly offered, but on condition that his state accede to India,

⁸ Explaining the reasons for Indian reverses in the fighting against China, Mr. Nehru said that "most of our military thinking" had been conditioned to the possibility of a war with Pakistan. (Philip Potter, *Baltimore Sun*, December 28, 1962.)

⁹ Mr. Nehru's telegram dated September 12, 1947.

whereupon he was prevailed upon to sign an instrument of accession. (It was on the basis of this document that India keeps claiming "sovereignty" over Kashmir.) Thereafter, the Indian forces moved in, took possession of the major part of Kashmir and have held it ever since. A pledge repeatedly given by Mr. Nehru that India would let the people of Kashmir decide the question of accession to India or Pakistan in a free plebiscite still remains to be honored.

On September 11, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah died. The nation was plunged into sorrow over the death of the Founder of Pakistan. India chose that particular moment to march her forces into Hyderabad, another state with a Muslim ruler, and forcibly seized it, not because Hyderabad had wanted to accede to Pakistan, but because it had hesitated somewhat to accede to India.

India again employed the same technique recently to settle her territorial dispute with Portugal over Goa. Within a few weeks of Mr. Nehru's visit to Washington in November 1961, in the course of which he declared that India had "a passion for peace," the Indian army invaded and forcibly annexed Goa. It is interesting also to recall in this connection that on several occasions in the past Mr. Nehru had strongly repudiated any suggestion that India take over Goa by force. On one such occasion, speaking in the Indian Parliament on September 17, 1955, Mr. Nehru said: "From the very outset our policy, both at home and abroad, has been to solve all problems peacefully. If we ourselves acted against that policy we would be regarded as deceitful hypocrites."

Mr. Nehru could hardly have given a stronger assurance to Goa against a forcible seizure. Nevertheless, when the opportune moment came, those high-sounding declarations were forgotten and another territorial dispute was settled by use of force. What is more, Mr. Nehru's conscience was outraged when the West took unkindly to the Indian grab of Goa. He castigated his critics for "being ignorant of the facts of today and of the past dozen years."¹⁰

It is because of this background of India's hostility toward Pakistan, her expansionist designs and her aggressive policies that Pakistanis view the continued flow of Western arms into India

¹⁰ Mr. Nehru on Mr. Adlai Stevenson's criticism of India's "aggression" in the Security Council, December 19, 1961.

from their allies with deep dismay and alarm. Indian assurances to the effect that she will not use American arms against Pakistan fail to carry conviction with the people of Pakistan in the light of India's repeated repudiation of her solemn pledges regarding Kashmir and her record of aggression.

Neither do American assurances against the misuse of these weapons reassure our people. They argue that the Indians have thus far successfully got away with every one of their acts of aggression, including that against Goa. Here was aggression against a NATO ally—and neither the United Nations, which was paralyzed by a Soviet veto, nor NATO nor the United States did anything to undo it. If India attacked Pakistan or Pakistan-held Kashmir on the excuse that she was “recovering” what she claims to be “Indian territory,” our people fear that the great powers might again be either unwilling to intervene out of consideration for their global policies or unable to thwart Indian aggression.

Apart from the fact that continued Western arms assistance to India causes deep concern in Pakistan and subjects Pakistan's alliance with the West to increasing strain, it is unlikely that it will achieve the objective in view. For if the security and welfare of the Indian sub-continent are the objective, then what is needed is not the injection of massive doses of military aid into India but a rapprochement between India and Pakistan, such as would ensure a disengagement and could even open the way to a reduction of the Indian and Pakistan forces. Such a rapprochement can be brought about only through a just and honorable settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It can be achieved in no other way.

On the other hand, so long as the dispute over Kashmir continues, India-Pakistan tension will continue to mount, immobilizing the bulk of the Indian and Pakistan armies in a senseless confrontation. In such a situation the flow of arms into India would fail to strengthen the sub-continent's defense posture. It would, moreover, make—as indeed it already has made—a resolution of the Kashmir conflict even more difficult.¹¹ The recent move to integrate occupied Jammu and Kashmir with India, in defiance of the Security Council resolutions, cannot but be regarded as a further manifestation of India's determination to

¹¹ Since the Birch Grove decision, Mr. Nehru's attitude on Kashmir has been rapidly hardening. His latest stand on this dispute is reflected in his statement in the Indian Parliament on September 3, 1963, to the effect that any change in Kashmir would have “disastrous consequences.” (*Times of India*, September 4, 1963.)

absorb the state irrespective of her international commitments and pledges. All this is going to aggravate India-Pakistan bitterness, heighten their mutual fears and suspicions and force on them an arms race that could spell disaster for both countries. Such an arms race would inevitably necessitate imposition of heavier economic burdens on the peoples of both countries and an even greater diversion of their meagre resources to armament; it would dangerously slow down their already inadequate economic growth rate, create popular discontent and thus make them an easier prey to subversive forces. Surely this could not be the way to promote the security or welfare of the peoples of the sub-continent. A massive Indian military build-up would, further, imperil the existing precarious balance of power in this area. It would increase the existing sense of insecurity among India's smaller neighbors, which could force them to courses of action that might undermine the West's position throughout South Asia.

ISSUES BEFORE THE U.N. CONFERENCE

By Isaiah Frank

IN the spring of 1964 representatives of more than 110 countries will gather in Geneva for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. To say that the less developed countries have high hopes for this event would be the understatement of the year. Again and again at meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference the refrain was that the Conference would be the single most important international event for the less developed countries since the founding of the United Nations. These countries look to the Conference to lay the foundations for a "new international division of labor"; to formulate a new and "dynamic international trade policy"; and, as one representative to the Preparatory Committee recently wrote, to advance the goal of "economic emancipation" from the neo-colonialism implicit in present trade relations between rich and poor countries.

It is no secret that the United States was originally cool to the idea of a world trade conference under the aegis of the United Nations. For a number of years in the late fifties, the Soviet bloc had been pressing for such a conference primarily for the purpose of attacking Western, and particularly American, strategic trade controls as well as the U. S. policy of denying most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet bloc. The American position was that these policies were simply a reflection of certain underlying realities of a political and security nature. Under the circumstances, a world trade conference such as that proposed by the Soviet bloc would merely provide a forum from which to attack Western "economic aggression" and appeal to the less developed countries for moral support for the "normalization" of East-West trade relations. In short, it would become an empty propaganda show.

At the General Assembly in 1961, however, the idea of a world trade conference took on a different cast. It was seized upon by the developing countries with great enthusiasm as a means of directing attention to the problems of *their* trade with the rest of the world. These problems were becoming steadily more acute and threatened to vitiate such advances as would otherwise be

possible through their own efforts and through external financial assistance. Given this shift in emphasis and the overwhelming sentiment of the developing countries in favor of a world trade conference, the United States decided to support the project, to participate actively in influencing its scope and character, and to join with others in seeking constructive solutions to what is now generally recognized to be a problem of great urgency.

The problem can be simply stated. If the developing countries are to maintain a satisfactory rate of growth, their import needs will expand rapidly. A large and growing part of their imports is now made up of machinery and equipment required to support national development efforts. Since few developing countries possess an excess of foreign exchange reserves, these needs can be financed in only two ways—through capital imports and through the proceeds of their exports. At the present time, capital imports through aid and private foreign investment amount to only about \$8 billion per year, whereas total export earnings amount to about \$27 billion. Clearly, therefore, exports are the principal determinant of the import capacity of the developing countries.

Beyond this importance, exports have a further essential role to play in the development process. If industrialization is to take place, the less developed countries must find an escape from the constrictions of their own limited national markets. In many cases, it is only through exports, both to other developing countries and to advanced countries, that adequate markets can be found to support their industrialization.

As the developing countries examine recent trends and future prospects, they see that the growth in the volume of their present exports—largely primary materials—has been extremely sluggish compared to the increase in their import needs. If present policies are continued, moreover, future trends are unlikely to show an appreciable improvement. The task of the Conference, therefore, will be to consider what new policies should be adopted, nationally and internationally, to accelerate the growth of exports of developing countries by strengthening markets for their traditional products and by stimulating the development of new export products and new markets.

II

It is a curious paradox that the enthusiasm generated among the developing countries for the U.N. Trade Conference is accom-

panied by a sense of detachment bordering on lack of interest regarding the "Kennedy round" of tariff negotiations scheduled to begin soon thereafter. Yet, the latter hold out the possibility of the most far-reaching dismantling of trade protection ever undertaken on a world-wide basis. Moreover, at the last Ministerial Meeting of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) under whose aegis the Kennedy round will take place, the industrial countries decided to make a special effort to include within the scope of the negotiations products of special interest to the less developed countries, without seeking reciprocal concessions.

Despite the concrete benefits likely to flow to the developing countries from the Kennedy round, they look upon it as merely more of the same kind of exercise that GATT has undertaken many times before. It is not the kind of break with the past that they seek from the U.N. Conference.

In order to understand the drive and fervor of the less developed countries for this Conference, it is not enough to examine their trade problems in terms of statistical trends. The problems are serious; there should be no question about that. But beyond any objective level of analysis, the leadership group in these countries is fired with a sense of injustice, a feeling that the international trading system is stacked in favor of the advanced countries, and that the Kennedy round is an operation undertaken within the basic framework of that system. What they want is to change the system, and the U.N. Trade Conference is viewed as a vital step in that direction.

The ideological sub-structure of the Conference is not spelled out neatly in any of the voluminous documentation produced by the able Secretariat of the Conference. But elements of it are found in a vast literature produced over the last decade on various aspects of the relationship between international trade and economic development.

This doctrine views the present rules, practices and institutions in international trade as essentially a reflection of classical trade theory—namely, that unhampered international trade tends to bring about an optimum allocation of resources within countries and therefore to maximize income. By pursuing liberal and non-discriminatory trade policies, each country will be induced to concentrate on producing those goods in which its comparative advantage is greatest. But in the view of many intellectual leaders

of the developing countries, by treating all countries alike, these liberal policies tend to perpetuate existing patterns of production in the world and therefore the existing inequities. In this line of thinking, the trouble with the classical theory is its static view of the world; it takes as given the existing distribution of resources among countries. Yet the whole point of the newly awakened drive for development is to alter the existing pattern and therefore to change the structure of comparative advantage. This means changed technologies, new industries and altered consumption patterns in the less developed countries.

To be sure, a respectable place is found within the established system for the protection of infant industry, but as a mere exception to the basically static body of doctrine. And while in the classical system the structure of comparative advantage and therefore of trade can change in response to dynamic forces such as new investment, these changes are viewed as passive responses to outside factors. What is needed is an overhaul of the international trading system so as not merely to permit an accommodation to autonomous forces of change but so that trade principles and policies will themselves operate to induce economic development.

Concentration on primary products inevitably means unstable foreign exchange earnings for the less developed countries in the short run and a slow growth in the volume of demand for their exports over the longer run. These trends reflect deep-seated forces that the less developed countries feel powerless to cope with on their own. In particular, they are unable because of the very fact of their underdevelopment to shift resources readily from products that are in redundant supply to others with more favorable prospects.

The recent deterioration in their terms of trade is viewed as a graphic demonstration of this helplessness. As the less developed countries increase their efficiency in producing primary products, the gains are passed on to the advanced countries in the form of lower prices. But the gains in productivity in manufacturing in the advanced countries remain, to a large extent, within those countries in the form of higher wages and other incomes and are not reflected in lower prices. In short, the less developed countries get less for what they produce and often pay more for what they buy.

Under the direction of Dr. Raul Prebisch, Secretary General of

the Conference,¹ the 32-nation Preparatory Committee has drawn up a comprehensive agenda. Although it "covers the waterfront," the main attention will be given to four subjects: (1) the slow growth in the volume of exports of primary products from developing countries and the deterioration in their terms of trade; (2) their need to expand exports of manufactured products; (3) the prospects for expanding trade between the developing countries and the centrally planned economies of the Soviet bloc; and (4) the existing institutional arrangements for international trade, particularly GATT, and the possible need for new organizational machinery.

III

For some years, the success of less developed countries in expanding their exports will depend on their ability to increase their earnings from sales of primary commodities. However much their ultimate salvation may lie in a shift toward exports of manufactures, it will be some time before substantial gains can be achieved in this way. Food, fuel and raw materials constitute 86 percent of the total exports of developing countries. It is natural therefore that the U.N. Trade Conference will in the first instance place major emphasis on policies to expand earnings from those products.

It is generally recognized that little can be done about the lag in the growth of traditional exports from developing countries in so far as it results from the march of progress in the advanced countries. As people become richer they spend less of their increases in income on food. And as technology advances, a whole range of man-made substitutes such as plastics, nylon and synthetic rubber come on the market in competition with natural products. But if the developing countries must resign themselves to accepting the consequences of these developments, they are totally unreconciled to accepting obstacles to their traditional exports which are consciously created by industrial countries.

Tariffs, quotas, revenue duties and internal taxes on tropical products, preferences which discriminate against certain develop-

¹ More than any other single individual, Dr. Prebisch, a Latin American economist of outstanding distinction, has succeeded in focusing attention over the years on the interrelationships between trade and development. Although his ideas have inspired a whole generation of economists, particularly in less developed countries, Dr. Prebisch has proven himself to be more than a creator of new and controversial doctrine. He is a man of practical bent as well and he sees the Conference primarily as an opportunity to consider and marshal support for concrete measures to assist the developing countries.

ing countries—these and other impediments to access to the markets of advanced countries will come under heavy attack at the U.N. Conference. A “program of action” to get rid of them has been under way in GATT since 1961, but concrete results thus far are not impressive. In fact, a recent effort to adopt a specific timetable for eliminating obstacles led to a stormy GATT session which brought to light a basic difference in approach to the entire problem of the commodity trade of developing countries.

On one hand, all industrialized countries other than those of the European Common Market accepted the obligation to reduce or eliminate barriers to the exports of less developed countries by stated dates, subject to certain qualifications. On the other hand, the members of the Common Market declined to accept the program of action and merely endorsed its general objectives. Their position was that the mere elimination of barriers would accomplish little and that “more positive measures” were required. They therefore urged international action to “organize” world commodity trade to insure increasing exports for the developing countries at more favorable prices. Although this idea was put forward in the name of the European Community, its paternity is unquestionably French. French thinking has been inspired by the fact that almost all advanced countries have resorted to various control and support measures for domestic primary producers, particularly in agriculture, and also by France’s experience in trading with the franc zone.

The basic idea is that commodity agreements would be entered into for those products which developing countries have difficulty in disposing of at favorable prices under open market conditions. But the agreements would go beyond the orthodox purpose of smoothing out short-term fluctuations in commodity markets without disturbing the long-term trend. Indeed, the purely stabilizing function would be secondary to the main purpose of improving the terms of trade by raising commodity prices above what normal market forces would yield. In other words, market organization would be a supplement to the conventional way of providing aid to the less developed countries. Resources would be transferred through higher prices paid by consumers in the advanced countries rather than through grants or loans by governments.

Essential elements in the scheme would include: establishment of target prices for each product at a level which, in view of world

demand, would give higher total receipts to producing countries; assignment of export quotas to producing countries at a level such that the total would clear the market at the target price; coöperation of importing countries either through establishing import quotas or, as a minimum, by discriminating against exporters not party to the agreement; siphoning off part of the export proceeds which otherwise would accrue to individual producers and channeling them into a fund to finance the shifting of resources out of redundant commodities into new products and new industries.

Apart from the enormous practical difficulties of negotiating and administering agreements of this sort, the French concept raises some more basic questions. How far could one go, for example, in increasing the price of natural rubber or natural fibres without reducing the incomes of producers by stimulating a further shift in consumption toward synthetic products? What about commodities such as cotton, tobacco and nonferrous metals which are exported both by advanced countries and by less developed countries? It is doubtful if more than a handful of commodities—mainly tropical—are of substantial importance in international trade and lend themselves to the market-organization approach. And of these, coffee is already subject to control and a recent attempt at a cocoa agreement met with failure.

How efficient are commodity agreements as a way of transferring additional resources from rich to poor countries? Automatic transfers mean that there can be no assurance that the resources go to the right countries—that is, those most capable of making effective use of the funds for development purposes. Moreover, any leverage which a donor can exert in inducing developing countries to make internal reforms would be absent from aid transferred through commodity control arrangements. And within the donor countries, the burden of aid would not be distributed according to individual capacities to pay but according to consumption. Apart from all other considerations, proliferation of commodity agreements would extend into the international sphere the rigidities of domestic agricultural support schemes.

Another way of coping with the long-term price problems of developing countries has therefore been proposed. It would leave the market alone but would compensate the developing countries directly for losses from adverse movements in the terms of trade. A compensatory arrangement would eliminate the need for export quotas, production controls or freezing of trade patterns.

Even if commodity agreements could be negotiated in a few key products, compensatory arrangements would provide a solution benefiting countries with exports not susceptible to specific market-control arrangements.

The charge is often made that the rich countries take back through trade much of what they give through aid. A system of compensating for losses from changes in the terms of trade would provide a direct answer to this complaint. The U.S. Ambassador to Brazil has pointed out, however, that Brazil's terms of trade, while declining in the 1950s, were higher during that period than in any decade since the 1920s. Most developing countries nevertheless think of life as having begun around 1950 because it was then that economic development became a major conscious objective. Anything that went on before is irrelevant today. The early 1950s is rejected as a base for calculating changes in the terms of trade because of the inflationary effects of the Korean War; but the developing countries suffer also from calculations based on more recent years. On the basis of crude indexes, it has been estimated that if the price relationships of 1958 had applied to the actual trade of the developing countries in 1961, the latter would have received \$1 billion more for their exports and would have paid \$200 million less for their imports.

Prices decline when producers place on the world market more than consumers want at existing prices. Does it make sense to compensate the producers for their failure to shift resources to other fields? Proponents of the compensation approach reply that the arrangement need not be symmetrical. Contributions to the fund by advanced countries could be based on their gains from the terms of trade, whereas payments to less developed countries could be made contingent on their need and on their adopting special measures to rectify uneconomic allocations of resources and to diversify production.

Put in these terms, a compensatory arrangement becomes another direct mechanism for providing economic assistance. On the receiving side, the usual aid criteria would be applied, *i.e.* need and the ability to make effective use of the funds. But on the side of the donors, there would be a new standard for determining the level of aid and the share of each in providing it. It seems reasonable for industrial countries benefiting from favorable movements in the terms of trade to provide supplementary aid in some relationship to these benefits.

In short, it should be possible to go a long way toward meeting the problem of secular weakness in primary materials markets by a combination of three measures: the elimination of import restrictions in advanced countries; a highly selective resort to commodity agreements; and the provision of supplementary aid funds to support diversification.

IV

The developing countries hope that exports of manufactures will provide the long-run remedy for stagnation in their international trade and a dynamic impulse to their internal industrial development. But in 1961, of their \$27 billion of exports, only \$4 billion were manufactured products, and a substantial portion of the latter were semi-processed materials.

Policies to increase their exports of manufactured products must be directed in the first instance to overcoming domestic obstacles. The widespread adoption of import substitution is a case in point. Protection to support the substitution of domestic production for imports may be perfectly appropriate as a means both of conserving foreign exchange and of getting industries started in the early stages of industrialization. But if carried too far, it can become a major impediment to economic growth; for it fosters high-cost industries geared to the internal market and completely incapable of competing in foreign markets. In Latin America, for example, tariff rates of over 500 percent are not uncommon. Internal restrictive practices are also widespread. Thus manufacturers are often effectively insulated from any real competition, foreign or domestic.

Perhaps the surest way for countries to price themselves out of world markets is through inflation and overvalued exchange rates. Why should producers in developing countries exert themselves to sell in unsheltered markets abroad at low prices when they can sell at high prices at home?

It is not enough to eliminate factors that deter the export of manufactures. Developing countries must undertake affirmative programs to promote such exports. Ignorance of foreign markets, lack of contact with foreign importing firms, lack of familiarity with the changing tastes of foreign consumers, inadequate grading and packaging—these are some of the difficulties facing potential exporters. To overcome them is a formidable task requiring government assistance and whatever financial and technical help

may be obtained from the advanced countries and from international organizations.

A U.N. document reports, however, that few requests for technical assistance in sales and marketing have been received. "Moreover, advice, when sought, has been in relation to marketing of primary products rather than manufactures, in spite of the fact that deficient management of sales and marketing of industrial goods is a great obstacle to the development of industry." Here is one area where the current stress on the need to coördinate trade and aid policies would have specific applicability. Here, also, the foreign investor can make a major contribution by providing not only capital, technology and management, but unique skills and facilities in marketing and distribution.

Other types of assistance can also be given to make selling abroad more attractive, such as various forms of export subsidies and tax exemptions related to exports. Export subsidies are frowned upon by GATT, however, and they lay the beneficiary open to countervailing duties in the export market. GATT and the U.N. Trade Conference should therefore consider making export subsidies and tax exemptions legitimate as temporary measures. Possibly the same objective could be achieved by less objectionable devices, such as government guarantees against losses incurred in the course of efforts to develop foreign markets.

At the U.N. Conference the major drive for expanding exports of manufactures will be toward improving access to foreign markets. At this stage it is impossible to state how much tariffs in advanced countries impede such exports. Although rates on many products exported by developing countries are as high as 20 per cent, it is by no means clear that even their complete removal would increase sales substantially since, as already noted, the policies of the developing countries are so crucial. Removing the gate at the church entrance does not necessarily bring people into the church. Nevertheless, the abolition of restrictions cannot help but have some beneficial effect and may even inspire the developing countries to act more vigorously at home to take advantage of the new export opportunities.

A principal deterrent to exports arises from the tariff *structure* in advanced countries. In general, raw and partly processed materials enter duty-free or at low duties, whereas manufactures bear the highest duties. The rates on the latter tend to vary according to the ratio of direct labor costs to total cost of the product.

Clearly, this militates against precisely those shifts in the pattern of production and exports in developing countries that should be encouraged—from raw materials to more processed goods and within the latter category toward the manufacture of goods requiring intensive use of labor.

Except for cotton textiles, in which world trade is now generally governed by an international agreement, the United States has no quota restrictions on imports of manufactured products. But because of the fear of “disrupting the market,” various Western European countries and Japan still maintain a hard core of such restrictions against products of interest to developing countries.

Market disruption is more a political and social problem in the advanced countries than an economic one. None the less, it poses real difficulties in the effort to dismantle restrictions—particularly in declining, stagnant or slowly growing industries. The formal principles embodied in the cotton textile arrangements—gradual expansion of access by importing countries, combined with the exercise of restraint by exporting countries—are pitched in a liberal direction, but there is a solid basis for believing that the actual administration of the arrangements has been unduly restrictive. It is to be hoped that in the future more reliance will be placed on expanded assistance in making domestic adjustments within the advanced countries and less on extending the scope of restrictive trade arrangements.

A joint statement submitted by the developing countries to last summer’s meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the U.N. Trade Conference said: “The removal of obstacles to the trade of developing countries is important, but the accelerated development of the parts of the world which are lagging behind requires more than the unconditional application of the most-favored-nation principle and the mere reduction of tariffs.” In the view of the developing countries, arguments in favor of financial aid to them apply also to the granting of preferential treatment to their exports of manufactured products.

The developing countries are not alone in their drive for preferences. The European Economic Community has expressed some sympathy for the idea and has invited GATT to study “various relaxations of present rules regarding non-discrimination.” The United States, while going along with proposals for the study, has expressed strong reservations in principle and has noted the absence of authority for preferences under existing U.S. legislation.

The issues in this debate are complex. There is much to be said for some relaxation of the most-favored-nation principle to permit regional trading arrangements among developing countries where they fall short of full customs unions or free-trade areas. But it is doubtful whether "positive discrimination" by industrial countries in favor of imports from developing countries would increase these substantially. Indeed, pressure for preferences might intensify the feeling in advanced countries that additional measures are needed to protect domestic markets against "low-wage imports." Despite the ideological appeal of preferences, it would seem far more important to get rid of existing restrictions and discriminations against such imports, and for the developing countries to adopt a coordinated program of domestic action to promote exports.

v

High on the agenda of the U.N. Conference will be the question of how the developing countries can expand their exports into the rapidly growing economies of the Soviet bloc. Soviet propaganda has played on the theme that Western trade with the developing countries is exploitative and unstable, and that there are vast possibilities for stable trade with the East on more favorable terms. The Conference will provide an opportunity to examine the realities of trade with the Soviet bloc and the kinds of measures needed to advance the interests of the developing countries in this trade. So far it is extremely small; imports by the Soviet bloc from developing countries amount to only about \$1 billion as compared to imports of \$19 billion by the industrial countries of the free world.

A major cause of this is the Soviet bloc's insistence on the bilateral balancing of accounts. In general, a developing country is not paid for its exports in convertible currency but simply receives the right to purchase up to an equivalent value of Soviet goods. Unless there is a reasonable prospect of the desired goods being available, trade will not take place; otherwise the developing country would find itself in the strange position of extending credit to its advanced trading partner.

Bilateralism, though prevalent, is not an essential feature of a socialist country's trading system. The Soviet Union pays in convertible currency when it buys from the United States and Canada. Its insistence on bilateral settlement when buying from less

developed countries is a reflection of the market power which, as a state trader, it is in a position to exert vis-à-vis weaker countries.

One of the principal Soviet claims is that long-term bilateral agreements offer a measure of stability to its trade with developing countries that cannot be matched in the sharply fluctuating markets of the West. However plausible this claim may appear in theory, data introduced at the Preparatory Committee show wide year-to-year fluctuations in Soviet-bloc purchases from individual developing countries within the framework of bilateral agreements. Of interest, too, is the fact that bloc imports consist overwhelmingly of food and raw materials despite the Soviet charge that a similar concentration of imports by the Western countries reflects their neo-colonialist tendencies.

Until the preparations for the U.N. Trade Conference were under way, international attention had focused almost exclusively on the measures to be undertaken by the free-market economies of the West to expand export opportunities for the developing countries. Now for the first time the spotlight is on Soviet trade policies and practices, in order to ascertain what rules should be adopted by countries with centrally planned economies to make their commitments comparable to the commercial agreements undertaken by Western countries in GATT.

The British took a major initiative in proposing such principles at the last meeting of the Preparatory Committee. Although presented as illustrative, they parallel precisely the commitments called for in the GATT "program of action." For primary products, for example, they would in effect amount to allowing imports from developing countries into the Soviet bloc in accordance with the volume of internal demand at world market prices plus distribution costs; purchases would not be impeded by internal taxes or quantitative import restrictions.

Acceptance of commitments of this kind would have far-reaching implications for the Soviet bloc. Members of the bloc, instead of continuing to assign a low priority in national development plans to imports from developing countries, would subordinate other elements of their plans to an expansion of such imports. In order to finance increased imports and consumption of tropical products, for example, they might have to cut down on domestic capital formation and seek additional markets abroad for the products of the Soviet machinery and equipment industries. This would be equivalent to the kind of adjustment faced by a free-

market economy when, confronted with balance-of-payments pressures, it avoids imposing restrictions on imports of coffee, cocoa and other products of importance to developing countries and instead seeks to achieve equilibrium by expanding exports.

It would, of course, be illusory to expect debate at the U.N. Trade Conference to bring about any such sweeping change in policy on the part of the Soviet bloc. But the pressures generated may well induce *some* greater willingness to accommodate national plans to more imports from the developing countries.

If a real détente in East-West relations should occur, with a resulting reduction in the Soviet arms budget, not inconceivably there would follow a major increase in Soviet imports from developing countries of both primary products and manufactured goods. The Soviet bloc might decide that the way to maximize the total resources available to it would be to step up the manufacture and export of civilian capital goods to the developing countries in return for much larger imports of basic and manufactured consumer goods. In coffee alone, the per capita annual consumption in the Soviet Union is 0.1 kilogram as compared to 4.3 kilograms in France and 7.3 in the United States; this one example suggests the scope for expanding Soviet trade with the developing countries.

Whether or not we favor greater trade between the developing countries and the Soviet bloc, its potential volume is such that it becomes important to protect the interests of the developing countries; this could be done by restricting Soviet action through international commitments of the sort under discussion in connection with the U.N. Conference. In this way, it should be possible to impose some constraints on practices tending to victimize developing countries by exploiting monopolistic state-trading positions and manipulating trade for political ends.

VI

Whatever else emerges from the United Nations Conference, of one thing we can be sure. Some new organizational arrangements will be established within the U.N. framework to provide a continuing rallying point for action to deal with the trade problems of the developing countries in their broadest context.

GATT, the only general international trade organization now in existence, is not formally a part of the U.N. system. Moreover, there is a widespread feeling among developing countries that it

is inadequate to the task of making trade a more effective instrument of development. Some have gone so far as to urge its abolition and replacement by a new body competent to deal with the trade problems of the developing countries "in all their interrelatedness." Most developing countries, however, want to keep GATT and improve its effectiveness.

Why the disenchantment with GATT among certain influential developing countries? In part, it reflects a sense of frustration with the painfully slow rate of progress in solving their trade problems and a psychological need to lay the blame on someone or something. Rationally, one can argue that organizations such as GATT are not independent entities but merely governments acting in concert. GATT should not be blamed therefore for the failure of governments to act; nor can the situation be remedied by establishing a new organization with a new name. To this line of argument, however, one of the spokesmen of a developing country replied: "There is one thing you do not understand. The reason we need a new organization is simple: GATT has no soul."

This alleged soullessness is not easy to pin down. It was perhaps best summed up in a Brazilian memorandum recently submitted to the United Nations: "For practical purposes, GATT is now, as it was at its inception, the trade framework of developed countries. It has been modified at its periphery, but remains unchanged at its core." The truth of the matter is that GATT is a living, evolving organism which bears little resemblance in 1963 to what was created in 1947. Over two-thirds of the 73 countries affiliated with it in one form or another are underdeveloped and their special trade problems are today a major preoccupation of the organization.

The transformation of GATT dates back to 1954-1955 when the General Agreement was subjected to review and revision. A main result was to accord freedom of action to developing countries with respect to the commercial policies they deemed necessary to further their development. But the subsequent evolution of GATT into an organization deeply committed to promoting the trade of developing countries is reflected not in any formal revisions of its charter but rather in its actual activities. Among them are the commissioning of "Trends in International Trade," the report which gave the first international expression to the significance of exports in the development process; the establishment of Committee III to analyze in depth the trade problems of

developing countries and to give impetus to international action to deal with them; the adoption of a set of basic principles on liberalizing access to markets for developing countries; and the recent plan to explore with individual developing countries the specific measures that need to be undertaken internally and externally to enable them to realize their export potential.

The high priority which trade, as a means of development, occupies in the day-to-day work of GATT should perhaps be given more explicit recognition in the formal provisions of its charter. But just as the United Nations itself should not be condemned merely because its charter has never been revised formally to reflect the enormously expanded scope of its responsibilities, so should GATT not be condemned because of the failure of its legal provisions to catch up with the reality of the evolving organism.

Nevertheless, there is merit in establishing continuing arrangements within the United Nations itself for considering the trade problems of the developing countries. For one thing GATT has not really addressed itself to the special problems arising in trade relations between the developing countries and the Soviet bloc. Although Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia are affiliated with GATT, the Soviet Union maintains no relationship with it. Moreover, the underlying premise of GATT's rules and operations is that of a basically free-market trading system. The one article of its charter concerned with state-trading enterprises is grossly inadequate as a basis for ordering commercial relations with Communist countries, all of whose foreign trade is conducted by the state. A forum in the United Nations could focus continuing attention on this problem and could stimulate an evolution of Soviet-bloc trade policy along lines more responsive to the needs of the developing countries.

There is also much to be said for a U.N. forum as a way of bringing together in one place a periodic discussion of all inter-related aspects of trade and development as they emerge in the various global organizations having competence in these fields—GATT, the International Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization and other bodies with responsibilities relating to primary commodities. After all, trade and aid are both instruments for accelerating the process of development, and policies with respect to the one impinge on the other. Aid can, for example, be used to help identify and finance

export industries. At the same time, trade can be a means of channeling aid, as in the case of some commodity agreements, or it can operate to vitiate the effects of aid through import restrictions in the markets of developed countries.

Fortunately, the need for a trade and development forum can be met without a further proliferation of the existing complex structure of international economic organizations. In the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and in the Second Committee (Economic and Financial) of the General Assembly, there already exists a framework broad enough to bridge the gaps that have been mentioned. With the will to do it, the necessary adaptation of this structure should present no insuperable obstacles. Ample time would have to be set aside in both bodies for regular "trade and development sessions." But basic to the success of the operation would be a determination on the part of governments to send qualified experts to the meetings and a willingness to shift the emphasis from political speech-making to serious concentration on real economic problems.

It would be regrettable, however, if so much time and energy at the forthcoming U.N. Conference were devoted to debate over new institutional arrangements that the urgent substantive trade problems of the developing countries were overshadowed. The world is looking to the U.N. Conference to point the way to concrete measures to accelerate the increase of exports from developing countries. In the last analysis, its success will depend on the extent to which it helps to mobilize a political will to act on the part of countries in all stages of development.

WHAT POLICY FOR COMMODITIES?

By John A. Pincus

OVER the past century and a half, periods of falling commodity prices have raised great political issues. In our history, for example, they profoundly affected the age of Jackson, the era of Bryan and the Populists, and the New Deal. These ferments, so familiar in our national experience, now beset us on a world scale. Food and raw-materials prices have been drifting downward, and the underdeveloped areas which bear the brunt offer their protests in various international forums. The past year's upturn in prices has not diminished the pressures for reform of commodity policies. The less developed countries' representatives believe that current price improvements are only a temporary fluctuation around an unfavorable trend. Their concern may be exaggerated, but a review of the record and prospects shows that it is far from groundless.

In that setting, this article seeks to come to grips with two issues. First, what role can commodity policy play to help meet the less developed countries' foreign-exchange needs? Second, in light of the political and economic importance of commodity policy, how much—or how little—could international commodity agreements, aimed at raising the prices of individual commodities above current levels, contribute to those needs? Estimates of the effects of a deliberate policy of higher commodity prices are obviously approximate. They do indicate what relative part commodity schemes can play in meeting a central economic issue for the less developed countries.

Of the many causes of slow growth in those countries, we are concerned here with only one—the inadequate inflow of foreign exchange—and the evidence in that respect is straightforward enough: the exchange earnings of less developed areas are remarkably stable in the aggregate; over the last six or seven years, exports have not been increasing. The table on the next page gives the totals and shows the part played by each of the major elements: commodity exports, exports of manufactures, foreign aid and foreign private investment. The figures show that the value of exports increased only 10 percent from 1956 through 1961.

During the same period the exports of industrial countries rose by 26 percent. Of the six categories listed in the table, only two—petroleum exports and foreign aid—increased sharply.

Why has trade been so sluggish, and where is it likely to go from here? Let's examine the situation by category.

(1) *Commodity Exports*. In 1960 commodity trade accounted for 86 percent of the exports of less developed countries, virtually unchanged from 1956. If we include all the major foreign exchange sources, by adding net private investment and foreign

EXCHANGE RECEIPTS OF LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES*
1956-1961
(in billions of dollars)

Year	Foods and Beverages	Agricultural Raw Materials and Mineral Ores	Petroleum and Other Fuels	Manufactures	Private Investment (Net)	Foreign Aid	Total
1956	8.0	7.0	6.5	3.3	3.0	3.7	31.5
1957	8.3	6.9	7.0	3.2	3.5	4.6	33.3
1958	8.2	6.2	7.4	2.8	2.5	5.2	32.3
1959	7.8	7.2	7.3	3.3	2.3	5.3	33.0
1960	8.1	7.6	7.7	3.7	2.5	5.9	35.5
1961	8.0	7.4	8.1	4.0	2.7	6.5	36.7

Source: United Nations, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, March 1962-March 1963; OECD, *The Flow of Financial Resources to Countries in the Process of Economic Development*.

* Less developed countries are here taken to include: Latin America, Africa (except South Africa), Asia (except Japan, Mainland China, North Korea, Viet Nam, Mongolia); and Oceania (except Australia and New Zealand).

aid, commodity exports still accounted for 66 percent of this larger total in 1960. This, in short, is where the money is. Therefore, whether or not the flow of economic aid does increase, the earnings from commodity trade will remain pivotal for many countries. Yet, both the recent trend as shown in the accompanying table and the free-market prospects of the next decade as estimated by the United Nations are not encouraging.¹

For some commodities the declining trend in prices started after the end of the Korean War and for others about 1955. A few commodities—petroleum, bauxite, aluminum—did not share in this general decline. The reasons underlying the falling prices of other commodities have been discussed by a number of writers;²

¹ Food and Agriculture Organization, *Agricultural Commodities—Projections for 1970*, Rome, May 1962; U.N. Economic and Social Council, "Prospective Demand for Non-Agricultural Commodities: Problems of Definition and Projection Methodology," New York: U.N., May 1962.

² William Butler, "Trade and the Less Developed Areas," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1963, p. 372-383; Jan Tinbergen, "Shaping the World Economy," New York: 20th Century Fund, 1963.

there is no need to dwell on them here. They include: (a) the tendency in high-income countries for demand for food to increase slowly—more nearly in proportion to population growth, for example about 1.5 percent a year, rather than in proportion to income growth which might average about 4 percent a year; (b) the demand for industrial raw materials, such as rubber and minerals, has been affected both by the growth of synthetic substitutes and the tendency of industrial countries to use smaller amounts of raw materials per unit of final output; (c) the supply of many products, particularly tree crops, was greatly stimulated by the high prices of the early 1950s; (d) in many less developed countries there is no ready alternative to producing the traditional export crops.

What about the future of commodity prices and earnings? Among major crops, which concern us most here, there is none that has favorable price prospects over the next decade. In general, the best that can be expected in that period for any major commodity is stable prices; this may be the case for certain fats and oils and for aluminum. Others, such as rubber and jute, are not likely to maintain even present prices. Pressures on coffee prices, and to a lesser extent cocoa and tea, may be strong.

The less developed countries, often supported by the United States, have emphasized the importance of removing restrictions on consumption, such as high tariffs or domestic consumption taxes on tropical products. This has been particularly stressed since the establishment of the European Economic Community, which adds a system of preferential duties for its associated overseas territories to existing tariffs and fiscal charges on tropical crops.³ There is no doubt that the existing tax structure does inhibit consumption of some of these crops. This is notably true for coffee in Germany. There is certainly very little justification for continuing these taxes; Western European governments have in general an ample variety of tax sources, and there is no reason why their policies should needlessly restrict the exchange earnings of less developed countries.

It is important, however, not to exaggerate the effects of abolishing these taxes. Tinbergen has estimated that in 1959 the net effect of abolishing all duties and charges on coffee, tea and

³ E.E.C. tariff preferences for tropical crops from associated territories, at their present levels, constitute more of an annoyance to free trade than a barrier. The real problem of E.E.C. preferences is that they will include quantitative restrictions on products from other countries.

bananas in industrialized countries would have been an increase of \$64 million in the export earnings of less developed countries. Abolition of major importing countries' tariffs on sugar would have had a much more important effect, amounting to more than \$400 million in increased imports for the year 1959. However, sugar is produced domestically in all importing countries and the chances for any substantial move toward world free trade in sugar are slim.

Therefore, it should be realized that in practice the increase in foreign-exchange earnings resulting from abolition of tariffs and charges will not be great. Efforts to raise the level of export earnings from commodities can depend only to a limited degree on freer trade as a solution. Industrial countries show no signs of abandoning agricultural protection. And it is only for protected commodities—such as sugar, oil seeds and nonferrous metals—that freer trade would have a major effect on the earnings of less developed countries.

(2) *Foreign Aid.* Gross Western foreign aid to less developed areas increased from \$3.7 billion in 1956 to \$6.5 billion in 1961 (about \$6.4 billion in 1962). It is now a major item in the international accounts of less developed areas, and a number of countries are heavily dependent on it. Aid now accounts for about 17 percent of their foreign-exchange revenues. This very considerable sum is unlikely to increase at anything like the recent rate—if at all. Europe has increased its aid effort substantially, partly in response to pressures from the United States. If the U.S. contributions remain where they are or—as seems more likely—decline, other countries will be in a better position to resist U.S. influence.

Furthermore, the real increase in foreign aid has been much less than the gross figures suggest. Most aid is in the form of loans. Six years ago, developing countries were spending approximately \$1 billion a year for principal and interest payments on foreign loans. Today that figure is more than \$2.5 billion. The West could increase the real aid flow by offering more grants and long-term loans at low interest. So far, most European countries have been reluctant to move in this direction. However, despite stalwart resistance, it seems likely that aid terms in the future will be more generous.

(3) *Industrialization and Export of Manufactures.* In the short run, foreign aid and higher commodity prices, where they are feasible, offer the principal source for increased receipts. In the

long run, however, self-sustaining economic growth will generally require economic and social reorganization. The less developed areas will have to industrialize, with some proportion of the output substituting for present imports and some of the rest being exported.

Exports of manufactured goods from the less developed countries have increased fairly steadily but more slowly than the output of industry in these areas; much of the less developed world's industrialization has gone into the production of goods for the domestic market, to replace products that were formerly imported. There are a number of reasons why growth of manufactured exports has been slow. First, domestic markets in a number of countries are too small to allow mass production of various capital and consumer goods; therefore, it is difficult to bring costs down low enough to compete in export markets. Second, some products require very heavy initial investment or the mastery of complex techniques, and in less developed areas both capital and technique are at a premium. Third, in the fields where developing countries *are* able to compete—for example, textiles, clothing, leather goods, bicycles, furniture—these industries face real barriers on world markets. The present trade policies of developed countries tend to restrict “low-wage” imports. In general, internal political forces in the West will oppose massive increases in imports of these products. Until the West changes its policies, the best that can be hoped for is a gradual increase—one that would allow the less developed countries to share in the growth of domestic markets in the industrialized nations.

(4) *Foreign Private Investment.* Foreign private investment can be an effective method of promoting industrialization, because it allies capital with technical knowledge. However, the short-term prospects for an increased flow of investment are poor. The trend in world markets, the favorable investment opportunities at home and the political risks abroad all serve to discourage private investment in the developing areas. In order to promote a greater flow of capital not only will governments in investing countries have to offer comprehensive guarantees, but also host countries will have to extend foreign investors a more favorable reception than they have, in many cases, recently offered. A more imaginative approach might bring a handsome payoff. For example, relatively little has been done to utilize Western capital and technique through the device of government guaranteed or

financed joint ventures that could be progressively turned over to local management and ownership.

In general, then, there is little prospect for rapid increases in *foreign-exchange receipts*, except possibly for the petroleum exporting countries. There is some likelihood of a slow increase in the *effective* flow of foreign aid through easier loan terms. The growth of manufactured exports depends in large part on the import policies of developed countries; at this writing, it seems unrealistic to expect any important changes soon. Private investment, a most effective contributor to economic development, remains a question mark. With the proper economic and political incentives from both the industrial countries and the host nations, the possibilities are good. So far, the record on the whole has been dismal.

In short, the present structure and trends of trade of the less developed areas are likely to continue. Institutional barriers will probably continue to hold back the growth of industrial exports; sluggish demand and unresponsive supply will continue to keep commodity prices down.

II

Is there anything that can be done by international agreement to raise commodity prices? A device for deliberately raising the level of commodity prices and earnings would be one method of increasing the flow of resources to less developed countries. As we shall see, it could in theory significantly increase the export revenues of a number of countries; but an effective system of commodity agreements, which would be difficult to achieve, would be only a modest element in any comprehensive effort to raise the export revenues of less developed countries.

Discussion of the commodity problem has been confused by a number of doctrinal or emotional predispositions. Representatives of the underdeveloped countries have sometimes maintained that the industrial nations in effect pocket the increased productivity of commodity exporters in the form of lower prices. Prices, they argue, should be set higher by agreements; then less developed countries could increase their incomes, pay for their import needs and develop at a rate commensurate with their ambitions. They state that the only thing that is lacking is willingness on the part of industrial nations to coöperate in such schemes. Furthermore, they point out, industrial countries are perfectly willing

to negotiate for higher prices for their own agricultural commodities, both domestically and internationally.

Representatives of the industrial countries, as well as professional economists, have often argued that commodity markets should be free, except in crisis situations, because free markets will in the long run call forth the right supply at the right price. Tinkering with the free market raises all sorts of difficulties with production control, export quotas, exporters who refuse to join the agreement, pressures of stockpiles on the market, dangers of substitution of other products when the price of a given commodity goes too high. They state that to abandon free-market prices will create more problems than it solves. Increasing the flow of funds to underdeveloped countries should be done directly through aid and not indirectly through measures which are unlikely to be effective, and will also reduce donors' control over aid.⁴

It is obviously unrealistic to expect that commodity agreements can result in raising the general level of all commodity prices; as we shall see, price-fixing techniques could be effective for only a limited number of crops. On the other hand, devotion to free markets and arguments in favor of direct aid rather than higher prices are not always realistic either. If we accept the thesis that it will be difficult to achieve further increases in foreign aid, then the alternative is not genuine. Economists sometimes sound as if they were saying that it is impossible to maintain prices above free-market levels. In fact, however, producers of some commodities have benefited from high fixed prices for many years, and in certain cases, have also been able to enjoy a steady growth of markets. The recent article by William Butler in *Foreign Affairs*, already cited, states: "Over-all prospects for food and industrial raw-materials exports from less developed nations are not at all bleak. Consumption of some primary products will rise more rapidly than the average—for example, petroleum, bauxite, aluminum, and the newer metals." It is worthy of note that the producers of these commodities have not always been distinguished for their adherence to free-market principles.

⁴ This last statement makes two tacit assumptions: (1) none of the price rises can be diverted into government hands for diversification and development; (2) commodity agreements do not allow importers to influence exporters' economic policies. Both assumptions are debatable, as the operations of West African marketing boards (which pay farmers a fixed price for the crop, and use part of the profits for economic development), and the provisions of the International Coffee Agreement (specifying regular review of export quotas) suggest, respectively.

Of course, countries that produce these products are lucky; they can, until further notice, have their cake and eat it. But this section deals with the possible outcome of a commodity policy designed to transform free commodity markets into regulated ones, where feasible.

Opinions, as usual, conflict. What are the facts about what commodity agreements can and cannot do to raise prices and earnings?

(a) Which commodities could be controlled? Commodity price-fixing agreements can work for only a very few commodities. First, we have to rule out all products that face close competition from synthetic substitutes. These include rubber, jute and cotton. They accounted for about \$2.6 billion of the \$15.7 billion total of commodity exports in 1960.

Second, some commodities face competition from natural substitutes or from exports of the same product by industrial countries. This group includes vegetable oils and oil seeds, nonferrous metals, citrus fruits and tobacco. Less developed countries exported \$2.8 billion worth of these in 1960. Agreements for these products are not feasible for a variety of reasons. In the case of oils and oil seeds, for example, the structure of demand and supply allows substitution among a variety of vegetable oils, animal fats, fish oils and synthetic detergents; and the complexities of regulation would be staggering. Nonferrous metals present a somewhat analogous situation, primarily because of substitution between aluminum and copper. This situation is also complicated by the practice of using reclaimed or secondary metal when virgin metal prices rise. Furthermore, for nonferrous metals, as for tobacco, citrus fruits and cotton, it is hard to believe that importers would be willing to transfer income to developed countries simply for the sake of the economic benefits to less developed areas.⁵

The third group consists of one product—rice. Less developed countries account for the vast majority of world exports (\$426 million of a world export total of \$552 million in 1960) but also for most of world imports. The effect of a commodity agree-

⁵ A sub-group of this class is the so-called temperate agricultural products—grains, meats, wool. These crops are exported almost exclusively by developed areas but are also important to a few underdeveloped countries (*e.g.* Argentina, meats and grains; Uruguay, wool). Agreements for these products would primarily benefit a few developed countries at the expense of all other importers. This is clearly a case where direct aid to exporters is preferable to commodity agreements as a device for raising foreign-exchange earnings.

ment to stabilize and raise rice prices would therefore be initially to redistribute income among underdeveloped countries; and later to stimulate the drive for self-sufficiency in rice production already under way in many importing countries.

This brings us to the fourth group—commodities for which there is some prospect of stabilizing and gradually raising world prices, within the limits imposed by possible substitution. These include coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar and possibly bananas. (A few other minor crops might also be included but their total value is small in world trade.) These five crops provided less developed countries with about \$4.6 billion in foreign-exchange earnings in 1960. In that year they accounted for 57 percent of all food and beverage exports of the underdeveloped countries.

(b) Which countries would be affected? These five commodities are important to the export trade of more than 30 countries, primarily in Latin America and Africa. At least 15 countries rely on one or more of these products for more than half of their export earnings. In Latin America the list includes such countries as Colombia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala; in Africa, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Cameroun, Ethiopia; in Asia, only Ceylon, Taiwan, and, to a lesser degree, India. Roughly speaking, commodity price-fixing could help about one-third of the world's underdeveloped countries. (See table on the next page.)

(c) How much would these countries benefit? Higher commodity prices mean higher revenue for exporters only if: (1) there are no existing close substitutes for the product; (2) the proportion of consumers' income spent on the product is small; (3) the higher prices do not call forth the creation of synthetic substitutes. Therefore, there will always be limits to the long-run price levels that can be maintained. These limits will determine the exporters' maximum gain. In estimating these limits, we must take account of past performance of the market for these products, prospects for development of substitutes and estimates of elasticity of demand.

Consideration of past performance of the market leads to a decision not to try to achieve prices as high as those that prevailed during the peak period of the early 1950s. In general, these prices could not be sustained for long; and any serious effort to maintain them would erode the long-run market for these crops.

In light of these considerations, the table shows what would happen to export earnings if prices of these crops were raised to

**EFFECT OF POSSIBLE COMMODITY AGREEMENTS (COFFEE, TEA, COCOA,
SUGAR, BANANAS) ON EARNINGS OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES**

(in millions of dollars)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Actual 1961 Earnings</i>	<i>"Target"* Prices 1961 Earnings</i>	<i>Projected 1971 Earn- ings at 1961 Prices</i>	<i>Projected 1971 Earn- ings at "Target" Prices</i>	<i>Percent Increase 1961-1971 (Col. 4 ÷ Col. 3)</i>
LATIN AMERICA					
Brazil	804	1009	967	1367	41
El Salvador	70	87	96	120	25
Costa Rica	61	72	85	101	19
Colombia	323	380	444	521	17
Guatemala	85	97	118	135	14
Mexico	142	159	177	201	14
British Guiana	27	30	30	34	13
West Indies	72	80	80	90	13
Dominican Republic	86	95	101	113	12
Panama	20	22	29	32	10
Honduras	29	31	41	45	10
Ecuador	81	83	117	119	2
AFRICA					
Ethiopia	43	54	59	74	25
Kenya	11	13	13	16	23
Angola	64	77	87	105	21
Ivory Coast	124	150	170	204	20
Cameroun	46	55	63	75	19
Ghana	194	231	262	311	19
Nigeria	95	108	128	146	14
Nyasaland	12	14	15	17	13
Mauritius	45	50	50	56	12
ASIA					
Indonesia	36	44	45	54	20
Ceylon	234	260	290	322	11
Taiwan	67	64	65	72	11
Fiji	13	15	15	16	7
India	260	278	323	344	7

* Target prices, as compared to average world prices in 1961, are as follows:

	<i>Average 1961 Price</i>	<i>Target Price</i>
	(U. S. Cents per pound)	
Coffee	30.7	48.0
Cocoa	21.8	29.0
Tea	48.5	64.0
Sugar	3.9	5.0
Bananas	3.8	4.7

target levels that could be sustained without encouraging long-run substitution. Demand for these products is "price-inelastic" within a moderate range. That is, increases in price result in increases in total sales revenues. Demand for coffee, tea and sugar is particularly inelastic, because people use these products habitually, there are no close substitutes and only a small proportion of total income is spent on them. Thus, when sugar prices double, as they did in 1963, consumption falls relatively little. The demand for bananas is relatively more elastic because other fruits compete directly. Therefore, the price of bananas cannot be raised very much in the long run without actually reducing exporters' revenues.

The target prices shown allow for differences in price elasticities of demand among these crops. Columns 3 and 4, showing projected 1971 demand, take into account the differences in the growth of demand among these crops. As incomes and populations grow in importing countries the demand for coffee, for example, is likely to grow faster than the demand for tea.⁶

At these target prices, under an effective system of commodity agreements, less developed areas would have earned \$700 million more from this trade in 1961 than they actually did in that year. Looking forward to 1971, and taking account of population and income growth, they would earn about \$900 million more at these target prices than they would if 1961 prices were to prevail.

Most of the revenue increase (about 55 percent) would accrue to coffee exporters. Tea producers would receive about 13 percent of the benefits; cocoa growers about 10 percent; sugar producers about 17 percent and banana exporters less than 5 percent.

These differences reflect several factors: (1) coffee is the most important agricultural commodity in world trade, and therefore anything which affects its price has a strong impact; (2) coffee prices can be raised relatively more than the prices of other crops because substitution is less of a problem; (3) cocoa prices can be raised only slightly in the long run because at high prices cocoa faces active threats of substitution from vegetable oils and from other confectionery products; (4) bananas also face close competition from other fruits, and could probably gain more from removal of existing restrictions on trade than from price-fixing

⁶ These estimates for demand growth are taken from the Food and Agriculture Organization projections for 1970. In preparing the foregoing table, it has been assumed that each country's share of the world market remains constant as of 1961.

arrangements; (5) much of the world sugar trade is already carried out under price-fixing agreements; any sharp increase in prices would stimulate domestic production in importing countries, unless offset by importers' guarantee to maintain their imports. Thus present world sugar prices are far higher than the 5-cent target price suggested above. However, it seems safe to assume that it will be impossible to maintain export prices much higher than 5 to 6 cents per pound over the long run, because above this level it becomes quite profitable to produce beet sugar in temperate zones. The target used here is about 20 percent above the average price during the period 1955 to 1960.

(d) Who would pay the higher prices for the increased earnings? About 40 percent of the value of these five crops is now exported to the United States; another 40 percent is exported to Western Europe; the rest is divided among Canada, Japan, the Soviet bloc, Australia and New Zealand. Although there are a number of qualifications, the incidence of higher prices—in effect a sales tax—would be about evenly divided between the United States and Western Europe. This means, assuming an average annual increase in export earnings of \$800 million over the next decade, that consumers in each of these two areas would be paying about \$275 million a year more.

(e) How can the agreements work? One might think that the simple arithmetic of such a system would give exporters all the motivation they need to meet the conditions of an effective agreement. These conditions are: (1) national export quotas, assigned by international agreement, aimed at limiting world supply, thereby raising prices to target levels; (2) domestic production control systems, aimed at limiting national output, thereby reducing the pressure of unsold stocks on the market; (3) adherence of all major exporters and importers to the agreement; (4) common national pricing and subsidy systems that establish relatively low farm prices for the export crop (either by setting up an export tax, or requiring deliveries to a national marketing board); and that also pay farmers a subsidy for producing other crops, particularly for domestic markets.

In fact, many of the less developed countries would now be reluctant to sign such agreements, and unlikely to adhere to them once signed. Other nations might well have to wage a propaganda campaign to explain the need for such restrictive conditions.

There are a number of good reasons for this reluctance. First,

countries that produce only a small proportion of world output have an economic incentive to avoid tight controls. They can increase their exports sharply without affecting world prices. Unfortunately, if many small producers behave this way, prices will fall (although total revenue of small producers may rise); but it is not easy to demonstrate by argument the connection between increased exports and lower revenues. Second, for domestic political reasons, exporting countries may find it difficult to accept reductions in export quotas; while production controls may require an administrative structure beyond the present capacity of many countries. Third, it may also be difficult to maintain and administer a system of high export prices and relatively low farm prices, although some countries (Ghana, Brazil) have established marketing boards with this function. Fourth—and not to be taken lightly—exporters remember that until the mid-fifties, high prices prevailed without this complex control apparatus. They hope for a return to high prices without the dreary concomitant of controls. The recent breakdown of negotiations for an international cocoa agreement probably reflects in part producers' optimism, generated by a recent upturn in prices.

Ultimately, it is up to the exporters to face and solve—with importers' coöperation—the problems of making agreements effective. If they are reluctant or unable, prices will probably remain low or drop further over the next decade. The learning process may be slow and the price may well include the breakdown of initial agreements, as exporters savor the costly merits of rugged individualism. We should not deceive ourselves into believing that persuasion will be easy; by the same token, it would be self-deception to assume that free-market forces supplemented by more foreign aid will somehow take care of it all.

The International Coffee Agreement negotiated in September 1962, and now ratified by the participating governments, is a case in point. It offers an opportunity to test the effectiveness of an international commodity agreement aimed at restricting the output and maintaining the price of tropical crops. The price objectives set forth in the agreement are more modest than those discussed in this article. The agreement speaks of "equitable prices" which will bring about long-term equilibrium between production and consumption and "increasing the purchasing power of coffee-exporting countries by keeping prices at equitable

levels." The quotas set for the first year are apparently aimed at maintaining prices at the 1962 average level. In view of the vast burden of stocks—nearly two years' supply at current consumption levels—this may be as much as it is feasible to expect immediately.

The coffee agreement includes at least in embryo the elements of a control mechanism that would be required, including a system of export quotas, penalty provisions for countries that do not comply with export quotas and production controls; and it makes a gesture toward programs of agricultural diversification. But the prospects for using it as a device for progressively raising coffee prices are not favorable. Higher prices will require production cutbacks in Brazil and Colombia and no increase in production in other producing areas. Brazil is embarking on a program of production cutbacks which includes rooting up coffee trees. It is still too early to say whether this can be done on the required scale.

The principal obstacle in the way of higher coffee prices lies in the reaction of smaller producers, notably in Central America and Africa. Under the provisions of the Coffee Agreement, countries that produce more than their export quota will have to store the coffee; if they persistently produce more than their export quotas plus domestic consumption, they will be penalized by not sharing in future quota increases. But a number of the Central American and African producers have no established system for storing surplus production and some governments may have only a limited ability to control farmers' production decisions.

Naturally it is always possible through devices such as export taxes or subsidies for planting new crops to transfer land out of coffee production. However, such policies may often raise administrative or political difficulties that are not easy to solve. The temptation may be very strong for countries that are producing more than their quotas to export the surplus in violation of the agreement. The Coffee Agreement allows some room for this temptation to be met legally by establishing so-called "new markets" in countries where coffee consumption is low, such as Africa, Asia or the Soviet bloc. Presumably coffee will be exported to these countries at a much lower price than in the quota market. However, it is far from sure that the new market will, in fact, be able to absorb potential surplus production.

Production control schemes are unlikely to work perfectly—

the tree crop response is slow, and effects of weather cannot be provided for. Therefore, there is a *prima facie* case for buffer stock schemes to help maintain prices at target levels. In the case of coffee, it is difficult to see how an international stock could be established unless the huge Brazilian and Colombian reserves could be eliminated. One possible solution would be to destroy sub-standard coffee and to require producing countries to contribute most of their exportable reserves to the buffer stock.

In these circumstances, it becomes quite important for the governments of the importing countries to work particularly closely with the smaller exporters to devise methods that will result in keeping production and exports at the agreed levels through systems of disincentive taxes and incentive payments for diversification, if necessary. Otherwise, there is a likelihood that the agreement will break down under the pressure of excess supplies.

This, then, is the outline of a feasible system of commodity agreements: one that could under "ideal" circumstances have a large economic impact on a half-dozen countries; a more modest effect on perhaps 25 more; and virtually none on perhaps twice as many. As our discussion of the Coffee Agreement indicates, such agreements would be difficult to administer; they would not help the majority of less developed countries, and even the countries that would benefit could do so only within the sharp limits imposed by possible substitution of other commodities or synthetic products. It would be clearly unrealistic to treat commodity agreements as a sovereign remedy for trade and development problems. None the less, the effort to raise systematically the prices of four or five commodities is a useful interim measure. There may be compelling political, as well as economic, grounds for making the attempt.

THE CHANGING POLITICAL CONTEXT

By Janez Stanovnik

THE Sino-Soviet rift and the first improvements in Soviet-American relations affect not only relations between East and West but also between North and South. The problems of the Southern Hemisphere are predominantly economic. Policies of trade and aid pursued thus far toward the developing countries, evolving as they did within the terms of the cold war, have not yielded encouraging results. The developing countries can no longer be an object in world policy; they must become a subject of policy on an equal footing with others. In order to attain that status, however, they must be able to exploit fully their own resources, both material and human. International action can serve as a catalyst. But for it to do so successfully, there must be a thorough reconsideration not only of present aid policy but also of international trade and financial policy. China's challenge introduces new elements in this field. The new international economic policy should not rest on political alliances, pacts and blocs but must try to assist the transformation of the developing countries internally so as to promote their consolidation and stabilization.

II

In the fifties, the developing countries had an average annual rate of increase of the gross domestic product of 4.65 percent, while the industrialized countries in the same period had an annual increase of 3.70 percent. At first glance, this tendency provides a basis for moderate optimism, as well as the hope that the gap between the underdeveloped and developed countries may in time diminish. Unfortunately, however, this statistical trend conceals quite a different reality. For meanwhile the average annual rate of increase of population in the developing countries had reached 2.21 percent in the fifties, while it was only 1.16 percent in the industrialized countries. This means that the per capita annual rate of growth was about 2.5 percent in both parts of the world.

Thus we see that the value of the product per inhabitant in the

developing countries is increasing annually by \$3.40, while in the industrialized countries it is increasing by \$38.60. The gap between the industrialized and developing countries is therefore still widening.

The gist of the problem, however, does not lie simply in the gap between the developed and developing countries. What makes the inequality in degree and tempo of economic growth a problem is not that the average per capita production in the developing countries is 11 times smaller than in the industrial countries, and not even that the annual increment is 11 times smaller, but rather that the production potential in the former is growing immeasurably more slowly than is required by peoples who have just emerged from colonial rule, have acquired the means of modern transport and communication and have come to understand all the possibilities opened to man by modern science and technology.

Economic development is the result of numerous factors, both human and material. Lacking a better yardstick, we consider gross capital formation as the principal dynamic factor of development. Capital can be "productive" or "less productive," depending on imponderable factors. The gross domestic fixed capital formation in the developing countries amounted to \$28 billion in 1959. The value of their exports, however, averaged \$27.8 billion annually for the period 1956-59. In view of the fact that the commercialization of the economies of the developing countries is still at a low level, it becomes evident that there exists a very close correlation between the volume of investments and the receipts from exports.

The average annual rate of increase of exports for the industrialized countries amounted to 6.9 percent in the 1950s while it was only 3.6 percent for the developing countries. But for the developing countries the value of export receipts was not limited only by the volume of world demand, but also by prices in the world market. Actually, in the past 12 years the terms of trade for those countries constantly declined. If we reckon the purchasing power of export receipts in terms of 1950 export and import prices, then the developing countries during the past decade lost about \$15 billion simply through the unfavorable price trends. And if we take the price relations of 1951 as the basis, these losses would be almost double.

Faced with such a situation, the developing countries first

sought to solve the problem by increasing capital imports. The import of private capital increased from an annual average of \$800 million in the period 1951-55 to \$1.3 billion for 1960-61. Much more significant was the increase of the official flow of capital, which rose from \$900 million to \$2 billion in the same period.

The increase of international indebtedness, however, very soon revealed that it had limits. In 1960-61 the interest and dividend payments of the developing countries was not less than 13.3 percent of their merchandise export receipts. The combined flow of private and official capital to the developing countries amounted to about \$3.8 billion in 1961 while the flow of interest and dividend payments in the opposite direction amounted to about \$3.4 billion. The slow increase in the demand for exports from the developing countries impaired their ability to repay their debts. Very rightly, then, the former president of the World Bank, Mr. Eugene Black, cautioned the governors that a group of countries representing 70 percent of the total population in the developing world had doubled their total external public debt in the period 1955-1961, while the export earnings which would make it possible for them to repay this debt had increased by little more than 15 percent.

In the same decade, the developing countries received donations from the industrialized countries amounting to \$19 billion. However, losses in trade most likely were greater than the gains in aid. The international grants in aid during the fifties prevented a collapse of the world economy but failed to remedy the basic problem of world development.

III

The past decade, however, not only revealed the problems of economic growth in the developing countries; it also made the international community aware of the need to solve them. But awareness of their gravity was not coupled with an adequate readiness for action. The political reality was colored by the invention of thermonuclear weapons and delivery systems, but more and more the field of conflict between the main centers of world power was being shifted to the economic sphere, and especially to the developing countries. Economic aid in the form of outright grants therefore became the basic instrument of the economic policy of the industrialized vis-à-vis the developing

countries and as such became an integral part of the general world strategy of that period.

The volume of international aid to the developing countries rose sharply during the fifties. In the second half of the period, the value of merchandise exports of the developing countries increased by only 17 percent while the over-all value of international assistance to them increased by 63 percent.¹ Parallel to an increase in the volume of aid, its character and direction were also changed. From July 1, 1945, to June 30, 1960, the United States alone allotted foreign aid in the amount of \$75 billion. Of this sum, however, \$39.5 billion was directed to Western Europe, while the developing countries, representing two-thirds of the world's population, received \$20.3 billion. The concept prevailed during the first postwar period that financial aid to the industrially developed countries would stimulate their economies and that this would indirectly help the developing countries by increasing the demand for raw materials. However, the philosophy of "aid to the industrial countries and trade with the undeveloped countries" was short-lived.

Early in the fifties—at the time, that is, of the Korean conflict—the main emphasis in aid to underdeveloped countries was military. It was only after Stalin's death that economic aid began to develop increasingly. The policy of aid to the developing countries went through three stages in the fifties: "trade not aid"—"trade or aid"—"trade and aid." Yet throughout this period the policy of assistance evolved within the general framework of "competitive coexistence."

Beginning in 1954, the Soviet Union also started granting aid, mainly in the form of long-term, low-interest loans to individual developing countries. From mid-1955 to the end of 1960, the socialist countries granted assistance to the developing countries amounting to \$3.6 billion while the United States gave them, in corresponding categories of aid, about \$7.3 billion.

Attempts to make trade take the place of aid—motivated primarily by the desire of the industrial countries to decrease the burden of internal taxation—soon proved unrealistic. In fact, experience showed that there was practically no correlation between trade and aid. The countries of the Middle East, for instance, increased their export earnings in this period—due

¹ Included are not only grants but also loans and agricultural surpluses, such as those under P.L. 480, etc.

largely to oil exports—by 43 percent, while simultaneously the volume of international aid to this area increased by 84 percent. On the other hand, Africa's export receipts during that period grew by only 23 percent while the inflow of international aid increased by only 8 percent. Let us take, for example, the case of Costa Rica, where the terms of trade in 1959 remained on the same level as in 1954 although the country was receiving per capita aid of \$37.90. In contrast, the terms of trade for Burma in the same period fell by 29 percent while the per capita aid amounted to only \$2.30. Aid was not a substitute or compensation for defects in the field of trade and it could not simply be replaced by trade.

Toward the close of the fifties, various attempts at reform somehow stabilized policy on the basis of "trade and aid." That concept aimed to maintain trade relations on traditional patterns, but admitted implicitly that this could succeed only if supplemented with a deliberate policy of governmental aid. Thus international economic relations with the developing countries evolved according to a dualistic pattern: in the field of trade, the attempt was made to maintain existing economic and commercial principles and motivations, while in the field of aid the principles and motivations applied were preponderantly political. This made the international economic relations of the developing countries highly dependent upon the general course of international political relations.

The concepts of "competitive coexistence" and of the "economic competition of two systems" proceeded in fact from the same basic assumptions. Both sides became increasingly aware that they could not resolve their differences by thermonuclear war. This does not mean, however, that in this period there had as yet matured the awareness, which President Tito forcefully expressed before the U.N. General Assembly last October, that "the time is past when economic and material benefits might have been achieved by war, by the conquest of foreign territories or the like." Quite the contrary, it was largely an attempt to attain the same goals by new means; and aid was an important one of them. Although in many instances aid led to a more rapid economic evolution in the developing countries, its basic aim, nevertheless, was not economic development as such but as a component of the political aim being pursued. This policy evolved in general from the belief that the destiny of our civilization rested

on some solution of the rivalry between East and West. Each side endeavored to expand its influence in the Southern Hemisphere, feeling that this might help it achieve its ultimate goals.

But this kind of aid policy made the situation of the developing countries more and more critical. Often it did not yield economic results—which is not surprising, as the motives and criteria for it were not primarily economic—while its long-term political effects proved dubious.

The fact that the experience of the fifties was unfavorable does not necessarily mean that international aid as such is an unsuccessful instrument for promoting economic growth. However, that experience does show unmistakably that international aid is a dubious instrument of international policy.

IV

Toward the close of the fifties it became increasingly clear that the leaders of the People's Republic of China did not accept the policy of the "economic competition between two systems," which was, in fact, only an aspect of the more general Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. For a number of years, however, the differences between the Soviet and Peking leaderships were resolved by compromise declarations in which one could not fail to see the contradiction between two attitudes. At the moment when this dispute came out into the open, there occurred the first major success of the policy of coexistence—the Moscow agreement banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. This effected a major shift of forces on the international plane. The final effect of this cannot yet be fully envisaged, but some of its implications for economic policy toward the developing countries can be surmised.

The Chinese leaders challenge the Soviet policy all along the line. Their criticisms of various aspects of it are so closely inter-related that it is hard to say which are primary. Did the dispute begin only because of differences in views regarding war and peace? Or because of differing attitudes toward the role of the developing countries in the world economic picture? Or because of differing attitudes toward the path of developing socialism in the world? Or on any other single disagreement on an individual issue? In estimating the causes, one cannot overlook the strong elements of big-power policy in the political concepts of the Chinese leadership. In 1961 the People's Republic of China, together

with North Korea and North Viet Nam, numbered 720,000,000 people, while the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries of Eastern Europe totaled only 315,000,000. While the gross national product of the People's Republic, North Korea and North Viet Nam amounted to only \$61 billion, that of the Soviet bloc amounted, according to conservative estimates, to \$231 billion. In their aspiration to take over the leadership of the socialist camp, the Chinese leaders founded their policy on the "theory" of the need for the simultaneous transition of all the socialist countries to Communism. In practice, this meant that the more developed socialist countries should concentrate their current economic efforts on assistance to economically backward China. In view of China's advantage in population, this evidently implied a final take-over of the leadership of the whole camp once economic equality was reached.

Such a demand obviously met with opposition in the Soviet Union. The new Soviet leadership was basing its policy on the recognition that a country's economic and social progress was possible only under conditions of greater consumption and well-being, the gradual freeing of initiative and a general relaxation in the internal psychological atmosphere. The position of the Soviet Union in the world arena probably did not allow it to shut itself up inside the frontier of the "camp." It thus found itself confronted by a twofold and huge task: to increase the standard of living in the country and to meet the international commitments imposed by the cold war. Efforts were made to extend economic aid to the other socialist countries alongside these two basic tasks, but not as an alternative to them. The Chinese policy of the "great leap forward" can therefore be understood as a rebuff and challenge to this Soviet policy. Chinese comments on the "national bourgeoisie" in the developing countries imply as well a criticism of Soviet aid to the "bourgeois" governments of these countries.

Events did not develop along a simple causal line: one cause and one effect. Did the U.S.S.R. come into conflict with the People's Republic of China because of the Soviet desire to coexist with the United States? Or did it perhaps attempt to coexist with the United States because of its increasingly tense relations with the People's Republic? Or did domestic Soviet requirements indicate a course of coexistence, while internal Chinese developments dictated another course of action which could not be rec-

onciled with the former? Or did the interests of the Soviet Union as a great power prevent it from taking steps which, in the final analysis, would downgrade it from that position? All these alternatives can be left to guesswork. What is undeniable is that, concurrently with the improvement of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, relations between the U.S.S.R. and China worsened, and that in their further development one can expect a certain inter-relationship.

This situation introduces new elements into the policy of "competitive coexistence" or "economic competition between two systems," the framework within which the aid policy for the developing countries has until now been evolving.

To the Soviet Union, coexistence means a relaxation of tension and a possibility to reduce the economic burden of armaments. Such a reduction frees resources for more rapid development and a higher standard of living. With its world responsibilities in the 1950s, the Soviet Union was probably not in a position to meet Chinese requests for aid. Now Soviet policy confronts the question: What are the aims and results of the aid policy to the developing countries in the new circumstances? In a time of rapprochement at the "center," the strengthening of the political influence on the "periphery" may not seem to have the same meaning it had before; therefore it may not seem to be worth while to sacrifice important resources for aid in those areas.

A new look at the policy of aiding developing countries is in progress also in the United States. What has happened in Pakistan, South Viet Nam, South Korea and other countries shows that economic aid does not guarantee political alliances in the new circumstances. Aid could be conceived of as an instrument of policy as long as there were only two main centers of power in the world and as long as both competed for influence over the governments of the developing countries. Now, however, Peking is increasingly asserting itself as an independent protagonist, not so much in the field of economic aid to the governments in those countries as with demagogic slogans addressed to the "revolutionary masses" there. Bilateral aid with political motives and based on political criteria might possibly secure the loyalty of the governmental circles which receive it, but it cannot affect the behavior of the peoples who have had little benefit from it so far, given its failure to promote general economic and social progress. In these circumstances, it seems a logical solution to supply aid

more through multilateral agencies. And in fact the developing countries have all along favored a multilateral approach so as to free themselves from dependence on big-power rivalries.

Thus we see that the new world situation affects aid policy in a most direct way. The basic accent no longer is: With which side will the governments of the developing countries become allied? The question is much more: What will be the real internal economic and social progress in these countries?

V

The world situation in the sixties is a new one and it requires a reconsideration of certain basic assumptions as to policy approaches. First of all, in a time of "competitive coexistence" and "economic competition between two systems," it will be necessary to reexamine the notion of "system."

The capitalistic "system" was the term used to designate the private-enterprise economies in North America, Western Europe, Oceania and Japan. The socialist "system" incorporated the centrally planned economies in the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe and Asia. Stalin carried this concept to its ultimate consistency with the theory of "socialist" and "capitalist" world markets, which served as a basis for the concept of the international division of labor on "socialist" and "capitalist" lines.

Although both the East and the West could aspire to giving practical application to the monolithic aspect of their territorial "systems," this concept met with serious difficulties when applied to the developing countries. The idea of the troika represented an attempt to reach a compromise in the concrete situation existing in the United Nations; but it only proved that a sharp territorial division of the world according to socio-economic systems was not feasible. The majority of the developing countries adopted a mixed economy as an institutional framework. However, as "competitive coexistence" and "economic competition between two systems" continued to grow, an increasing tendency set in toward non-alignment and toward African, Arab, Indian, Cuban and other paths to socialism. The Belgrade and Cairo Conferences were clear reflections of this development.

If it was true that inconsistencies in the old concept of a "system" had been demonstrated in the past, it is even more true today when the general principles of coexistence are being applied. The basic premise of coexistence and the prerequisite for

its further progress are the establishment of mutual confidence. But as long as the "systems" continue to have a territorial connotation, practical policies will encounter a wide range of difficulties.

If the countries of the Western alliance consider themselves identified with the capitalist system, while those of the Eastern alliance are identified with the socialist system, then either coexistence or confidence may come into question. Marxists cannot renounce the class struggle between the socialist and capitalist systems. Both the adherents of capitalism and of socialism logically aspire to extend their influence and their ideas. If this extension is identified with the territorial expansion of "systems" or the spread of spheres of interest, then coexistence must sooner or later damage the confidence which is the precondition of progress and the fulfillment of the policy of coexistence. In short, coexistence is possible only under the condition that neither territorial grouping should be committed to "bury" its opponent and inherit its territory.

Coexistence is possible on the basis of strict respect for territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs, the renunciation of force as an instrument in settling disputes, respect for sovereignty and the realization of a minimal system of collective security. That is why coexistence can and should be the principle underlying the relations among states, regardless of whether such states are associated in some territorial alliances or not; among various countries, regardless of whether they are large or small; among national economies, regardless of whether they are organized into capitalist, socialist, feudal or traditional institutional patterns. Progress and fulfillment of the policy of coexistence is therefore possible if both sides give up their claim that their territorial alliances of states are the sole embodiment of one system or another. Thus, systems should again be conceived as they properly are: the institutional organization of economy, a social organization of life, production and distribution, and not an international political or military alliance. "Systems" relate to internal and not international relations. Coexistence therefore need not involve the renunciation of the class struggle or further social evolution or the sanctioning of the status quo. Coexistence as thus conceived is essential not only for the East and the West but for the developing countries as well.

Such a clarification of general conceptions, which seems to be a

logical consequence of the further evolution of the policy of co-existence, will have far-reaching implications for international economic policy regarding the developing countries within the framework of a re-formulated policy of "competitive coexistence" or the "economic competition of two systems."

It thus becomes possible for there to be an independent institutional evolution of the socio-economic systems in the developing countries which is acceptable to both the developed parts of the world and which does not change the basic balance of power. Relations with the developing countries in the new situation need no longer evolve in the shadow of attempts to enlarge spheres of interest. The new situation thus creates new conditions in which relations with the developing countries can be based primarily on economic and no longer on political or military motivations.

VI

The need for a new international policy vis-à-vis the developing countries is obvious. It must take into account the new world reality; it must be founded on the experiences and lessons of the fifties; it must also be adapted to the internal experiences and needs of economic and social growth.

Aid for development purposes during the fifties was primarily motivated by political considerations, with humanitarian and economic motives of secondary importance. Trade policy toward the developing countries, however, remained subject to the rules of the game, inherited from the past. And since there was no inner connection between trade and aid policy, it is no wonder that the aid policy did not succeed in mitigating or neutralizing the negative effects of the trade policy.

The new world developments diminish the likelihood that aid will be extended for the purpose of attracting political sympathizers and allies. This does not mean, however, that it weakens the motivation for constructive and effective economic policies toward the developing countries in general. Reduced tension decreases the political motivation but at the same time increases the economic motivation.

The problem confronting the world community does not arise from the alternatives of "development" or "stagnation" in the developing countries. The demand for economic growth is a *sine qua non* in our day and as such it is only a sequel to the play of those same forces which during the past decade led to the libera-

tion from colonial rule. President Kennedy was right when he told the United Nations that "political independence is but a mockery without economic advancement." The problem facing the world community is whether the developing countries will be compelled to develop primarily with their own resources or whether they will enjoy the advantages of international coöperation. The implications of one or the other path are today clear (as the developments in China may serve to illustrate).

Out of approximately 80 independent developing countries, about 50 are so small that the annual gross national product of each amounts to less than one billion dollars. If these countries are compelled to develop by relying solely on their own resources, they will be forced to undertake a much more intensive substitution for imports than is economically reasonable, they will have to introduce a much more rigid internal discipline than they wish, they will have to "tighten their belts" much more than their populations would freely be ready to do. The internal and external consequences of such a policy can easily be foreseen. If, on the other hand, they are to enjoy the advantages of full international coöperation—trade and aid—then the transition will be much smoother and the international implications much more favorable.

It is not a question of neutralizing Chinese demagoguery. Chinese propaganda cannot secure mass support in the developing countries either with its theories on the inevitability of war, or by such actions as its territorial expansion toward India, or with such policies as breaking up the family. The case is different when it comes to economic and social achievements in China. China cannot become a sympathetic symbol with its foreign policy, but only with its internal policy and with its opposition to those whom the masses in the developing countries blame for their plight—supposing, that is, that the international community does not provide a better alternative through change and economic and social advancement.

Despite a certain measure of progress in the last decade, economic progress in the developing countries is still largely restricted to a thin upper layer. Dr. Raul Prebisch recently noted that 5 percent of the upper strata of society enjoy 30 percent of the entire consumption in Latin America. The dualistic character of economy and society, inherited from colonialism, stubbornly continues to prevail. The dependence of a tiny commercialized

sector of the economy upon foreign trade—in circumstances where there is an unfavorable trend in commodity exports—is the Achilles' heel in the economies of these countries.

Under the changed conditions, the political alignment of the developing countries is of lesser significance than their economic and social advancement. This advancement, however, is being impeded by inherited international trade relations. The terms of trade are still determined largely by the concentrations of economic power which put the peoples of those countries in the status of "hewers of wood and drawers of water." Just as economic and political stability is inconceivable in a national economy in which the workers and farmers are exposed to the pressures of a concentrated economic force under the pretext of the "law of supply and demand," so world stability is inconceivable under conditions in which the world's workers and farmers—the primary commodity producers, that is, the developing countries—are exposed to the pressure of the concentrated economic force of those who have already attained a degree of economic maturity.

The new world trade policy should make it possible for the developing countries to put their natural and human resources to productive use, and thus to earn their own way. But though it should provide new opportunities for the developing countries, it will not automatically increase production. Trade policy should therefore be coördinated and supplemented by an aid policy.

Such a trade and aid policy does not necessarily mean a new "sacrifice" on the part of the industrial countries. The launching of development activities on the territory of one-half of the globe will give to the whole world economy an impulse similar to that produced in the American economy with the opening up of the American West. The effects will be felt in greater employment, the transfer of economic activities to sectors of high productivity, and in many other ways. A new trade and aid policy toward the developing countries will thereby become not a liability but an asset for world progress.

THE CHALLENGE TO MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

By Colonel Robert N. Ginsburgh

THE mounting tension in civil-military relations within our Government is made up of many factors—especially, perhaps, the tightening of civilian control and the postwar changes in the nature of war and of the military profession itself. The conflicts are reported almost daily by the Pentagon press corps, and the frustrations of the military are made evident in the writings of Generals Gavin, Ridgway, Taylor, Medaris, White and Admiral Anderson. It is not that these men question the principle of civilian control. Nor is the struggle simply a contest for power. What the military are principally reacting to is the implicit challenge to their professionalism.

Undoubtedly, there exist certain elements of a power struggle for the control of defense policy. A succession of Secretaries of Defense have discovered that it is no easy job to exercise control over officers accustomed to lead and command. The very fact that Mr. McNamara has sought to exercise a greater degree of direction than has any of his predecessors is certainly one cause of the conflict. Yet this fact alone is not sufficient to explain the extent of present tensions in civil-military relationships in Washington.

Although the American military have not always been submissive to the civilian controllers, they have never seriously challenged the right or the tradition of civil control. They have recognized that the ultimate decision-maker must balance military recommendations against other considerations. It is not too difficult for a military man to accept an adverse decision based on nonmilitary considerations. It becomes extremely difficult, however, for him to reconcile himself to an adverse decision by his civilian superior based on military considerations. This strikes at the very *raison d'être* of the military man. It challenges his military professionalism.

The maintenance of a high degree of military professionalism is essential to the preservation of our nation's security without sacrifice of basic American values. The challenge to military professionalism is reflected in each of what Samuel P. Huntington calls the essential characteristics of a profession: corporateness, responsibility and—especially—expertise.

II

A sense of corporateness is especially strong in the military profession. Like other professions the military has its community of interests, common experiences and common values which bind the profession together. But two additional factors make the corporateness of the military especially strong. First, the military man can pursue his profession only within his own national military establishment. Although he may transfer some of his expertise to other areas of endeavor, he cannot continue as an active member of the military profession outside the national military establishment. Second, the sharing of common danger, inherent in the profession, provides a unifying bond—and one which grows stronger as the danger becomes more immediate.

Prior to World War II there was a third factor which contributed greatly to the military's sense of corporateness—its isolation. Geographically, politically and philosophically the military profession lived its own life in a military society set apart from American society. A fundamental challenge to military corporateness today stems from the fact that the military are no longer isolated from the mainstream of American life. There still exist isolated military bases and long tours outside the United States on ship or shore, but the military have become intermingled with civilian society both within their local communities and in the nation.

It is undoubtedly desirable that the military be closely identified with the society they have sworn to defend. But in the intermingling process, many military officers have become less willing to sacrifice personal convenience and have become more concerned with the adequacy of military pay than when they were living on military stations isolated from the impact of the more attractive wages and hours of work of the civilian community.

These two factors—personal inconvenience and pay—combined with the policy which permits early retirement have caused many military men to think of their profession as just a job rather than as a lifetime career. At an early date many military men start planning for their second careers; in fact, many dedicated military professionals have felt that they could simultaneously have greater impact on military policy and receive greater personal rewards by leaving the military profession to work for industry, the "think factories" or even for the Defense Department in a civilian capacity.

Finally, the administrative fusion of the military services in the Department of Defense has not been accompanied by a fusion of their corporate loyalties, which remain attached to the individual services. More than that, emphasis on specialization has tended to splinter the sense of corporateness within the services so that Naval officers think of themselves as black shoe or brown shoe, while Air Force officers may classify themselves as SAC types or TAC types.

III

As compared to the inter-war years, the responsibility of the military has clearly increased, but their authority has been progressively eroded. As a result of the expansion of the unified command concept, the authority of the Service Chief as an individual has been supplanted by the corporate authority of the Joint Chiefs, while the authority of the Chiefs of Staff has been reduced through the creation of the elaborate superstructure for defense policy-making in Washington. At the same time the important responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not lessened and exist whether or not they can agree on the actions to implement them. Their authority to act, however, depends on their reaching agreement.

A further challenge to the responsibility of the military is inherent in our form of government. Because of the separation of powers between the Executive and Congress, the individual public servant may justifiably be confused as to where his responsibility lies. This is especially true for the military. As a result of the increased importance of military affairs in our national life, questions of defense policy have been added to the political issues in the continuing power struggle between the executive and legislative branches. Congress took pains specifically to grant to the Chiefs of the military services the right to appeal to Congress—a right which President Eisenhower once described as “legalized insubordination.” There remains, too, in the military profession a sense of responsibility to the people and to the Constitution which transcends the more immediate responsibility to Congress and the Administration. When beset by frustration, the military man tends to satisfy his need for a feeling of responsibility by turning to this ultimate loyalty.

Finally, the concept of responsibility is also challenged when the expertise of the military profession is put in question. When

the political decision-maker asks for and accepts the opinion of an expert, he can hold him responsible for the adequacy of such advice. When he refuses to accept his advice because he challenges his qualifications, he can no longer expect to hold the expert responsible. Certainly the expert's sense of responsibility also suffers as a result.

IV

The challenge to military expertise is the most important aspect of the challenge to military professionalism, because expertise is, after all, the very basis of any profession.

Military expertise encompasses strategy, tactics and administration. Generally speaking, military expertise in tactics and administration has not been seriously challenged. The reason for this, according to Bernard Brodie, is that: "There is no doubt that tactics and administration are the areas in which the soldier is most completely professional. The handling of battles by land, sea or air, the manoeuvring of large forces, the leadership of man in the face of honor and death, and the development and administration of the organizations that affect these purposes are clearly not jobs for amateurs." In the area of strategy, however, Brodie asserts as a "basic fact" that "the soldier has been handed a problem that extends far beyond the expertise of his own profession."¹ In similar vein Joseph Kraft argues that "the professional soldiers—not through any fault of their own, but on the contrary in consequence of their virtues—are ill-fitted for high-level strategic thought."² This is indeed ironic when we consider that originally the word "strategy," derived from the Greek *strategos*, meant simply the art of generalship.

Even before World War I, however, wars were usually considered too important to be left to the generals—unless the commanding general was also chief of state. Since World War II, the political leaders have become more concerned than ever before with the problems of war, strategy and military affairs in general. War is no longer a question merely of victory or defeat on the field of battle. With the advent of nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems, we have reached the stage where peacetime preparedness is likely to determine the outcome of a major nuclear

¹ Bernard Brodie, "Strategy in the Missile Age." Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, p. 15-16 and 9-10.

² Joseph Kraft, "The War Thinkers," *Esquire*, September 1962, p. 148.

war. Thus not only war but also peacetime defense becomes too serious a matter to be left to the generals.

At the same time that technology has forced political leaders to concern themselves with military affairs, it has operated to make the military man less of an expert. The development of new weapons has always been of great importance in the history of warfare. In earlier times, however, the military professional was able to assimilate the military impact over a period of years or even generations, and if he was not necessarily the creator of the new technology, he was almost invariably its exploiter. Today, however, technological developments come so thick and fast that it becomes difficult to keep abreast of their existence, much less assimilate their impact on military problems. Furthermore, the professional has a much smaller role in the creation of new weapons because their complexity requires the specialized services of the scientist and engineer, and their magnitude generally requires that they be produced by industry rather than government.

Thus in the continuing technological race for new and better weapons, the scientist, the engineer and the industrialist become partners with the military man; and he becomes dependent on them in the pursuit of his profession. By no means silent partners, they may be in a position to insist successfully that a particular project of great interest to the military is impractical. It may, in fact, be impractical, but it may also be that the scientist or engineer for one reason or another personally thinks it undesirable. In any ensuing dispute the military man frequently finds himself at a disadvantage. The scientist probably has more technical knowledge of the subject; and if, as is probable, the dispute involves new weapons requiring new military techniques, the military man will have little experience on which to rely. Furthermore, to the extent that warfare has advanced toward the push-button stage, there is increased emphasis on peacetime pre-planning at the expense of decision-making and military judgment during the heat of battle—the peculiar province of the military professional. Thus, the nuclear scientist can say that he knows more about nuclear physics than the military and that, after all, the military man hasn't had any actual experience in waging nuclear war, in which there isn't much need for military judgment anyway.

It is not only the natural scientists and engineers who cast doubt on the expertise of the military; it is also the political scientists and those whom David Lilienthal calls "the methodolo-

gists.”³ The military services had of course used the techniques of operations analysis during World War II, and subsequently their application was expanded within the military services to include the determination of desirable characteristics and uses of new weapons and the development of new tactical and strategic concepts. The services also created a variety of nongovernmental think factories. Thus, we find the RAND Corporation working primarily with the Air Force, the Research Analysis Corporation with the Army, the Operations Evaluation Group at M.I.T. with the Navy, and the Institute for Defense Analysis with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Department. In addition, there are some 350 other non-profit corporations, some 300 college research centers, and 1400 industrial companies, as well as various private foundations and scientific advisory committees—all involved in some degree in the business of thinking about military problems.

Unquestionably, these think factories have performed a valuable service to the military professional in his search to adapt technology to military problems. But on occasion they have further complicated this search, and they have undoubtedly challenged his professional expertise.

Here once again, the professional military man frequently finds himself at a disadvantage in comparison with a member or “graduate” of the think factories. First, the very independence of a think factory tends to lend its findings greater prestige than if the same conclusions were reached by the government agency which employed it. This independence also gives the think factory the opportunity to approach other agencies in an attempt to persuade the government as to the correctness of its findings. Similarly, the individual “academic strategist” who has graduated from a think factory may move back and forth among other think factories, universities and government. If his ideas on military strategy and policy are not well received by one organization, he may be more successful through one of the other avenues.

The strategist in uniform, on the other hand, finds himself constrained both by the hierarchy of the strategic planning organization and the military discipline of subordination to higher authority, which make it more difficult to take issue with accepted policy. Nor can he publicize his views through magazines or books as easily as the lay strategist can. Writing for publication is an important element of the academic rather than of the military

* *The New York Times Magazine*, September 29, 1963, p. 23.

profession, and the academician is much more likely to be granted time and financial support for his research. Even when the military man combines both the opportunity and inclination to write for publication he finds himself more severely constrained by rules of military security and government policy review. These circumstances partly explain why most of the influential books and articles on military policy and strategy published since World War II have been written not by professional military men but by civilian academic strategists, many of whom have been associated with the think factories. But the cause lies also in the failure of the military colleges to "stand on the frontiers of knowledge."⁴

Thus, since the end of World War II there has gradually developed an increasing number of civilian experts on military policy. This growing body of academic or lay strategists is being used more and more to challenge the views of the professional military man. In fact, Joseph Kraft maintains that "the Academic Strategists emerge as a key factor in the maintenance of civilian control over the Armed Services. . . . Their generalizations provide civilian officials with a useful yardstick for judging rival service claims, and for keeping the whole defense establishment in line with the nation's strategic goals." On the other hand, he notes that "without the Academic Strategists, the basic decisions about how defense monies were spent would be thrust upon the professional soldiers."⁵

The growing influence of the lay strategist has been accentuated and accelerated by the so-called "Whiz Kids" who were brought to the Pentagon by the present Administration and who personify the new civilian experts. Unquestionably a brilliant and gifted group, they nevertheless—in Stewart Alsop's words—"display occasionally the intellectual arrogance that is the chief failing of the overintelligent."⁶ At its extreme, this results in the assertion that there is no longer any need in nuclear warfare for military judgment because the outcome of nuclear campaigns can be predetermined by precise mathematical computations. In many ways this is reminiscent of the eighteenth-century "scientific" approach to strategy based upon a system of complicated and carefully calculated geometrical movements and angles of attack. Since the occupation of key geographical points was de-

⁴ John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, "Soldiers and Scholars." Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 436, 509.

⁵ Kraft, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

⁶ Stewart Alsop, "Master of the Pentagon," *Saturday Evening Post*, August 5, 1961, p. 46.

signed to make victory almost mechanical, it might make actual fighting unnecessary.

The proliferation of lay strategists has been accompanied by an expansion of civilian influence and a decrease in military influence in the councils of government having to do with national security policy. Thus there is no military representation on our highest military policy-making body, the National Security Council. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff are designated as advisers to the N.S.C., they are also advisers to and subordinate to the Secretary of Defense, who is the principal adviser to the President in all matters relating to defense. And as a matter of practice the Joint Chiefs—other than the Chairman—are rarely invited to attend meetings of the National Security Council. Furthermore, between the military Service Chiefs and the civilian Secretaries, there have grown up new ranks and hosts of individuals—mostly civilian—without any corresponding decentralization of authority; in fact, taking full advantage of modern communications and computer techniques, the decision-making authority has become more centralized. As a result, the military professional faces many more roadblocks—more people who can say no and fewer who can say yes.

The invasion of the area of military strategy and policy by the lay strategist has been facilitated by the military professionals' sallies forth into nonmilitary areas—in pursuit of what Huntington calls the theory of political-military fusion. "This theory started from the undeniable fact that military policy and political policy were much more closely interrelated in the postwar world than they had been previously. It went on, however, to assert that it had become impossible to maintain the distinction between political and military functions at the highest level of government."⁷

One aspect of this theory was that military leaders were expected to incorporate political, economic and social factors into their thinking. This gave rise to situations in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff defended the importance of political considerations while the State Department was concerned with military arguments. The fusionist theory also gave impetus to the heavy emphasis in the senior war colleges on nonmilitary subjects. Most recently, it has stimulated professional and popular interest in prob-

⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State." Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 351.

lems of cold war and counterinsurgency which require successful fusion of a wide variety of military and nonmilitary techniques.

A second result of the fusionist theory was the heavy demand for military leaders to undertake nonmilitary responsibilities. Because of their wartime popularity, prestige and experience, professional military men were called upon to fill influential positions in politics, in industry and in government. Some of the governmental positions required the exercise of military as well as political functions, but others were filled by military men not because of the relevance of their experience, but because of their prestige or general executive ability and the comparative lack of experienced and available civilians immediately after World War II. Once the military professionals had breached the wall between military and nonmilitary affairs the route was widened into a two-way street, so that the military professional found himself challenged both on his own ground and on nonmilitary grounds as well. Meanwhile, the application of the fusionist theory forbade him to retire from the nonmilitary field to his former sanctuary.

In addition to political-military fusion, World War II set the stage for the fusion of the military profession itself—a fusion, however, which has not been completed. The Unification Act, born of World War II experiences pointing up the need for coördinated military actions on land, sea and air, established a coalition of the military services rather than a fusion. The military profession has not yet successfully met the challenge posed by even this much change. It requires the development of broad-gauged military professionals who can speak with authority on a full spectrum of military matters rather than a collection of individual experts in air, land and sea warfare. The more specialized expertise is still needed, but the military profession must also develop the generalists who can fuse together the particular competence of the specialists. This does not necessarily mean that the specialists themselves or their organizations must be integrated into a single service but that their individual points of view must be fused into a more broadly professional military expertise.

The singular failure of the military profession to meet this challenge has provided the lay strategist the occasion to invade the area of military affairs. In fact, the conflicts within the military profession have made it imperative for the civilian to step in to reach decisions. To avoid making purely arbitrary decisions, the

informed expertise of the lay strategist has, with justification, been relied upon. In fairness to the military profession, however, we should note that the failure to develop professional generalists has been abetted by some civilians who have not wished to see the military services develop a common profession—who felt that a policy of divide-and-conquer was the surest way to maintain civilian control.

The extent of the conquest is, I think, aptly illustrated by the following commentary by Huntington on the influence of the military professional on military policy between 1945 and 1960: "It is not surprising that military leaders played a key role in implementing policy and that they seldom actually made important decisions on policy. Perhaps more striking is the relatively unimportant role which they played in proposing changes in policy. In no case did military leaders initiate major new policies and in no case did they effectively prevent changes in old ones."⁸

v

Huntington's analysis of military professionalism leads him to conclude that "the requisite for military security is a shift in basic American values from liberalism to conservatism. Only an environment which is sympathetically conservative will permit American military leaders to combine the political power which society thrusts upon them with the military professionalism without which society cannot endure."⁹ Another proposed solution is to divide the problems of national security into total war and limited war, with specialists for each. The limited war specialists would retain the traditional "heroic" characteristics of the old military profession. Huntington, in effect, would solve the fundamental problem by changing the environment which creates it. The other approach would solve the problem by dividing it in two, by ignoring the more fundamental half, and by turning the clock back to solve the other.

Either response would, of course, help to resolve the frustrations caused by the current challenge to the military profession. But the first seems to be an extreme solution unless it is the only way to preserve our nation's security; and the second does not really solve the problem.

⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Common Defense." New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, p. 114.

⁹ Huntington, "The Soldier and the State," p. 464.

To meet satisfactorily the challenge to its professionalism, the military must first of all become more professionally expert. Under today's conditions the military profession can meet this requirement only by developing an expertise which transcends that of the individual service. The military profession must develop strategy, tactics and techniques which can deal with the entire spectrum of organized conflict from total war to guerrilla war, in all its media—land, sea, air and space.

The development of an all-around military expertise would be aided by greater mobility of personnel among the services. This should be something more than the occasional opportunity to transfer from one service to another. More intensive use should be made of the existing exchange programs, with particular emphasis on areas of military management, especially at higher staff levels—rather than trying to make a single individual into a submariner, an infantryman, a pilot, a ship's captain and a missile expert.

The development of greater expertise will not be enough in itself, unless it can be effectively communicated to the political decision-maker. This will require a flexibility in adapting to changing political administrations and the ability to explain military concepts in the particular language of each administration. It will also require a special skill in mastering the techniques of the think factories in order to evaluate the efforts of its own thinkers and to compete successfully with the independent lay strategists.

If the desired professional military expertise is ever to be achieved, the military school system—especially the senior military colleges—will have to assume a key role. The average military man probably devotes a larger proportion of his career to formal schooling than any other professional. If the military schools are to fulfill their function adequately, the best of them must encourage original thought, research and publication comparable to that of our leading universities. In the course of study the military aspects of national strategy should be emphasized anew with the objective of developing new strategic concepts and doctrines. Politics and economics need not be ignored, but the curriculum should focus on military subjects. The courses should also develop a general knowledge of contemporary military technology and a competency in the techniques of operational research.

A prerequisite for the re-creation of military expertise is the

abandonment of the fusionist theory whereby military and non-military factors are so entwined that a separate expertise in the military aspects of national security is simply impossible. Obviously there is an intimate interrelationship between military and nonmilitary factors; but there is a difference, and we need to reestablish the concept that the problems of national security can, in fact, be broken into various aspects even though they interact on each other. The statesman needs sound military advice; the military professional needs firm policy guidance. Each must, of course, understand the problems of the other. The military man should be aware of the political, economic, social and other factors which affect national security, but it is not his business to evaluate them. He should limit himself to a consideration of the military aspects which are within his area of competence. The civilian authorities, both executive and legislative, should assist him in exercising self-restraint by not requiring his comments on nonmilitary matters. Similarly, the statesman who is concerned with a political problem must recognize that it may have important military implications but he should refrain from making military analyses. He should use the results of the analysis of the military expert as one of the factors bearing on his total problem.

The separation of a national security problem into its various aspects does not mean that the military man and the statesman should work independently of each other. A military analysis may well depend on the particular political, economic or psychological assumptions which are made. The establishment of these assumptions should be the task of the statesman. The military man can contribute by pointing out how various ranges of assumptions may materially affect the military estimate.

A traditionally military—and perhaps also American—response to most problems is to reorganize. While this predilection should not lead us to expect too much, it is apparent that certain organizational changes in the Department of Defense would help the military to exercise their expertise and make them more responsive and more responsible to civilian control.

First of all, the organization and procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff need to be streamlined so that they can act more quickly and be more responsive to the Secretary of Defense. The host of special committees, councils, assistants and groups should be realigned to report through staff directors with increased stature

and authority. The Joint Staff should exercise effective direction over the various defense agencies. It would be highly desirable for the Chiefs to use the Joint Staff as their primary advisers and to give the Joint Staff officers increased stature and authority in their relations with the Service staffs. Finally, the Joint Staff should be given greater authority to act on certain operational matters within established policy. This would make it possible for the Chiefs to fulfill their responsibilities without having personally to consider and agree on all matters for which they are responsible.

A second major effort should be to improve the working relationships between the J.C.S. and the staff of the Secretary of Defense. These staffs ought to be cooperating rather than independent and competing staffs, and some realignment of functions is desirable to achieve that end. Serious consideration should be given to opening up the "closed system" of the J.C.S., whereby lateral communication is prohibited and access to its studies is only by way of the Secretary of Defense. If this system could be altered, perhaps the J.C.S. would fill the proposed position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans and Operations with some of its existing functions and personnel distributed to the various existing offices of Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

A third measure would involve organizing to encourage self-criticism on the part of the military profession itself. The military professional must be able to produce new ideas and concepts if he is to compete with the lay strategist. It is perhaps too much to expect that the military, with its emphasis on discipline and the chain of command, can ever achieve the same degree of academic freedom enjoyed by the lay strategist. It should be possible, however, to encourage more original military thinking without sacrificing the traditions of obedience to higher authority. One possibility, for example, would be the creation of small groups charged with long-range planning and new conceptual thinking and made directly responsible to the military service chiefs. This system would make it possible for a new idea to be aired at the highest levels without having to follow the tortuous path of military command which tends to reject concepts not in accord with previously approved policy.

Taken together, these measures would respond to the challenges to the responsibility as well as the expertise of the military. Its sense of corporateness could also be strengthened by

measures to re-create the prestige and attractiveness of a military career—without, however, trying to return the military to its prewar state of isolation. Especially effective would be the resurrection of the traditional fringe benefits of the military. Similar personnel policies within and among the individual services would also contribute. This does not require uniformity in personnel matters, ignoring differences in requirements and problems, but it does mean the elimination of conflicting policies based on historical differences which are no longer relevant.

A fundamental obstacle to achieving the various responses which have been outlined is likely to be the continuing fear of military power and the traditional anti-military bias of the liberal ethic. To the extent, however, that the suggestions made here are nonpolitical and encourage professional expertise and responsibility, they should, in fact, lead to more effective civilian control. If civilian control seems reasonably well assured, perhaps military professionalism could be acceptable without necessarily substituting the conservative for the liberal ethic. Surely the United States is strong enough to allow Americans to choose their political philosophy—whether liberal or conservative—on grounds other than national security alone.

TOWARD UNITY IN AFRICA

By Clyde Sanger

NO one who looked down from the galleries last May on the glittering array of African heads of state assembled in Africa Hall at Addis Ababa could fail to see that this meeting constituted an historic landmark. But just what sort of landmark was it? Clearly it had greater significance than a gathering of emperors, kings, presidents and prime ministers at a single sparkling event—like, say, a coronation in Britain. But was there as much common purpose in Addis as moved the 55 men who met in Philadelphia in May 1787? President Nkrumah of Ghana had hoped and intended that there should be; in speeches, memoranda and even a full-length book he had urged the states to form a single parliament forthwith. But gazing down on the patrician head of the Mwami of Burundi facing the taut Ben Bella, observers must have realized that the differences of past experience and future problems impeded any such swift fusion into one close entity. It is still too early to assess the full achievements of the Addis conference—how far short it fell of Nkrumah's ideal, how much more important it was than just an imperial jamboree. But enough has happened in the months since May to attempt at least a progress report.

The Addis Ababa conference marked the end of the period when, beginning with the first meeting of the Independent African States in Accra in May 1958, the states were "feeling out" the ways in which they might achieve both greater unity and the liberation of the whole continent. They had experimented with organizations for close coördination in economic matters alone, and at the new Addis airport the Union Africaine et Malgache (U.A.M.) was able to display an impressive advertisement of the successful coöperation by its 14 member states—a jet airliner of their Air Afrique fleet. There had been more dramatic attempts at political union, such as the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union announced in December 1960; but the coolness obvious between Nkrumah and President Sékou Touré of Guinea, who found themselves by alphabetical accident next to each other at the horseshoe table, showed the disappointments experienced in that venture.

The Casablanca group of seven states—Morocco, Ghana,

Guinea, Mali, Egypt, Libya and Algeria—had drifted apart after the issues which first brought them together in January 1961 had either faded into history or reared into points of actual disagreement among them. Morocco had lost its battle against Mauritania; in January 1961 the Casablanca powers had called Mauritania “a puppet state” of France and backed any action by Morocco “for the restitution of her legitimate rights,” but now Mauritania was seated at the United Nations, her Prime Minister, Moktar Ould Daddah, was sitting in Africa Hall, and Morocco in consequence was boycotting the conference. The three other issues which had led the seven states to meet originally had taken them to no satisfactory conclusion. Withdrawal of troops from the United Nations force in the Congo, in protest against the U.S.’s unwillingness to recognize the Gizenga régime, had always been opposed by Ghana, and Gizenga was still being detained when President Kasavubu and Premier Adoula of the Congo came to Addis. Avowed hostility to Israel as “the instrument of imperialism and neo-colonialism” (the first resolution at Casablanca) had not inhibited Ghana from close economic coöperation with that state. And the consultative committees which the Casablanca powers had announced to foster unity—political, economic, cultural and a joint high command—had made no noticeable headway beyond setting up a defense headquarters in Ghana. The Addis conference provided the Casablanca powers with the opportunity to submerge, or it may be kinder to say sublimate, their efforts into the larger sphere of planning provided by the meeting of all heads of government.

The Monrovia group (more properly if less often called the Inter-African and Malagasy States Organization, I.A.M.O.) had been more successful, perhaps because of its pragmatic approach. It began with the 12 “Brazzaville” powers trying to mediate in the Algerian war and championing Mauritania. By the time of the Monrovia meeting in May 1961, it had gathered seven more adherents, including Nigeria and Ethiopia and the host, Liberia. The group spoke of “unity of aspirations and of action” rather than political integration, and by the time they came to approve the Lagos Charter in December 1962, they were planning very much on the pattern of the Organization of American States.

Another issue which by May had had its edges blurred by long hammering was the question of regional groupings. At the first All African Peoples Conference at Accra in December 1958, the

delegates agreed that "as a first step towards the attainment of the broad objective of an African Commonwealth, the independent states of Africa should amalgamate themselves into groups on the basis of geographical contiguity, economic interdependence, linguistic and cultural affinity." Informally it was decided to speak of five regions of Africa which could be a first tier in this future Commonwealth. But by February 1962 Ghana had strong suspicions about what was happening in East Africa. The Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) grew to an organization embracing 20 countries at its conference in Addis, and enlarged its title to PAFMECSA to include Southern Africa. John Tettegah, Ghanaian Ambassador Extraordinary, intervened at this meeting with a press statement in which he said that Nkrumah believed "that regional commonwealths and territorial groupings will be just another form of Balkanization, unless they are conceived within the framework of a larger union based on the model of the United States or the U.S.S.R." The PAFMECSA chairman, Kenneth Kaunda, gave Tettegah a polite assurance that it was conceived inside the framework of the All African Peoples Conference (which was perhaps not quite the same thing, since the A.A.P.C. had never committed itself to more than "the broad objective of an African Commonwealth").

At any rate, Nkrumah was inveighing against "regional Balkanization" when he flew to Addis last May. He claimed in a memorandum, "Towards African Unity," which he sent to the conference ahead of him: "There is a general feeling in Africa today that development into separate political or economic groupings is unfortunate, since it tends to a dispersal of energy, resources and general inter-state or inter-territorial coöperative effort." He was convinced, he added, that frontier disputes, economic difficulties, political disagreements between African states and neo-colonialism can all be resolved within the framework of a Union Government of African States. At the airport he repeated his written warning: "We must unite now or perish."

He found at Addis virtually no support for his case. As host, the Emperor of Ethiopia made the keynote speech and led the great debate which followed onto other ground. Said the Emperor:

While we agree that the ultimate destiny of this continent lies in political union, we must recognize that the obstacles to be overcome in its achievement

are numerous and formidable. Africa's peoples did not emerge into liberty in uniform conditions. . . . Further, no clear consensus exists on the "how" and the "what" of this union. Is it to be, in form, federal, confederal or unitary? On these and other questions there is no agreement, and if we wait for agreed answers, generations hence matters will be little advanced, while the debate still rages.

The union which we seek can only come gradually. A period of transition is inevitable. Old relations and arrangements may for a time linger. Regional organizations may fulfill legitimate functions and needs which cannot yet be otherwise satisfied. . . .

There is nonetheless much that we can do to speed this transition. There are issues on which we stand united and questions on which there is unanimity of opinion. Let us seize on those areas of agreement and exploit them to the fullest. . . . If we act where we may, in those areas where action is possible, the inner logic of the programmes which we adopt will work for us and inevitably impel us still farther in the direction of ultimate union.

The Emperor went on to speak about economic coördination, the establishment of the African Development Bank, planning for an African defense system, and campaigns against nuclear tests and racial segregation.

The Emperor's speech and the draft charter submitted by his government provided the guide-lines of the conference. Besides Nkrumah, only Milton Obote of Uganda spoke out for an African parliament now, saying: "However nice one may feel as complete master in one's own house, the time has come for African independent states to surrender some of their sovereignty in favor of an African central legislative and executive body"; and he suggested this executive should have powers to establish a common market, collective defense, a common foreign policy and common monetary zone, and to supervise continent-wide planning. The others all stuck to talk of coördination, mainly in the economic sphere, and wanted periodic meetings of heads of governments. President Nasser, who Nkrumah hoped would support him solidly, suggested vaguely, "Let there be an African League" without offering any idea of constitution; and then, even more vaguely, "Let there be anything, but let it be something real."

So the pattern was set, along the O.A.S. model. Indeed the Ethiopian Government had engaged the former Chilean secretary-general of the O.A.S., Señor Trucco, to advise on the administrative structure. The Charter of the Organization of African Unity finally adopted at Addis lays down as "supreme organ" the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments, meeting at least

once a year. It followed closely the Lagos Charter with the notable addition of provision for a Defense Commission. In the conference resolutions, the establishment of the Liberation Coordinating Committee of nine nations was the most striking innovation. Under the heading of "General Disarmament" the heads of governments unanimously agreed to seek the removal of all foreign military bases and "disentanglement of African countries from military pacts with foreign powers." But Nasser wisely warned: "Military pacts will not fall by themselves like autumn leaves."

II

Perhaps more important than any of the details of agreement was the infusion of what has become known as "the Addis spirit"—best defined in the Emperor's exhortation to "seize on these areas of agreement and exploit them to the fullest." Those skeptical of the effects of enthusiastic spirit have been asking, "What mileage can you get out of such a mixture?" They will of course have to wait for their answer until the spirit has run out. At present that seems a distant point, although there have been splutterings which we shall examine shortly.

The Addis conference exerted heavy pressure on states to agree and, through the example of Morocco, demonstrated the disadvantages of being the "odd man out." Morocco learnt its lesson—that it should never have boycotted the conference—and attended the foreign ministers' meeting in Dakar in August. Nkrumah agreed that it was best to show agreement and, astute in the midst of disappointment, saw to it that Ghana was among the first to ratify the O.A.U. Charter. A quarrel which had taken up a great deal of the time of the foreign ministers in their preparatory talks before the heads of states met was over the recognition of the Grunitzky régime in Togo. Most of the "Brazzaville" states had earlier opposed recognition at a special meeting at Ouagadougou because it amounted in their eyes to countenancing assassination; but by May they were wavering. Only Nigeria, Guinea and Tanganyika (whose independence celebrations had been attended by President Olympio) maintained opposition and kept the Togo seat vacant. Nigerian and Guinean opposition was founded on suspicions that Ghanaian leaders were not averse to fomenting subversion in nearby states, and that the assassination of Olympio may have been plotted

from Ghana. But written into the O.A.U.'s principles of the charter was "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member state and for its inalienable right to independent existence." With Ghana's signature under this principle, further opposition to President Grunitzky melted and the Togolese foreign minister was welcomed to Dakar.

At Dakar the greatest discussion developed over what constituted a legitimate regional grouping. A resolution proposed by Guinea recommended the abrogation of all charters which predated the O.A.U., and mentioned specifically the Casablanca and Monrovia charters, and the charter of the 13 U.A.M. states, signed in Tananarive in September 1961. PAFMECSA was not mentioned in the resolution, which laid down as a definition that "geographical realities and economic and social conditions common to neighboring states be the sole justification of such groupings and subgroupings." The chief target in this debate was the U.A.M., which could hardly claim the justification of "geographical reality," leapfrogging as it does across the continent from Senegal to Chad, Rwanda and Malagasy. The U.A.M. leaders had met before Dakar to discuss the future of their organization, and decided it should remain in existence, at any rate temporarily, while "progressive fusion" of the U.A.M. with the O.A.U. would inevitably take place. But at that Cotonou meeting there was evidence of diverging views. The Mauritanian president argued that the U.A.M. must not compromise African unity, but the President of Chad stood at the opposite pole declaring that the U.A.M. should not sacrifice itself for a new (and untested?) organization. The others, led by Senegal, stood in the middle ground on the basis that the U.A.M. should evolve and adapt itself to the new situation which the Addis conference had created. As a first step in adaptation they dissolved the U.A.M. group at the United Nations.

This was hardly enough for the other leaders at Dakar. Jaja Wachuku, the Nigerian foreign minister, called the U.A.M.'s continuance "an enterprise of sabotage," while Sékou Touré said it was draining the O.A.U. Charter of its "essential dynamic content" and he went on to attack what he termed "an insolent resurgence of U.A.M. activities." But the U.A.M. has stood firm, with the Ivory Coast vice-president M. Philippe Yace saying there is no question of breaking up either the U.A.M. or the "Entente" group (Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Upper Volta and the

Niger Republic) for the time being. The next U.A.M. conference is scheduled for February, and its leaders will doubtless ponder whether some of the reasons for the October coup in Dahomey—workers' annoyance at Ministerial extravagance, radical attacks on ex-President Maga's too obvious "French connection"—are not relevant to other states.

The ferocity of Touré's attack is partly due to historical factors, dating back to the time of the French withdrawal from Guinea. Touré sees dangers in the way the U.A.M. is linked closely with France through its defense coöperation and military pacts, and also by its members' special relationship with the European Common Market (E.E.C.). Through these arrangements, 20,000 French troops are today still stationed in U.A.M. countries and the lion's share of \$784,000,000 in the latest five-year plan of the E.E.C.'s Overseas Development Fund is going to these states. The troops may have acted very properly during the recent overthrow of President Youlou in Congo (Brazzaville) and the association with the E.E.C. may not yet have uncovered political strings. But Touré and other African leaders see in these arrangements a wedge dividing African states. The ex-British dependencies in Africa, at last year's Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, resoundingly rejected the idea of associate membership on several grounds, and they hope to bridge the gap between the 18 "associated" African states and the 14 others by the swift creation of an African Common Market. But officials are more cautious than politicians. Paul Morawetz, heading a team of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa to study the possibilities of harmonizing the economics of neighboring states in West Africa, said in September that the creation of a common market would be a long task; he thought it could be achieved only over several stages, beginning with a grouping of West African states into three "harmonizing" units. Sierra Leone, alone of the ex-British territories, has decided that the way to unity is to become associated with the E.E.C. In its separate way, this decision underlines the anxiety of African leaders over the divisions created by trade and other links with European states.

An existing grouping which was clearly legitimate under the O.A.U. definition is that in East Africa, composed of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, whose heads of government pledged themselves in June to try to form a political federation by December 1963 (Zanzibar added its name as a founding member

in July). The plans ran into a variety of troubles. Ugandan leaders were suspicious (with some good reason from past experience) that Kenya would gain by far the greatest benefits from the natural processes of closer association, in the same way that Southern Rhodesia gained most from the federation in Central Africa. To take on Kenya's greater debt burden and trade deficit seemed to Uganda a large price to pay for federation if she was not to receive in return some of the best perquisites of the union, such as high office for her leaders or perhaps the federal capital at Entebbe or assurances that new industries would be directed her way instead of gravitating to Nairobi. Uganda has also wanted to maintain some independence in foreign policy, including a separate vote at the United Nations, and shuddered at reports that President Nyerere said in Oslo that he accepted the idea of a United Africa having only one U.N. vote. There have been technical arguments, centering on such matters as the structure of a central bank, and tussles between personalities. Zanzibar in its minor role has contributed another problem, in that its coalition government does not want to relax immigration restrictions on "mainlanders."

These differences, rather than any opposition from a frightened traditionalist group (the Buganda Lukiko, for example), are the reasons why it is now acknowledged that an East African Federation cannot be formed until some time in 1964. Kenyan leaders know, from a cursory glance at trade figures, that development depends absolutely on the achievement of federation, at any rate with Tanganyika, some time in 1964. The mood set in Tanganyika by Nyerere strongly favors federation, and in the end it is probable that Uganda's doubts can be dissolved. At present, though, Nkrumah's phrases about "regional Balkanization" uttered at Addis and elsewhere are useful for quotation by Ugandan politicians who want to go slow on federation and yet appear to all as fervent Pan-Africanists.

With the setting up of federal working parties in East Africa and the establishment of the Liberation Coördinating Committee after Addis, there was discussion on the future role of PAFMECSA: Kenneth Kaunda, its chairman, supported by Nyerere felt that its liberating functions had been assumed by this Committee of Nine and its unifying functions were being taken care of by Ministers in East Africa (in Central Africa the process is at present one of dissolution rather than unification).

In September Kaunda said that, although PAFMECSA was not "a spent force," it had been "overtaken" by the O.A.U. Mboya, prominently involved in PAFMECSA's work throughout its five years of life, felt it had a remaining usefulness as an intermediate tier to be placed between East Africa and the O.A.U. in the structure of Pan-Africa. But it is likely to be wound up as a superfluous organization causing unnecessary friction inside the O.A.U. Its secretary-general, Peter Koinange, has spent virtually no time at its Tanganyika headquarters since he became a member of the Kenya Cabinet in June. However, the close friendships between East and Central African nationalist leaders will remain whether or not PAFMECSA becomes defunct.

III

As for the Liberation Coördinating Committee, it is too early to say how effective it will prove. The Committee itself is well balanced politically and contains the three strongest military powers in Africa—Egypt, Algeria and Ethiopia—as well as Senegal, Nigeria, Guinea, Uganda, Congo (Leopoldville) and Tanganyika. At its first meeting in Dar-es-Salaam in July, the Committee ran into the problem of which group of "freedom fighters" to recognize and support. This problem recurred in several countries where there are rival organizations—South Africa, South-West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Angola and Portuguese Guinea. By August the Committee had met Angolan leaders in Leopoldville and had decided to put the O.A.U.'s support behind Holden Roberto's U.P.A. (Unaio das Populações de Angola), and at Dakar picked as the most representative movement in Portuguese Guinea Amílcar Cabral's P.A.I.G.C. This occasioned a bitter argument between Senegal and Guinea, as Cabral is a Touré man. But before the end of the Dakar conference both countries suffered further disappointments: Senegal failed to get Dakar accepted as O.A.U. headquarters, and Guinea failed to get its Ambassador to the U.N., Diallo Telli, chosen as O.A.U. secretary-general. Both site and post went (temporarily) to Ethiopia, which may mean some loss of dynamism in the organization.

The Committee of Nine prepared a budget for the Foreign Ministers which called for \$4,200,000 a year for liberation movements in 18 different territories. A subcommittee of Algeria, Egypt and Guinea also made detailed proposals for military aid, and sketched out a training program in sabotage and politics. The

report showed the liberation fund had received \$675,000, two-thirds of it being contributed by Nigeria and Algeria. A general impression of the Committee's work is that, faced with some knotty problems, it has begun reasonably well and can expect to gather momentum soon. The Addis conference produced a mood of emancipatory zeal at which Salazar and Verwoerd (and Winston Field in Southern Rhodesia) are unwise to scoff. It seems clear that the first pressures will be upon Portuguese-held territories, although Algeria and Ghana are already training freedom fighters from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. What is less certain is how many volunteers from independent states may come forward to fight alongside them.

A fierce attack against the Committee of Nine was launched on October 25 in the Accra weekly *Spark*, the organ of the African Affairs Bureau in Ghana. It analyzed at length a secret official report of the Committee's meeting in Dar-es-Salaam and criticized its decisions on three main counts. First, it had exceeded its responsibilities by setting up a commission for propaganda aimed at 12 colonial territories and had allocated £300,000 (or most of its six months' budget) to this purpose—money which should have been used for military purposes. Second, it had also planned, as major strategy, to negotiate with the colonial powers after organizing sufficient action to create an atmosphere of insecurity in these territories; this was "unrealistic and futile." Third, it had acted "entirely outside its mandate" by transferring the major role in helping liberation movements to the "neighboring countries." This, said *Spark*, was unwise because it gave colonial powers easy targets to attack and also damaged African unity by encouraging regional groupings.

Ghana is not a member of the Committee of Nine, and might therefore be expected to be its leading critic among African states. The article also appeared while the Defense Commission, set up at Addis, was holding its first meeting at Accra. Kofi Baako, Ghana's Defense Minister, took the lead in proposing the immediate establishment of an African High Command and (in secret session) of a "strike force" to operate against the colonial territories. Nigeria surprisingly came closest to Ghanaian views on the need for a High Command, but the U.A.M. states defeated such a proposition, and the Commission merely voted to set up an executive committee under the administrative secretariat in Addis Ababa—and then adjourned for a year.

Recent talk of aggression against the white governments in Southern Africa is in marked contrast to the attitudes of non-violence expressed at the first A.A.P.C. at Accra in December 1958, when it was resolved to support "all those who resort to peaceful means of non-violence and civil disobedience, as well as all those who are compelled to retaliate against violence to attain national independence." But, partly from humanitarian instincts and partly from natural caution about challenging powerful white armies in battle, the independent African states are still persisting in trying out more peaceful means of unfastening the grip of the Portuguese and South African governments on Africa. Efforts to isolate them, including economic sanctions, have been intensified since the Addis conference. Refusal to accept South African representation on international bodies—whether it is the International Labor Organization, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature or the International Olympic Committee—has progressed to the point of moving to get South Africa excluded from the United Nations. Adlai Stevenson and others have warned against the folly of doing this, and Jaja Wachuku, the Nigerian Foreign Minister, told the General Assembly in September that it was, he thought, better to bring South Africa and Portugal to the United Nations and "keep on whipping them until they learn some lessons, than to toss them outside and leave them in the cold." But feelings were given play a fortnight later when African and Asian delegates staged an unprecedented mass walkout to protest the South African delegate being allowed to defend apartheid from the Assembly rostrum.

Perhaps the most spectacular move to boycott trade with South Africa has been the banning of South African Airways planes from landing or overflying the African states, and driving their Europe-bound airliners out over the Atlantic. Where an embargo on trade with South Africa has been imposed, as in Tanganyika and Uganda, the burden has of course been heavier on the African black states than on South Africa; for instance, to find new markets for Uganda coffee is difficult. But it is a valuable boost to nationalist morale, and plays its part in promoting unity.

A U.N. special committee on apartheid, which included five African states, has insisted on immediate action against South Africa on several fronts: refusal of technical aid, prohibition of emigrants or investment bound for South Africa, an effective embargo on arms and petroleum shipments, denial of facilities

for all ships and planes bound for or returning from South Africa. It is unlikely that all these measures will be effectively implemented, especially since British investment in South Africa amounts to a billion pounds. But there is little doubt that these recommendations cause embarrassment to Britain and annoyance at least to Verwoerd.

IV

It is notoriously easier to combine against someone or something than it is to find common cause for constructive action. If this explains the greater emphasis on moves against the Salazar and Verwoerd régimes, it should nevertheless be conceded that there has been an increase in constructive planning since the Addis conference. A conference to plan the regional needs for hydroelectric power is one recent example. Another, which was initiated before Addis but consummated afterwards, was the agreement in July to establish an African Development Bank next year with an authorized capital of \$250,000,000 to foster economic coöperation on a regional basis.

Yet to be tested is the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration set up at the Addis conference based on detailed proposals from Tunisia. The title gives an idea of the methods such a Commission (when established by the Assembly of Heads of States) would employ, but there is no hint yet of how arbitration decisions would be enforced, without bruising the charter's third principle, "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member state." In the meantime, the "spirit of Addis," amplified by Emperor Haile Selassie and President Keita of Mali, temporarily soothed the passions aroused between Algeria and Morocco in their October skirmish around two oases. Whether the O.A.U. can round off what the Bamako cease-fire conference began remains to be seen. Probably the next occasion for this Commission to set to work will come in trying to settle the dispute between Somalia and Kenya, where 150,000 Somalis live along its northeastern border. Mauritania and Mali have settled a disputed frontier this year, and there is some hope that the Ghana-Togo border dispute may be eased with the proposed trade agreement, although there is no sign that President Grunitzky would want to integrate his country with Ghana. The first integration of countries may come with Gambia's absorption into Senegal. Gambia, a British colony with 300,000 people and little

else besides a river and a lot of groundnuts, became self-governing in October. There are many matters to be negotiated: Can Gambia keep Commonwealth ties? Can she maintain her own (British) legal system? Can she have a degree of autonomy not granted to the surrounding 3,000,000 Senegalese? But if Senegambia and an East African Federation cannot be achieved by the end of 1964, the prospects for full African unity will become extremely remote.

Is the "Addis spirit" strong enough to drown personal jealousies? Ghanaian opposition to an East African Federation is not based just on ideological dislike of regional groupings. As the pace-setter since 1957, Nkrumah finds it hard to share, and harder to yield, the lead. Nyerere of Tanganyika has shown himself likely to become a practical-minded leader of radical thought throughout Africa, although his country has not the resources to be the prime example of development. Ghana has spent a large part of her budget on diplomacy, and her 60 embassies give her a respected position in foreign affairs and at the United Nations. But Kenya leaders, such as Mboya, Odinga and Murumbi, have international experience which may soon bring East Africa into preëminence diplomatically. Others will argue that Ghanaian opposition to the East African Federation is based on a fear that it might encourage a similar move in westernmost Africa, with Mauritania, Senegal, Mali and Guinea planning an economic grouping which could lead to federation. The obstacles, as the Emperor warned, are "numerous and formidable."

As their offering to the Addis conference, the Band of the Imperial Bodyguard produced in English, French and Amharic an "African Nations Anthem," but this did not relieve its members of the burden of learning 32 national anthems. This lack of a common anthem and flag is not a trivial matter; symbols are basic requirements if a Pan-African consciousness is to permeate all levels. Musically, and in every other way, the African states have a long path to march before they reach unity. But the Addis conference put heart into many of the less resolute to attempt this journey. When the Emperor formally registered the O.A.U. Charter at the United Nations during his visit to New York in October, U Thant was not venturing into a polite exaggeration when he replied that the charter was "one of the historic documents of this century."

BRITISH DEFENSE POLICY UNDER LABOR

By Anthony Verrier

MR. Harold Wilson has been leader of the Labor Party for nearly a year; in 1964 he may well become Britain's first Socialist Prime Minister in 13 years. Around his aims and methods, and in particular his expressed belief in the possibility of a new society created by technological as much as by political change, have gathered much speculation and comment. However, he is by nature cautious, anxious to nourish growing party aspirations rather than initiate controversial debate, and therefore unlikely to be hasty in making innovations in either domestic or foreign policies. It is the latter which will be considered here.

About foreign policy Mr. Wilson speaks publicly in acceptable generalities; in private he is more specific, but a consistent thread of intention, should he become Prime Minister, is hard to discern. More than most, he has pondered the ten-year strife which rent the Labor Party from 1951 to 1961. He has put a guard upon his tongue. The 1962 annual conference was notable for a virtual absence of debate about foreign affairs and defense, and Herr Willy Brandt's appearance early in the proceedings was symbolic rather than significant.

The initial 18 months of Labor in office will be mainly a bridge-head. Of more interest are the objectives Mr. Wilson wishes to achieve and the arguments he may use to justify them once the initial period is over and the first major ministerial reshuffles are made. They are already made on paper. Mr. Wilson will be occupied at first with neither measures nor men, but with machinery. As a wartime civil servant and former political head of one of Whitehall's largest departments—the Board of Trade—he regards economic administration as the necessary precursor of more radical change. Whether or not he intends to reorganize the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defense, effectively supplanting them with an enlarged Cabinet office staffed from outside the civil service and operating a modern apparatus of policy-making, remains a matter of carefully concealed doubt.

Because some of the home ministries are to be reformed in this

manner—a stated objective—it should not automatically be assumed that those responsible for Britain abroad will be similarly treated. There is little doubt, however, that the present policy-making powers of the Chief of the Defense Staff and the Chiefs of Staff will be reduced. Moreover, the Foreign Office and the Service ministries are likely to lose their present supremacy in terms of prestige and share of the budget. A more substantial issue is whether Mr. Wilson will continue, as now, to rely largely on private advice in the evolution and execution of his foreign and defense policy, or, which seems less likely, establish well-equipped research and consultative organizations on the American model.

II

The source and quality of that private advice require some dispassionate analysis, but first it is necessary to establish Mr. Wilson's convictions about Britain's role in the sixties. As his hosts in Washington and Moscow last year discovered, he has the wit to be stimulating and articulate, without, on contentious or inherently complex subjects, being very explicit. Little is known of his intentions in foreign affairs and defense; apart from the now orthodox commitment to put an end to Britain's nuclear weapons system as speedily as possible, the public record offers slender clues. This much, however, can be said categorically: he believes that Britain's future international role is first to provide economic assistance to developing a more equitable pattern of world trade, and thus to provide a steadily rising standard of living and greater security to the have-not nations. This economic diplomacy must rest on a home base that is expanding, socially just and technologically competent.

The language of economic priorities is the language Mr. Wilson best understands and where he is more impressive and sure of his objectives. Nevertheless, some would construe them as unexceptional. After all, Mr. Maudling, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, has adopted them in the arguments he has put to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank over the last year. But Britain's spokesmen, both in and out of office, can only exhort; they cannot demonstrate that Britain is ready to play a part in stabilizing international trade. Britain's industrial, investment and technological base is not strong compared with that of the United States or Western Europe. And the precise point, so far as Wilson is concerned, is that significant improvement will

come only when Britain drastically reduces her defense expenditures.

At present these are running at approximately £ 1.9 billion annually, absorbing between 7 and 8 percent of the Gross National Product. In the United States or the Soviet Union this may not be considered a high proportion. It is not rising, while, slowly, the G.N.P. is increasing. Since President Kennedy took office, however, the United States G.N.P. has increased by the amount of the whole British G.N.P. This type of statistic is as significant for Mr. Wilson and his notions of feasible British foreign policy as that which shows British aid to underdeveloped countries to have been more than offset since the Korean War by successive falls in the prices of primary products and increased costs of goods from the Western Hemisphere. Mr. Wilson, with some reason, believes that his kind of imbalance is a bigger threat to international security than fifty varieties of Communist penetration. Now it may be argued that 7 or 8 percent of the G.N.P. devoted to defense is not only less than comparable American or Soviet figures, but is rather a trivial sum for a state which hopes to stay in the world league. However, in a revealing aside made by Mr. Wilson while in the United States last year, he declared that his Britain had no such aspirations and that in any case military strength could no longer satisfy her.

Moreover, the 1.9 billion figure for defense represents a quarter to a third of the whole budget in any one year—a fact which reinforces Mr. Wilson's genuine dislike of what he regards as misapplied resources and his followers' objections to defense spending *per se*, entangling alliances, incomprehensible strategies and expensive British commitments in Arabia and Asia. Even the rising French defense budget, devoted to the ideal of complete independence, is only a fifth of the whole. It is the British taxpayer, the elector, who suffers, or so it is said, by so heavy an arms burden. Reduce it, and many benefits will flow to a Labor Government. A second term, from 1969 to 1974, might even be possible, to complete the technological revolution and eradicate the canker of class.

Conservative Governments which have been in power since 1951 have regularly reduced taxation before elections, and Sir Alec Douglas-Home can hardly afford to be an exception. But they have not reduced defense budgets. Nor of course did the 1951 Labor Government; it increased it because of the Korean

War, coupled with the Malayan emergency (absorbing 40,000 conscripts) and the beginning of the nuclear weapons program, costing £1 billion. Wilson resigned in consequence; the Labor Party was defeated as a result.

In the last ten years the sum spent on defense has risen by more than a fifth. Nuclear weapons account (as their proponents in Britain so often remind us) for "only" 13 to 15 percent of this budget. But the increasingly expensive (and unsuccessful) system of volunteer regular recruitment costs more than twice as much as conscription—nearly 60 percent; 200,000 skilled workers are engaged in defense contracts of one sort or another; the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston, employs approximately 5,000 with degrees or specific technical qualifications—a number which will not significantly decrease unless the Polaris submarine program is scrapped as a result of renegotiating the Nassau Agreement. If the submarines are built, a further £500,000,000 must be found, although the number of shipyards benefiting will be few; if the T.S.R.-2 aircraft is built in quantity, another £400,000,000, although only one airframe and one engine firm stand to gain.

If the defense budget is reduced by a Labor Government, the commitments must be also. Yet Mr. Wilson has publicly supported NATO, has pressed for strong conventional forces there—which, as we see, are the really expensive element—and has said that Britain "must be strong east of Suez." This is an emotive rather than a precise description of commitments which absorb 25 percent of the entire budget now, and which are likely to require a steadily rising percentage in the future.

The solution to the problem of reconciling commitments and resources may be sought in that blessed word "independent," a nostrum for all evils, as General de Gaulle would have us believe. The illusion of independence in foreign policy—it is, after all, not the same as influence, in which France is singularly lacking—is that states can ignore the realities of power. The fact of the matter is that in today's strategically unique balance of power and deterrence, only weak states can indulge in the illusion. They may not realize that doing so could be an unfortunate catalyst of conflict; equally, of course, they may realize it, and attempt to create a catalytic situation deliberately. I suggest that Britain has unwittingly adopted the first course, France under de Gaulle has consciously chosen the second. My conclusions will attempt

to show that Britain, under a Labor Government, can either continue as now; adopt the de Gaulle method by openly rejecting the current American strategy for Europe; or fashion a foreign policy and defense budget which implies a degree of influence, while accepting that today virtually all options are indivisible.

III

The method adopted here for determining the more probable courses open to Mr. Wilson is to examine the various kinds of advice which he receives now, and in particular to concentrate on those advisers who seem most influential because their views on strategy happen to coincide pretty closely with Mr. Wilson's on economic priorities. Their advice forms an intellectually able, but to my mind unacceptable, case against Britain's commitments in general and against those to European security in close association with the United States in particular. It has a wholesale quality, which provides little or no opportunity for Britain to exercise influence through providing credible, if limited, military strength in Europe; nor does it sufficiently distinguish between American objectives in that theater and those elsewhere.

To call this advice neutralist is not automatically to condemn it. To say it is motivated by a belief in comprehensive, inspectable disarmament is to applaud the sentiment only to question the methods considered feasible and the economics likely to result. To label it "Little England," as do some intemperate critics on the right, is to ignore the fact that insularity has always distinguished British foreign policy, and under the guise of an illusion does so today. To say that the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is its source is to accord that movement a totally unwarranted measure of success, although it must be admitted that it has made some inroads into an intelligent socialist appreciation of international problems, due to the serious lack of communication between those who are equipped to argue the facts of our nuclear environment and the Labor Party as a whole.

Mr. Wilson receives advice from two main groups. One is the group which supports only a gradual reduction of commitments, believes genuinely in those expensive "adequate conventional forces" to which so much lip service is paid, and argues for the closest possible relationship with the United States, specifically for the preservation of European security through a strategic détente that rests on a mutually accepted balance between con-

ventional defense and nuclear deterrence. This group also accepts American control of the nuclear armory of NATO as more likely not only to advance such a détente but to see that it presages an eventual settlement of the German problem. In a word, American power is accepted; the notion of Western Europe as a power in other than an economic sense is denied.

All official Labor Party spokesmen adhere to this group, which is led by Mr. Patrick Gordon Walker and Mr. Denis Healey, respectively shadow foreign secretary and minister of defense, and likely to hold those offices in the first 18 months of a Wilson Cabinet. On the basis of the advice which he has received, Mr. Gordon Walker, although a loyal critic of independent nuclear systems, has hitherto been unwilling to accept the distinction between multilateral forces and multilateralism. He is also overly optimistic about regular recruitment and somewhat sanguine about the feasibility and credibility of conventional strength deployed in the Indian Ocean and the Far East and operating on the American concept of amphibious task forces. But his orthodoxy has the merit of honesty, and his lack of strategic expertise is more than compensated for by Mr. Healey's acknowledged eminence in this field.

Were Mr. Wilson to heed his shadow ministers he would find himself spending a great deal on defense and earning a considerable amount of American good will. British commitments, whether reduced by further decolonization in Africa and the Caribbean, or by the gradual transfer of responsibilities to other members of the Commonwealth, would neither be lightly regarded nor feebly supported. But if "adequate conventional forces" were provided for Europe and elsewhere, savings on research, development and production of nuclear weapons would be rapidly absorbed. British commitments need men; these are not being recruited in adequate numbers, as even official spokesmen now admit. For this reason much comment in that part of the British press which is devoted to a serious appraisal of foreign and defense policies is constrained to question whether the gradualist approach will be adopted. Such comment, being free of contemporary strategic jargon, can concentrate on concrete situations rather than abstract propositions; it questions whether the Labor Party's adamant refusal to consider the merits of selective military service allows its current statements about defense to be taken seriously.

The arguments of the second group appear to demonstrate quite convincingly not merely how, but why, large savings in defense expenditure are possible and desirable, and how independence can be secured and commitments reduced. It is perhaps misleading to call Professor P. M. S. Blackett, Mr. Philip Noel-Baker and Mr. Wayland Young (Lord Kennet) a group. But the close similarity of their ideas, the brilliance with which they are argued and the receptivity they enjoy suggest something more than coincidence. Whatever may be one's considered opinion about the soundness of these views in relation to Britain's international responsibilities, we cannot afford to treat them lightly.

The Labor Party is not so well dowered with brains that it can disregard the knowledge and experience of two Nobel prize winners and a most gifted and lucid exponent of strategy and disarmament. Mr. Noel-Baker is also shadow minister for disarmament, and though derisive remarks are sometimes heard that constituting a ministry does not produce a solution, Mr. Wilson intends to prove these critics wrong. By reputation alone, Mr. Noel-Baker was the obvious choice for the post. His work for disarmament needs no comment, except to emphasize that he is a committed proponent of comprehensive schemes and a bitter opponent of partial measures; he regards the test ban treaty as no more than a *pis aller*.

Professor Blackett's influence on strategic thought has been profound. His rejection of multiple options, the controlled response and the counterforce doctrine—which many American strategists believe to be his own brain-children—excites fears and despondency in Washington. A lifelong Socialist, Professor Blackett is one of Mr. Wilson's few confidants, forming with Mr. Richard Crossman a singularly fertile source of ideas, which he admires and values. Mr. Crossman is shadow minister of science; it is a reasoned calculation that he will eventually succeed Mr. Gordon Walker as foreign secretary.

Mr. Young occupies a position midway between the other two. He has played a prominent part, like Professor Blackett, in successive Pugwash conferences; in the House of Lords, where he speaks from the Opposition benches, he has advanced some bold views on the nature of deterrence; as rapporteur for the Western European Union defense committee he has made perceptive analyses of decision-making and control. In the press and in private debate he is a severe critic of American defense policy and strat-

egy, rejecting therefore the idea that they should govern in NATO. He stresses the argument that a counterforce strategy predicates an arms race and that insistence on an inspectable disarmament treaty is used to conceal a real American reluctance to have one at all.

This is the group whose views and advice are valued by Mr. Wilson because of a harmony of strategic and economic beliefs, together enshrined in what may be called the illusion of independence. But the strategic case must be analyzed to enable us to assess whether, simplified for the elector, it can promise economy and justify renouncing international obligations. Essentially, the Blackett case consists of the following propositions: The United States and the Soviet Union both have a capacity for overkill. A stable balance is therefore possible and could validate a genuine search for comprehensive disarmament down to the level of invulnerable, inspectable, retaliatory finite deterrents. Large savings in defense expenditure would result, and resources could be released for more rational purposes. The United States strategy propagated by Mr. McNamara of threatening the enemy with defeat rather than annihilation clashes, however, with the Soviet strategy of relying on the reverse proposition. Since the latter requires a smaller nuclear armory, it encourages a belief in finite deterrence and the hope that the arms race may be all but ended. Moreover, since it poses a bigger threat it implies a greater readiness on the part of the Soviets than of the United States to negotiate rather than destroy, whether in a "controlled" manner or not. United States strategy therefore tends to destabilize and inhibits disarmament hopes. Britain should reject it and free herself from the cord that binds her to America. Failure to do so means the loss of independence and increases the risk of war for Britain, since it is the acts of the United States, not of its weaker brethren, which would be the catalyst; guarding against this also forces Britain to spend expensively on her own nuclear weapons.

How true is all this? First, the case concentrates almost exclusively on nuclear strategy and, in so far as it gives a role to the conventional element, ignores its cost. No attention is given to the real as compared with the theoretical facts of the nuclear stalemate, in which the U.S. President and the Soviet Premier now spend more time warning their own than the other's citizens of the effects of nuclear war; if ever there was a "no win" analyst of nuclear war it was President Kennedy. Thus the improbabil-

ity of nuclear war is not admitted; nor is allowance made for the American insistence on providing further safeguards by centrally controlling the West's nuclear armory, by acknowledging the inadequacies of massive deterrence and emphasizing the dangers inherent in proliferation. As a result, the Blackett case gives little or no attention to the curious phenomenon that as nuclear war becomes less likely, non-nuclear conflict remains possible in Europe and more than probable in other areas of latent or actual insecurity. The cost of providing deterrents or limitations to this threat is not allowed for. Perhaps the most precise criticism which can be made against the case—for all the elegance of its arguments and the justness of some of its rebukes—is that it is already overtaken by events.

However, a more fundamental criticism is that a totally false notion is advanced as to what constitutes a catalyst of war; thus an impracticable policy is provided for Britain to escape from this supposed dilemma. Counterforce is held to be destabilizing and to menace the security of Britain—or of any other ally of the United States. Why should a counter-city strategy be considered stable? It would be as logical to argue that the threat to *initiate* any nuclear exchange was a deterrent; indeed official British nuclear strategy, wedded to “independence” from the United States, predicates just that. The doctrine of massive retaliation was rightly attacked by Professor Blackett because it was not only immoral but incredible; it was an ugly mixture of bullying, bluff and irrelevance. But why should counterforce be attacked for lacking these vices? It is disturbing to see such indifference to the fact that the really dangerous catalysts of European war are weak nuclear states and exigent conventional forces, which make considered development of anything other than a nuclear strategic détente difficult, if not impossible.

As Mr. Alastair Buchan and Mr. Philip Windsor so cogently argue,¹ a catalytic state of this kind—as Britain is now—is certainly independent in the sense that it can frustrate the search for détente. It can do so because it cherishes the illusion that independence and sovereignty are the same; or, like France, it can virtually blackmail negotiations by threatening first-strike, or “demographic,” strategies—surely one of the most intolerable euphemisms for wanton and wholesale destruction ever coined. But it is important to note that whatever the motive the result is

¹ “Arms and Stability in Europe.” New York: Praeger, 1963.

the same, which is doubtless why, despite the specific issue of the Common Market, there is much rapport now between official British and French strategists. And, by only an apparent paradox, these views turn out to be in practice indistinguishable from Professor Blackett's. Whether it is de Gaulle advocating the status quo or Professor Blackett and his confrères advocating total disengagement—which they do—the result is the same: hostility to a bipolar relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union predicated on a European settlement, and thus indifference to the part Britain can play in ensuring that this fact of power is not made an excuse for arbitrary decisions or coercive policies.

IV

This digression from an examination of Mr. Wilson's motives and possible choices has been made in order to indicate what I believe to be the dangers of following advice which promises only an illusory independence but contributes nothing to international stability. Now in conclusion we must consider which course is likely to be adopted. It is the comparison with France which may provide the clue. De Gaulle, for all his defiance, cannot escape the dilemma of geography; indeed his realization of the fact explains his attitude. France cannot defend herself. Only the United States can defend her. What France can do is to make this difficult and expensive—and dangerous, mindful as the United States now must be of its own vulnerability. De Gaulle knows full well that, *force de frappe* or no, it is American military strength in NATO and the credibility of its strategy which enables him to posture. His "independence" is strictly by courtesy of the Pentagon.

Britain is not in this position. She could disengage from Europe; there are many in Britain who urge it and there are no elements in current defense policy which contradict it. Unfortunately, the British Army of the Rhine, dependent so heavily on tactical nuclear weapons, hardly reflects belief in the strategy of the controlled response. Mr. Wilson, inheriting an indifference to European security and attracted by economy, could justify expunging this commitment by simplifying the Blackett argument to the point where it appeared that Britain was in pawn to America.

I am not suggesting this will happen, only that it might, and

implying that it would be unfortunate, to say the least, if it did. What forces are there, then, to see that it does not, bearing in mind the burden of conventional forces and the apparent impossibility of conscription? The question can be answered only by estimating the probability of crises peculiar to Britain and the nature of her relations with allies. It would be absurd to pose a crisis to clinch an argument; but should a Labor Government be forced to tackle, say, a worsened conflict with Indonesia, the lack of Britain's real independence might be dramatically revealed. A Gordian knot might of course be cut; the Malaysian emergency is not yet on the Malayan scale of 1948-1958. But it is substantial and by nature protracted. When Gurkha troops can no longer buttress Britain in this area, the emergency will be very difficult to conclude satisfactorily.

The other factor which could prove decisive, should Mr. Wilson become Prime Minister, is his natural wish to be in close rapport with Washington and to develop an already promising relationship with the Social Democrats of West Germany. In neither quarter is the French line of policy favored. A British version of it, sundering all ties, would cause something more than sharp protests. But initially the point which Britain's allies would make is that today we *are* all in pawn to each other; this is a fact, whether it be considered desirable or not. A hopeful sign perhaps, amid a good deal of ambiguity about what Mr. Wilson really intends, is that the Labor Party and S.P.D. are now sitting down together for the first time to decide what contribution the two countries can make to providing the adequate military strength for European security on which all hopes for détente, settlement and disarmament must eventually rest.

In the long run, however, it must be the Labor Party itself, educated in the realities of power and the rapid change in nuclear strategies, and rejecting the fiction of entire independence, which must evolve a sensible compromise between economy and responsibility. If Mr. Wilson will bend his considerable energies to that educative process—which is long overdue—and not heed the voices calling for Britain's abstention in the international debate, he may find a compromise that forms a coherent and viable policy.

NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE NORTH

By Trevor Lloyd

“THE war and the aeroplane have driven home to Canadians the importance of their Northland, in strategy, in resources and in communications,” Lester B. Pearson wrote in these pages some years ago.¹ They have learned, he said, that the earth is still round and that the shortest routes between many important spots in it lie over the North Pole.

Since then these facts have become commonplace. Any who doubt it need only contemplate the enormous expenditure of money, effort and ingenuity which has gone into stringing lines of radar and other detection devices from Bering Strait to Iceland, in the hope of intercepting hostile attacks by the short polar route from Eurasia. It may be useful to reëxamine the premises which have made the Arctic a focus of military strategy and have diverted so much of polar research away from the traditional coöperative inquiry after truth which happily still characterizes the Antarctic.

The continents are so distributed on the globe that most of the land is in the Northern Hemisphere; there, too, live most of the world's population, concentrated in the middle latitudes. The earth being round, the shortest routes between the main centers of population therefore run not due east and west but somewhat to the north. Indeed, these “Great Circle Courses” are often surprisingly far to the north. Flying direct from Chicago to London, one crosses northern Labrador; from San Francisco to Copenhagen, northern Greenland. As Anne Lindbergh long ago demonstrated, and the airlines have learned to their profit, the shortest route from the United States to Japan lies more north than west, in fact “North to the Orient.” Long-distance sailing routes were formerly very roundabout. Captain James Cook reached northern Alaska from England by way of Cape Horn. Contemporary naval explorers in atomic submarines are able to take a more direct route not far from the North Pole.

Irrespective of various intrinsic merits that the northern lands may possess, their mere location in the far north is of significance today. From this stems the demand for DEW Line sites and for I.C.B.M. bases, and it explains the dramatic change in

¹ “Canada Looks ‘Down North.’” *Foreign Affairs*, July 1946.

significance of a little village in Northwest Greenland called, by Knud Rasmussen in 1910, "Ultima Thule"—the end of the world. There, today, stands one of the largest and best-equipped air bases—Thule. Fort Prince of Wales, near Churchill on Hudson Bay, is once more recognized as guarding a strategic route, and Svalbard (Spitsbergen) and Novaya Zemlya are no longer left to polar bears and explorers. In the midst of these and other newly-found strategic sites lies the Arctic Ocean, which washes the northern shores of Canada, Alaska, Greenland and the Soviet Union. It is not large as oceans go, and links them more than it divides.

Isaiah Bowman said long ago that a fundamental distinction between Antarctica and the Arctic is that the one is a "hump" and the other a "hole." This is because a vast plateau of rock and ice surrounds the South Pole, while the sea ice at the North Pole is perpetually cracking, grinding and shifting under the force of varying winds or persistent currents. In reality the Arctic Ocean is one of the many inlets of the Atlantic Ocean. There is a continuing exchange of water between the two, and ice drifts southward from the polar area into the North Atlantic shipping lanes. Such ice in the center of the polar basin has proved impenetrable by surface ships. It seems unlikely that even the descendants of the *Lenin* class atomic-powered icebreakers will ever be free to move at will in the heavy polar pack ice at the North Pole. Today, however, this obstacle can be overcome by submerging beneath the ice.

Navigation in the marginal seas is now practicable with specially designed vessels for shorter or longer periods, depending on the season and unpredictable variations from year to year. These seas were first proved during the search for the "passages" between western Europe and the Orient. What has become known as "The Northern Sea Route" is today of economic significance to the Soviet Union, but long-distance traffic through the Northwest Passage in Canadian waters is still rare enough to secure headlines.

How are North America and Eurasia located both in relation to one another and to the North Pole? And how has this affected their relative development?

The northern mainland coast of Canada and Alaska lies at about 70°N. latitude, or roughly 1,400 miles from the Pole. The northernmost Canadian settlement—Alert, on the coast of Elles-

mere Island—is at about 82°N. latitude, or 500 miles from the Pole. Most of the mainland coast of Eurasia is also at about 70°N. latitude, but at one point extends still 500 miles farther north. The northernmost island settlement in the Soviet Union is a little more southerly than is Alert. Rivers draining these northern lands flow, in many cases, into the polar seas. Examples are the Mackenzie of northwest Canada and the Ob, Yenesei and Lena



of Siberia. They provide potential water routes between the continental interiors and the seacoast and also lowlands suitable for roads and railways. Their tributaries form a network which alone made it possible to explore the continents overland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Because settlement took place initially along the southern margins of the area, railways and later roads ran east-west between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The need to link these transcontinental routes with the more northerly sea routes has been met to a considerable extent

by using the north-south river valleys. This is best exemplified in Siberia where the Northern Sea Route and the Trans-Siberian Railway are tied together very effectively in summer by river transportation, and all year by feeder airlines. In North America this grid-like pattern is less apparent, except in the case of the Mackenzie. However, the Hudson Bay Railroad to Churchill and the Northern Ontario Railroad to Moosonee serve a similar purpose.

Greenland is a special case in any discussion of northern topography. As is usual with northern lands, the east coast is swept by southward flowing currents carrying heavy ice, while the western coast benefits from a northward flowing warmer current and hence is able to support a relatively large population. Thule air base lies far north along the kindlier western side. The same principle permits all-year navigation around northern Norway at least as far as Murmansk, but on the eastern shore of Eurasia it is necessary to use icebreakers to open the port of Vladivostok, which is 1,700 miles farther south. The contrast between the open waters of southern Alaska and the icebound coast of southern Labrador is less dramatic but remains economically significant.

Where do the people live? The center of gravity of population and economic activity in the Soviet Union lies much farther north than it does in North America as a whole or even in Canada. Leningrad is at 60°N. latitude, which marks the southern border of the Canadian Northwest Territories, and Odessa, the southerly Black Sea port, is about as far north as Quebec City. The new industrial regions of Siberia, the southern Urals, Kuzbas and Irkutsk complexes, lie in the middle fifties, comparable in latitude with Prince Albert or Edmonton, Schefferville and Goose Bay. There are quite large Soviet cities in high latitudes—Murmansk has a quarter of a million people at almost 70°N. while the Siberian mining city of Norilsk, with a population of over 100,000, is in about the latitude of the Mackenzie Delta. It is apparent that population is not distributed symmetrically about the North Pole. On the Eurasian side it lies appreciably farther north, and dips more to the south in North America.

The Arctic can be thought of, then, as a moderate-sized sea, rather more than 2,000 miles across, bordered by islands and continental land masses, the latter linked to the south by broad

river valleys, or in the case of Canada by the large embayment of Hudson and James Bays. It is this arrangement which offers so much promise in an era of long-range aircraft and atomic submarines.

I believe we may expect the influence of these physical factors to bear increasingly on local and international relations in the years ahead. The existing conflict between geographical potentialities and everyday political realities is nowhere more apparent than in the world-wide pattern of international air routes. Despite popular impressions about trans-polar aviation, very few commercial airlines fly regularly close to the actual Pole. Most of them at best skirt the polar basin and some in fact "dog-leg" across the world by way of the subarctic. The longer routes must still be followed even in the north because approximately one-half of the circumpolar lands are closed to foreign aircraft. Thus a commercial plane going from Copenhagen to Tokyo could, if free to do so, follow a direct route over the North Pole. But such desirable short cuts cannot at present be utilized because Soviet air space is not available.

Apart from rather academic matters, there are no disputes over territory in the Far North today. Nations with territorial interests in the area are the United States (Alaska), Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Norway (Svalbard and Jan Mayen) and the Soviet Union.² Because of the area's remoteness from centers of administration, its strategic sensitivity and the dearth of experience in dealing with political problems there, it is always possible that some minor incident may be inflated into an international dispute. This is particularly the case when submarines are on "exercises" and long-range aircraft on "routine training missions."

The traditional seaward extent of sovereignty—three or four miles—does not apply to the Soviet Union, which has established a boundary at 12 miles. There is also a wide variety of fisheries-limits and of aircraft identification zones which are usually marked on charts. More recently there has arisen some doubt about the extent of a nation's right to claim resources within the submerged continental shelf. Clearly there is room for careful study of the many boundary lines drawn, some unilaterally, on political maps and charts of the Arctic. The "Blue Line" dispute

² Norway, the Soviet Union and Finland also have high latitude (though not strictly arctic) interests where their territories adjoin near the Barents Sea.

about trawling limits off the north Norwegian coast led eventually to a World Court decision which the United Kingdom lost—and this subsequently influenced the better-known dispute over Icelandic waters. A similar case could yet arise off West Greenland. The disagreement between Norway and Denmark concerning sovereignty over part of East Greenland was also settled at The Hague but only after a good deal of acrimony. It is encouraging to note by contrast that Soviet-Norwegian boundary questions have been settled amicably in recent years and the improved atmosphere has resulted in most useful agreements concerning offshore fishing and hydroelectric development.

There is an interesting contrast between the attitude of the United States and Denmark on one hand, and Canada on the other, with regard to the “sector” principle. This concerns the extension of international boundaries for long distances across the open Arctic Sea. The United States and Denmark do not advocate or recognize this method of determining sovereignty, but Canada (with confidence in the authority of Opposition Senator Poirier in 1907) has continued boldly to print boundaries reaching to the Pole along the 141st and 60th meridians. Government maps sometimes go farther and with a varying degree of precision show a line down the center of Davis Strait between Greenland and Canada which eventually fades off into the open North Atlantic.

Russia followed Canada's example in 1916 by claiming two meridians as boundaries as far as the Pole. However, the westerly limit was not moved still farther west with the occupation of Petsamo following World War II, and its effectiveness is somewhat reduced by the need to detour around Svalbard. The territorial limits and the rights of Norway in this area are very carefully spelled out in a treaty. One consequence is that for almost 40 years Svalbard was the only considerable part of the world to be permanently demilitarized by international agreement; since 1959 it has been joined in this by Antarctica.

Territorial sovereignty in the Far North is clearly not without interest as a subject of political inquiry, and the possibilities are continually expanding. About 15 floating ice stations manned by scientists have circled in the polar basin at one time or another since 1937. Some have crossed sector lines. One American “island,” *Arlis II*, has spent a considerable time west of the Soviet line, others have gone aground, and some eventually drifted into

the Atlantic. One Soviet icefloe station, N.P. 7, which was first manned in 1957, was evacuated in 1959 north of Greenland. Two years later it turned up off the coast of Baffin Island—complete with buildings and supplies and a message of welcome for the finders. A nice question can be posed as to whether the station remains Soviet property until the floe finally melts. Until this happens is it, to the sea lawyer, jetsam or flotsam?

It has been shown that there is a basic physical unity about the north polar region, but that on the other hand its settlement and exploitation have been brought about piecemeal, sector by sector, from the south. So it is the dissimilarities which first strike one. Different social and economic patterns have been imposed; one encounters a variety of languages and educational systems; and commerce, transportation, scientific inquiry and above all defense are remarkably diverse.

II

There has been no lack of praise for the economic success of Soviet enterprise in the Arctic. Unfortunately, little direct proof of such success is available and there has been no opportunity for an independent assessment by outside scholars. Beyond a few rather generalized statistics, quantities of brick, mortar and concrete revealed in photographs, and the happy faces of the pioneers, we have not been allowed to penetrate. It is more than a quarter of a century since a Western specialist traveled widely in the Soviet North. There has recently been frank public criticism within the Soviet Union of past shortcomings in developing the northern regions. This suggests that undertakings there have not been uniformly successful. It is known that there has been a large-scale northward migration involving hundreds of thousands of workers and scientists, but not whether there has been a satisfactory economic return for the very large sums invested; nor do we know anything of the quality of the widespread construction or the permanence of the settlements.

An appreciable beginning in this northern economic development took place before the 1917 Revolution. An English sea captain, Joseph Wiggins, pioneered commercial use of the Kara Sea route between the Yenesei River and the Atlantic. He was followed by a Norwegian businessman, Jonas Lied, who, with encouragement from the scientist, explorer and statesman, Fridtjof Nansen, planned a detailed program of exploitation of the

resources of Northern Siberia and had put it partly into effect before the Revolution came. Nansen's volume, "Through Siberia, the Land of the Future," was an outcome of this activity.

It was not until the 1930s that further appreciable advances were made. Then the Soviet Government formed the rather spectacular Northern Sea Route Administration, which in effect administered the whole country north of 62°N. latitude. Its shipping and lumbering enterprises were paralleled by a powerful scientific campaign which provided the essential basis for Soviet successes both in the Arctic and Antarctic in the postwar years. During this period of the 1930s the Canadian North was almost completely neglected—scientifically, economically and socially.

As a part of the campaign to bring all native peoples within the Soviet system, the Arctic became a field for stirring missionary endeavor in the 1930s. Selected leaders were trained in Leningrad, and eventually a network of schools and colleges spread throughout the north; today the more advanced of them—such as that at Yakutsk—have become universities. At the same time scientific stations were set up—some for gathering routine data, others for more complex duties. All provided a training ground for new northern recruits. Today the Arctic and Antarctic Institute in Leningrad and various Institutes of the Academy of Sciences have a closely interrelated system of basic scientific stations. Economic planning has of course called for comparable work in the social sciences, and here, too, the Soviets are far in advance of anything in North America. Part of the acknowledged Soviet success is undoubtedly due to the early start, part to the widespread conviction that the northern areas of the U.S.S.R. are not different in kind from other parts of the country. This means that their development is planned in the same way, though it is recognized that effort expended may bring relatively fewer returns.

The results of 30 years of northern scientific and economic study are now appearing in Soviet university textbooks and technical journals. They provide knowledge of the Arctic unequalled in any other country. Thus more than half the items in a recent volume of the "Arctic Bibliography," published in Washington, D.C., originated in the Soviet Union. However, early optimism concerning the economic potentialities of the Soviet Arctic appears to be giving place to a more sober assessment of

the difficulties inherent in exploiting resources in a remote region. It is now recognized that to justify development either the resources must be present in very large amounts or they must be scarce elsewhere. In addition, some of the early urgency to seek natural resources in the Arctic has passed because the U.S.S.R. is now able to secure them from abroad through normal trade channels.

III

Events in the Soviet Arctic are often compared with those in northern Canada. There, during the nineteenth century, development was left to the fur traders, who limited their activities for the most part to the Northwest and rarely ventured beyond the tree-line. Whalers from the Pacific and sealers from the Atlantic made contact with the Eskimos. Though the Klondike gold boom had a dramatic short-term effect in the Yukon, it made little or no impression elsewhere. It was not until the 1920s and 1930s that Canadian industry began to reach the North, and then only in the Mackenzie Valley. First came a small-scale oil boom at Norman; later a mining development on Great Bear Lake where radium and uranium of great strategic importance were produced; finally gold was mined at Yellowknife. The fur trade had meanwhile extended to isolated posts in the Eastern Arctic, where it unfortunately altered for the worse the Eskimos' traditional way of life. One vessel a year provided the Eastern Arctic Patrol; its mission was partly political, but it also provided a minimum of medical services and caused a few settlements to be given an annual "paint up and brush up" in the best Potemkin tradition. The railway to Churchill, and the seaport itself, though so important to the Prairies, made no impact on the remoter North until many years later, when there was an urgent need for defense construction. Administration was of necessity rudimentary; there was no genuine local self-government and little call for it. Yukon retained vestiges of the territorial form of government which had been designed in far-off Klondike days for the golden future. Elsewhere, the whole of the North could have been termed, in the modern jargon, "underdeveloped and non-self-governing."

There was considerable influence on the Canadian North from the outside during World War II. The United States built the Alaska Highway and the Canol pipeline, constructed a string of

airfields across the Arctic to ferry planes to Asia and Europe, and scattered weather stations here and there to service them. It also photographed and mapped. These activities drew the attention of the Canadian Government to the new significance of the North.

No clear picture can be obtained as yet of the economic potential of the vast area north of the settled belt of southern Canada. It has been tacitly assumed that when any resources there may be developed they will be processed and marketed elsewhere. This has been true of gold and uranium, and would also have been true of Mackenzie oil had it flowed through the Canol pipeline. Today the principal purpose is to extract from the North enough to pay for the cost of shipping goods in—with sufficient margin to make the transaction worthwhile. Not many consider it possible to create there a self-sufficient economy, although this is what eventually occurred on a vast scale in Siberia and to a lesser degree on the Canadian prairies.

What of the indigenous peoples, the Indians and Eskimos? Are they to take an active place in local development and be encouraged to move outside and join the multi-national settlers to the south? Or are they to be left to eke out a living in the North, a burden on the consciences of their more prosperous fellow citizens, contributing little to their own support or the future of their people?

And what inducements are going to attract newcomers from the south? To make quick money as miners or summer workers and leave? Or to build up communities with assured futures in the North as has been done farther south? Can one foresee Inuvik, the new town on the Mackenzie Delta, as a local Ottawa, Frobisher Bay as a miniature Quebec City, Yellowknife as a northern Sudbury? Is there a possibility of building electro-chemical centers like those at Niagara Falls beside some northern hydro site? Will there be petro-chemical communities like Edmonton or northern scientific centers like Chalk River?

The Canadian Federal Government in a sense has a dual responsibility in the Far North. It provides a quasi-provincial administration and oversees a rudimentary legislative system. On the other hand, the Federal Government departments and agencies have their own interests in the north: Agriculture seeks insects on the remotest islands; Mines and Technical Surveys has a wide range of activities from mapping to oceanography; Public Works

builds; Revenue taxes. There are weather observers, weights-and-measures inspectors, postal clerks and telegraphers; there are sailors, soldiers and airmen. The lines of authority from each department in Ottawa run to the remotest outpost, and the loyalty of the employees follows the same lines back. Departmental autonomy discourages attempts at integration.

Local government also raises questions. There are a few oases in the vast wilderness—minute specks in fact, though appearing larger on the map. Each is a special case—a mining town, an administrative center or a scientific community—often with mixed populations of different races, languages and levels of culture and achievement. To what extent should such groups govern themselves and whom else should they essay to govern? Can the Yellowknife miner claim authority over the Indian of Fort Rae not far away? Should the Eskimos of southern Baffin Island be allowed to outvote the technicians, priests and schoolmen of Frobisher Bay? Is government necessarily better because it is geographically closer? And is Frobisher Bay any “closer” to an Eskimo on the other side of Baffin Island than is Ottawa? And in DEW-Line posts and other technologically advanced communities, can the bored and frustrated transient technicians be expected to give loyalty elsewhere than to Toronto or Schenectady? Can there be self-government in such a situation?

IV

Settlement in Greenland has proceeded entirely differently from that in either the Soviet Union or Canada. The first settlement was by descendants of Norwegian-Icelandic farmers and fishermen. By the thirteenth century, however, southern Greenland had reverted to a scattering of Eskimo camp sites perched precariously between the icecap and the sea. Modern Greenland dates from Danish missionary zeal in the early eighteenth century. The subsequent Danish state monopoly varied little in its over-all guidelines down to the present century. It abolished illiteracy among the primitive Eskimos and created successful settlements, particularly along the west coast. Profit motives were never allowed to interfere with the well-being of the native peoples. That this closely knit little welfare state was rigidly cut off from the outside world was until recently no disadvantage. Certainly in the 1930s it was true that of all the Eskimos, those of Greenland were the best cared for.

Yet the coming of the airplane and radio meant that foreign influence could not forever be excluded, and in 1950 Denmark wisely decided that Greenland should move into a radically new stage of development. The country was thrown open, very large sums of public money were poured into new schools, hospitals, harbors, fish-processing plants and housing, and Greenland was absorbed into the Danish community as another province. Today the Greenlanders undoubtedly lead their Eskimo relatives elsewhere in social and cultural affairs, even though they may remain inexperienced in economic matters. By good fortune, the waters of West Greenland warmed appreciably in the 1920s and the resulting increase in the supply of cod and other commercial fish made it easier to provide a soundly based economy. Today Greenland "fish sticks," frozen shrimp and other high quality products are very widely marketed and help to pay for the consumer goods which crowd Greenland's new self-service stores. On balance, however, Greenland remains a heavy financial burden on Denmark and it is difficult to see how this can change for the better.

The large United States-operated air bases in Greenland during the past 20 years have undoubtedly played a part in this remarkable social and economic revolution. Yet it would be a mistake to attribute it to direct United States intervention; at all times, even during the war years, Danish authorities completely controlled the country. However, the intensity and range of scientific research in and about Greenland during the past two decades owe an enormous amount to American initiative, personnel and financial support.

v

While intensive exploration for resources has taken place in the Arctic recently, much remains to be learned. In the sixteenth century, expeditions sought mineral deposits; afterward the objective was fur trapping. Later when the true wealth of the North was found to be in the seas, the rich whale fisheries of Spitsbergen, Greenland and Alaska flourished. The seas now yield large harvests of fish, and oceanographers suggest that the convergence of cold and warm waters there provides an exceptionally rich growth of plankton, the basic foodstuff of the seas. As fishing areas farther south are being more rigidly policed, there is pressure on the long-distance trawlers to penetrate still farther north into truly arctic waters.

Forest resources do not by definition exist in the true Arctic since this lies north of the tree-line, but there are enormous reserves of soft woods in subarctic lands, some of which are best reached from farther north. This is so in Siberia, in northern European Russia and in Finnish Lapland. Britain and other West European countries regularly trade for timber via the Northern Sea Route to Igarka far up the Yenesei River. Collaboration between Norway and Finland may result in more rational use of the Finnish timber for production of pulp and paper on the Norwegian coast near Kirkenes.

It is generally believed that mining offers the most encouraging basis for arctic development, for only minerals can stand the heavy freight charges and exceptionally high costs of production. The list of arctic mining centers is already impressive, but the addition of others depends less upon further exploration and prospecting than on a rise in world prices of metals and oil products.

Greenland has been fortunate in possessing a unique and highly profitable mine opened more than a century ago. This produces cryolite which is in great demand by the aluminum industry. The deposit is almost ideal for exploitation in the Arctic, since it occurs at tidewater on an ice-free coast and can be mined inexpensively. On the other hand, despite determined efforts, no other successful mines have been opened in Greenland.

Canada's two genuinely arctic mining operations at Port Radium on Great Bear Lake and at Rankin Inlet on western Hudson Bay closed recently. Coal mining, which has a long history in Svalbard and on Disko Island in Greenland, faces an uncertain future. On the contrary, the long-established iron ore (taconite) mine at Kirkenes in northern Norway was successfully reconstructed following World War II and continues to find a ready market in Western Europe for its high quality concentrates. Its success is due in part to its location very close to an open seacoast.

The economics of Soviet Arctic mining remain a closed book. There are several high-latitude enterprises which not only continue but expand. Some of them are associated with large permanent settlements. The well-known Petsamo nickel deposit close to the Norwegian border, a few miles from Kirkenes, apparently continues to prosper; it uses a large part of the hydroelectric power produced at the nearby Pasvik River. Even larger is

Norilsk far to the east, some miles from the Yenesei, where both base metals and coal are present and a highly complex industrial center has been erected in a region of permanently frozen ground. On the margin of the true Arctic, the Pechora Valley of northern European Russia produces coal, oil and natural gas which are moved southward to industrial centers. Various minerals are mined in northern Siberia east of the Yenesei and there are new reports of oil drilling near the arctic seacoast.

In North America today the greatest effort is being put into the search for oil. This began in Alaska during World War II when the Naval Petroleum Reserve near Point Barrow was the scene of intensive study. A large-scale search for new oil fields has been going on in the Queen Elizabeth Islands since 1959. Many companies, usually grouped in syndicates, have secured exploration permits and undertaken detailed geological mapping and geophysical prospecting. Drilling has been done at a few sites, first on Melville Island and later farther east. This has presented the first opportunities for use of part of the Northwest Passage for strictly commercial shipping. Even if oil in commercial quantities were to be discovered shortly, there might well be considerable delay before it could reach world markets as the method of transportation is still to be determined. Some companies believe that arctic oil can be competitive with that from the Near East, and speak of using submarine tankers to ship it to Western Europe. However, any oil located in the remoter parts of northern Canada may possibly be regarded for the present as a hedge against serious depletion of resources elsewhere, rather than for immediate production.

With a few exceptions, the Arctic does not yet make a major contribution to world mineral needs and there is no assurance that it is likely to in the near future. Costs are always higher in the Far North than in more accessible areas, and most of the skilled labor needed to operate mines, build and man cities, staff schools and hospitals, are transients who under present conditions do not regard the area as a permanent home. As yet companies have but few inducements, such as tax benefits, to develop northern resources in preference to more accessible ones.

VI

Among the contrasts between the Antarctic and the Arctic, none is more striking than the close international collaboration

in the one and the almost total lack of it in the other. Despite apparently fundamental disagreements over territorial claims in Antarctica, an epoch-making treaty went into effect in 1959 ensuring the closest scientific coöperation between the 12 nations concerned. In the Arctic, where there are no pressing boundary problems, where the need for scientific coöperation is every day more urgent and where no elaborate treaty would be required, there is an almost total absence of official contact between the Western nations and the Soviet Union and its allies. That this is merely a by-product of disagreements over policies in other areas is all the more regrettable. There are, however, some signs of improvement in international scientific relations. Informal exchanges of scientists are increasing. The Arctic and Antarctic Institute of Leningrad has welcomed visitors from the West, and there have been contacts in Moscow between the Northern Sea Route Administration, various Institutes of the Academy of Sciences and corresponding groups in North America. The Arctic Institute of North America particularly has welcomed several groups of Soviet scientists. A Russian delegate to an arctic symposium held in Montreal in 1963 was subsequently taken on an extended tour of Canadian research sites in the Queen Elizabeth Islands. And individuals persist in exchanging publications and ideas and in answering inquiries.

In Arctic North America today there is a considerable degree of coöperation across the frontiers. The farthest-north weather stations in Canada are manned jointly, and jointly paid for, by Canada and the United States. There is a truly international scientific station on Devon Island, operated by the Arctic Institute of North America and employing scientists from several nations. The staff of the Axel Heiberg Expedition of McGill University has included scientists of many lands. Japanese, British and Canadians have worked together on United States icefloe stations, and a desire has often been expressed to include Russians. Much scientific research is necessarily international, and this is particularly the case in northern Canada—the home of the North Magnetic Pole, with nearby the Geomagnetic Pole which is the focal point of the Aurora. The vast Precambrian Shield is of interest to all who study the structure of the earth and the behavior of shock waves. The shores of the Polar Basin may give clues as to how continents and oceans are formed, and arctic waters may throw light on climatic changes much farther south.

Of even greater significance is the value of the Arctic as an area for studying physical and socio-economic problems which are of broad scientific interest. If only because the environment is relatively uncomplicated and uncluttered, ideas can be developed there which may advance science everywhere.

When Lester Pearson wrote of the Far North in 1946 he was very much aware of the need for international collaboration in all aspects of its development. "It is in Canada's interest, and in the general interest," he wrote, "that each northern nation should coöperate with every other in all Arctic problems. Though much has been accomplished, a great deal remains to be done. . . . If the fullest use is to be made of the resources of the northern regions, there should be a pooling of scientific data and co-ordination of research and experimentation. All the polar nations can learn from each other and thereby advance the knowledge and resources of mankind. For this reason Canada desires to work not only with the United States, but with all the Arctic countries—Denmark (for Greenland), Norway and the Soviet Union—in exploiting to the full the peaceful possibilities of the Northern Hemisphere. Particularly is this true of the U.S.S.R., which is well ahead of the rest of the world in the development of its polar areas and which, Canadians are beginning to realize, is their neighbor across the North Pole." The years which have passed since 1946 have done nothing to diminish the urgent need for such collaboration.

SOVIET SECOND THOUGHTS ON TSARIST COLONIALISM

By Lowell R. Tillet

IN the endless campaign for ideological purification which goes on in the Soviet Union, the "historical front" is accorded high priority. No academic discipline has received such constant attention and supervision from the Party as that called "historical science," and no group of scholars has been so frequently out of step.

Since 1934 Russian history has been extensively rewritten to serve the Party in several ways: 1, to show that the Marxist laws of history have been working in the past; 2, to inculcate a new Soviet patriotism which will act as a counterweight to the nationalism of non-Russian subjects; 3, to prove the correctness of Party decisions, past and present.

To a Soviet historian who disappeared in Stalin's purges in the middle 1930s, and who returned to Khrushchev's Russia two decades later to resume his work, the new Soviet histories must have seemed to be caricatures concocted by some "bourgeois falsifier." In no field would he have encountered more surprising changes of interpretation than in the history of tsarist colonialism. He would have remembered the Russian conquests of the Caucasus and Central Asia as particularly brutal campaigns carried out by generals called by Soviet scholars "tsarist satraps." In the new histories—some of them by the same authors—he would find that many of the conquests did not take place at all, but that annexation to Russia came about peacefully with the consent of the inhabitants. In other cases he would find brief accounts of hostilities, subordinated to discussion of the progressive results of annexation. As for the Russian generals, they were now more remembered as benevolent administrators and civilizers than for their military skills.

Not only had the villains become heroes, but the heroes had become villains. The resistance movements against tsarist expansion had earlier been typed "national liberation" movements and were characterized as just and heroic efforts of the masses to preserve their freedom. The leaders of these movements were among the greatest heroes and martyrs in Russian history. But now our returning historian would find that most of these move-

ments were regarded as reactionary uprisings, and their leaders were denounced as representatives of the feudal landlord class, or as spokesmen for a reactionary religious ideology, or even the henchmen of foreign powers—Britain, Turkey or Persia.

Other revelations awaited our scholar. He would discover that trade and cultural relations between the Slavic and non-Slavic peoples went back to medieval or even ancient times, and that the friendship of peoples was one of the constants of Russian history. He would learn that the colonies were settled by the best sort of Russians. If he chanced to read into the popularized history of "Russian America," as written during his absence, he would find that "the settlement of Alaska by Russians bore a clearly expressed laboring and democratic character dissimilar to the trade-plundering colonization by the Anglo-Saxons, who recruited their agents from among tramps, adventurers and criminals."¹

In short, our returning scholar would find that the history of tsarist colonialism has been turned inside-out, and the new history is one which could, for the most part, be read with approval by the tsars themselves. Its theses are remarkably similar to the 1864 circular of the Russian Foreign Minister, Prince Gorchakov, in which he justified Russian expansion in Central Asia as a civilizing mission and a necessary step for stabilizing boundaries.

II

The Soviet revision of Russian colonial history came much later than other revisions because of the strong anti-colonial position of Marx, who had called the Russian Empire "a prison of peoples." Indeed, early Soviet histories had stated that the subject peoples of Asia had been under a "double oppression:" a "national colonial oppression" under reactionary tsarism and "a feudal oppression" under the native aristocracy which frequently collaborated with the Russian governors.

There were a few attempts in the 1930s by the Party to influence the interpretation of colonial policies, especially in connection with the building up of a new concept of the long and unshakable friendship of peoples in the Soviet family. But the first celebrated case involving a widely known book occurred after the publication in 1943 of "History of the Kazakh S.S.R.," co-edited

¹ *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Nov. 3, 1951, as quoted by Walter Kolarz, in "The Peoples of the Soviet Far East," London, 1954, p. 25.

by one of the best known Party historians, Anna Pankratova. The work was severely criticized in *Bolshevik* (No. 6, 1945) for its emphasis on Kazakh "military traditions" and the fight for independence. The Party journal also took serious objection to the glorification of Kenesary Kasimov, who had led a resistance movement against incorporation into the Russian Empire in the 1830s and was regarded by the Kazakhs as a national hero. It pointed out that he was a member of the exploiting class and was supporting feudal institutions and not the interests of the working people. The attack in *Bolshevik* evoked a resolution from the Central Committee of the Kazakh Party, acknowledging the criticism as just and appropriating funds for a new history of Kazakhstan. But before that history appeared, a distinguished Kazakh scholar, E. Bekmakhanov, published in 1947 his "Kazakhstan from the 1820s to the 1840s," which continued and even enhanced the heroic role of Kenesary. Bekmakhanov's book not only invoked Party rebuke, it was made the subject of a public debate in 1948. Historians were divided and *Voprosy Istorii* (No. 4, 1949) was alarmed because some of the most distinguished Soviet historians had favored Bekmakhanov's views.

During the same years, some effort was made to revise the history of the Caucasus, but with even less success. The most celebrated of all the "national liberation" leaders was Shamil, the fiery leader of the Murids, a fanatical sect of Moslems in Dagestan. For 25 years Shamil held down Russian armies far outnumbering his own and built such a reputation that he was treated with special respect after his capture in 1859. In 1947, K. G. Adzhemian read a paper on Shamil which ran counter to the long respected interpretation. He declared that Shamil was the leader of a reactionary religious sect and that he had received aid from Britain and Turkey. The annexation of the Caucasus to Russia brought these people "the first gleam of civilization, and opened the road . . . to broad European development." Since Shamil and his movement stood in the way of this progressive historical event, they could be characterized only as reactionary. In the discussion which followed the paper, Adzhemian found himself completely without support, and the chairman of the meeting, N. M. Druzhinin, president of the Institute of History, laid the matter to rest with a concluding statement charging that Adzhemian had given no criticism of the sources and had not demonstrated knowledge of some of the facts.

If Adzhemian's paper was a Party warning, it was unheeded. Soviet histories published during the next two years left Shamil on his pedestal, and in 1949 one of Shamil's countrymen was to carry his praise to new heights. The book "From the History of Social and Political Thought in Azerbaidzhan in the Nineteenth Century," by Geidar Guseinov, praised Shamil not only for his military prowess but as a great democrat and statesman. The volume was hailed by early reviewers as a major publishing event, and was nominated for a Stalin Prize.

It was apparently the reception of this book and its nomination for the prize which convinced Party ideologists that they must leave off scholarly admonitions and institute a crackdown in the style of the recent *Zhdanovshchina*. On May 14, 1950, *Pravda* announced that the committee on Stalin Prizes had admitted an error. The article went on to state that Guseinov's book "radically distorts the real meaning of this movement, which was nationalistic and was in the service of British capitalism and the Turkish Sultan." Two days later the prize nomination was withdrawn: Adzhemian's forgotten argument of three years earlier had triumphed.

The chief spokesman for the new line was M. D. Bagirov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaidzhan Communist Party and close associate of Beria. Writing in *Bolshevik* (No. 13, 1950), he emphasized that annexation was, for the people of the Caucasus, "the only possible path for the development of their economy and culture." By annexation they "obtained protection from external enemies." Shamil was a feudal chieftain and beast of prey, in the pay of imperialist Britain and Turkey.

Bagirov's charges caused reviewers and journals to make their usual round of apologies and retractions, but there was none from the author, Guseinov, who, according to an announcement made a decade later, committed suicide. Two large conferences were called to discuss the matter, and the Praesidium of the Academy of Sciences passed a sweeping resolution which fired historians and administrators, called for new research and appropriated 150,000 rubles for a new history of Dagestan.²

On December 25, 1950, *Pravda* renewed the Party fight with the historians of Central Asia in a long article condemning half a dozen histories. Kenesary was given the same treatment as Shamil, and a particularly harsh rebuke was reserved for Bekmak-

² *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, II, No. 48, p. 13-14.

hanov, whose book had continued to idealize Kenesary in spite of an earlier Party directive.

For the next few years Soviet historians hewed to the new Party line in a flurry of activity. A number of uprisings and their leaders were analyzed and pronounced reactionary, more conferences were called and volumes of documents appeared. Museums in the borderlands were purged of art objects and dozens of folk epics were denounced as reactionary. The drastic revision was explained as the result of new and more detailed research on a "scientific Marxist level," which had overcome the survivals of "bourgeois nationalism" in historical writing.

The revision came to be more and more closely linked with one of Stalin's favorite themes—Great Russian leadership. Emphasis was increasingly placed on the civilizing mission of the Russians and on the friendship of peoples of the U.S.S.R. This trend resulted in a revision and finally the denunciation of the "lesser evil" formula. This scheme had been used to reconcile tsarist oppression with the progressive consequences of annexation. According to this argument, the border peoples faced the alternative of being taken over by reactionary Britain, Turkey or Persia or of being annexed by Russia and being set on the road to eventual Communism. The latter was clearly the "lesser evil." But Bagirov, in his speech to the Nineteenth Party Congress (October 1952), denounced the "lesser evil" formula because there was too much evil implied in it. What he wanted—and got—was something like an "absolute good" formula, which left tsarist colonialism with no negative qualities. The term "elder brother"—referring to the Great Russians—came to be substituted for the "lesser evil."

Following such reasoning, a Kazakh historian rewrote the history of his country in these terms:

The Kazakh steppes were not conquered by the Russian state, and the incorporation of the . . . Kazakh hordes was carried out with their complete approval. . . . The isolated punitive expeditions carried out by the Russian frontier troops in reply to marauding expeditions of Kazakh batyrs, in the course of which many innocent Kazakh villages also suffered, cannot be regarded as a general campaign of conquest. . . . The Russian construction of military forts was progressive, designed to bring order to the area. . . . The inhabitants approached the Russian fortified line in search of protection and because they were attracted by the prospect of a more stable existence.³

³ S. E. Tolybekov, "O reaktsionnoi borbe kazakhskikh sultanov i batyrov mladshevo zhuza protiv dobrovol'nogo prisoedineniia k Rossii" [On the reactionary struggle of the Kazakh sultans and batyrs of the lesser horde against voluntary annexation to Russia], *Vestnik Akademii Nauk Kazakh S. S. R.*, No. 6, 1955, p. 43-59.

The tsarist generals, too, had to be rehabilitated. General Ermolov, the "proconsul of the Caucasus," was pictured in the 1947 edition of Pankratova's ninth grade textbook as a conqueror who "applied military and administrative measures of a very drastic nature," who built forts with such awe-inspiring names as *groznaia* (the Dread) and *zlobnyi okop* (Wicked Trench). He was said to have forced the mountaineers into submission by hunger and siege. The 1953 edition omitted all these passages and substituted a new one which mentioned three of the general's activities: the development of the silk industry, the opening of schools and the abolition of slavery.⁴

III

For a few months in 1956, it appeared that this entire structure, so carefully erected by the Party and historians, would be toppled in the general campaign of de-Stalinization. The first open criticism came in the now famous Readers Conference of the journal *Voprosy Istorii*, held in January 1956 on the eve of the Twentieth Party Congress. E. N. Burdzhakov, deputy editor of the journal, and the leader of the anti-Stalin revision movement to come, presided at the conference and announced that the gross distortions and falsifications resulting from the "cult of personality" must be corrected. He gave a prominent place to the correction of errors about Shamil and Muridism and he blamed them on Bagirov, who was at that moment awaiting trial and the death sentence as a henchman of Beria. He gave the floor to a middle-school teacher named A. M. Pikman, who made a blistering attack on the authorities in historical science, who, he said, had grossly distorted Marx and Engels, falsified documents and denied space in journals to anyone in disagreement on the Shamil question.⁵

Further historical revision was called for in the speeches at the Twentieth Party Congress. Mikoyan characterized the writing of Party and social history as "perhaps the most backward sector in our ideological work," and called on historians to correct all the errors resulting from the "cult of personality." Khrushchev threw the "elder brother" out the window in a single phrase when he said that "our Party has succeeded in removing the mutual

⁴ "Istoria S.S.S.R." A. M. Pankratova, ed., Moscow, 1947, II, p. 171; *ibid.*, 1953 edition, p. 270-271.

⁵ *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 2, 1956, p. 199-213.

distrust which existed among the peoples in tsarist Russia, and in uniting all the peoples of the Soviet Union in bonds of fraternal friendship. . . ." This reference to mutual distrust, whether made by intention or a slip of the tongue, contradicted the "friendship of peoples" theme so painstakingly constructed by Soviet historians in the last few years. Pankratova carefully noted the reference, and parroted it in her speech to the Congress. She confessed a number of errors of her colleagues, stressing in particular that Soviet historians had idealized tsarist colonialism. She preferred to have it both ways: tsarist colonial policy was extremely oppressive and reactionary, but annexation was progressive in the long run.⁶

After the Party Congress there was the characteristic flurry of conferences, editorials and articles. Three large conferences were held in 1956 alone on the Shamil question. The unusual thing about this spurt of activity was that there was no unanimity. Scholarly arguments found their way into print, and history journals sometimes carried two points of view in the same issue. A. M. Pikman, who had become the spokesman for Shamil's reputation at the Readers' Conference, spoke his mind in the March issue of *Voprosy Istorii*. He pronounced Shamil's movement progressive in no uncertain terms, and he was backed up by a Dagestan scholar in the July issue. At the same time the journal carried an account of an April conference at which some of the most respected Party historians vigorously disagreed. The historians of Central Asia, who were closely watching the Shamil issue as a test case, proceeded somewhat more cautiously. It was pointed out that the peoples of Central Asia were making solid progress before the Russians came, implying that annexation was hardly essential to the well-being of the people. One reviewer chided a Central Asian author for attributing too much cultural influence to Russia and dismissed a chapter on the progressive consequences of annexation as superfluous.⁷ Through all of this it is possible to detect a contest between the non-Russian historians, who were eager to restore their heroes and traditions, and the Moscow historians, who preferred to move more cautiously.

That fall Soviet schools opened with old textbooks and new interpretations. A pamphlet was hurriedly prepared as a guide for

⁶ *Current Digest*, VIII, No. 5, p. 12; No. 8, p. 10; No. 12, p. 10.

⁷ *Central Asian Review*, No. 1, 1957, p. 3-4.

teachers, who were cautioned not to use certain sections of the textbooks. As far as tsarist colonialism was concerned, the guidebook expressed an ambivalence which has been characteristic of Soviet writing on the subject ever since. The oppressive nature of tsarist colonial policies was to be fully emphasized, but at the same time the annexation of territories was always to be considered progressive. Shamil should be presented as "a gifted ruler, warrior and military leader" but also as "a representative of the feudal class" who was inconsistent in his fight for independence.⁸

The period of indecision ended with a sharp rebuke of *Voprosy Istorii* in March 1957 in *Kommunist*. The Party journal charged the editors of *Voprosy Istorii* with numerous errors, and specifically condemned Pikman's article, declaring that "it is clamorous in tone, weak in argumentation, and ignores the attained level of scientific knowledge." Pikman was denounced for representing Shamil as a democrat, for denying the role of Britain and Turkey and for not mentioning that annexation was progressive.

Shortly thereafter the editorial board of *Voprosy Istorii* was purged and the following number of the journal (No. 3, 1957) carried a long lead editorial in which the new editors denounced their predecessors. Among other things they charged that "the publication of Pikman's article was totally unjustified. . . . The underlying theme of this article is a veiled denial of the progressive nature of the unification of the Caucasus with Russia."

After these developments the issue subsided in Moscow but was kept alive in Shamil's homeland. The Dagestan Party Bureau passed a resolution late in 1956 which sought to soothe regional sentiments and at the same time to meet Moscow's main demands. It called upon scholars of the Caucasus to engage in further research on "the peoples' struggle for independence and freedom under Shamil's leadership" but also on "the progressive significance of Dagestan's entry into the Russian state and the beneficial influence of Russian culture on Dagestan's cultural development."⁹ The scholars complied. They published two editions of the proceedings of the Makhachkala Conference, at which they had been outspoken on the question, and a new history of Dagestan which returned Shamil to the role of heroic leader of an independence movement. In 1958 they published a second printing of Guseinov's book, which had started the whole issue. The

⁸ *Current Digest*, VIII, No. 38, p. 3-6.

⁹ *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 1, 1957, p. 195-6.

following year they published a volume of documents, designed to answer a documentary collection of 1953 entitled "Shamil—Henchman of the Sultan of Turkey and the British Colonizers." The Moscow journals had little to say about all of this: *Voprosy Istorii* did not review the Guseinov book until January 1963.

The Central Asian historians have been less troublesome. Bekmakhanov removed his errors of a decade earlier with the publication of "The Annexation of Kazakhstan to Russia" in 1957. It regarded Kenesary Kasimov as a reactionary and devoted a long chapter to the progressive consequences of annexation. It was well received, as was "The History of the Kazakh S.S.R.," the third general history of that Union Republic demanded by the Party in a little over a decade.

IV

From a study of the tortured path of Soviet historians in recent years it is possible to construct a catalog of priorities which the Party has imposed on historical writing about tsarist colonialism. Two themes—both highly tendentious to the Western mind—are absolute requirements and must be explicitly affirmed. They are the friendship of all Soviet peoples and the progressive nature of tsarist acquisitions of territory. The Party's sharpest rebukes have been aimed at those historians who have denied them or even omitted mentioning them.

On the other hand, current Soviet histories give a much wider variety of opinion on some phases of tsarist colonialism than would have been tolerated in Bagirov's day. It is permissible now to discuss tsarist brutalities and oppression, provided the long-range progressiveness of annexation is considered. Thus it is possible to find in one recent history a detailed account of the confiscation of land, the destruction of crops, the burning of villages, the requisitioning of foodstuffs "which sometimes degenerated into plain robbery," while other histories dwell almost entirely on the advantages brought by the conquerors. In a new history of the Soviet North, for example, Russian guns are mentioned only once, in this passage: "the firearms which they [the natives] received from the Russians were instrumental in greatly increasing the development of hunting."¹⁰

The resistance movements have been examined in great detail, and some of them are now again designated progressive. The

¹⁰ V. Uvachen, "Peoples of the Soviet North." Moscow, 1960, p. 13.

Party has insisted that each movement be analyzed in the context of the class struggle, with the result that any leader of aristocratic origin is *ipso facto* reactionary. Sometimes Soviet historians are obliged to find the class struggle in hitherto undiscovered areas, or to define classes in an arbitrary fashion. The peoples of the Soviet North, for instance, have been divided into social classes on the basis of the number of reindeer an individual herded. For a movement to be pronounced progressive, it must have been of peasant origin (leaders and followers), it must have been aimed primarily against local feudal lords or "foreign imperialists," and not Russians, it must have been free of "reactionary religious ideology," and it must not have been separatist in nature. Needless to say, not many pass the test. Some verdicts are mixed: a movement is said to be partly progressive and partly reactionary, or to have begun in one category and ended in another. The revolts of 1898 and 1916 in Central Asia are particularly slippery when examined by these standards, and a number of minor revisions have been put forward in the last few years.

Why was the process of house cleaning in the Soviet historiography of tsarist colonialism, which was clearly called for at the Twentieth Party Congress, checked after a few months? The answer can be given in a word: nationalism. Nationalism in the non-Russian republics is a major centrifugal force in the U.S.S.R., and is undoubtedly the main deterrent to that fusion of cultures and elimination of internal boundaries envisioned in the new Party Program. The Program recognizes nationalism as "the chief political and ideological weapon used by international reaction" against the unity of Communist countries.

Several developments have prompted the Party to move cautiously here. At the very beginning of the de-Stalinization campaign, there were nationalistic riots in Georgia on the third anniversary of Stalin's death, and before 1956 was over there were object lessons in the strength of nationalism as a divisive force in Poland and Hungary. Guilt of "bourgeois nationalism" was given as the reason for the wholesale firing of officials in the non-Russian republics, particularly in Central Asia.

The Party is also wary of several potential threats—some imagined and some real. Rehabilitation of the Moslem leaders of the resistance movements might inspire the emergence of a new Kenesary or Shamil; it might encourage current Moslem leaders to new resistance; it might upset the delicate "friendship" of

Moslem and non-Moslem peoples of the U.S.S.R. Restoration of the old themes might give encouragement to Soviet subjects to form separatist movements with their brothers across the borders. Recent Soviet denunciations of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism, Pan-Iranism and Pan-Arabism seem to be far more alarmist than the reality of the situation would justify. Central Asia, which is ideologically unreliable, is also a key pawn in the Soviet-Chinese conflict. It is significant that the recent Soviet denunciation of alleged Chinese border violations in Kazakhstan also charged (*Pravda*, Sept. 23, 1963) that the Chinese leaders, "by concentrating the attention of people on border questions . . . artificially stir up nationalistic passions and hostile relations with other peoples."

Today the term "national liberation movement" is reserved almost completely in Soviet usage for foreign countries, where the Communists hope to use the forces of nationalism to overthrow capitalism. As Richard Pipes has pointed out, nationalism is regarded by Soviet leaders as either their worst enemy or their best friend, depending on whether it is the domestic or foreign variety.

It seems unlikely that the Soviet history of tsarist colonialism will be stabilized in its current posture. Interpretations will probably change to meet new policy demands. The usefulness of history to the present situation is illustrated in the August 1963 issue of *Voprosy Istorii*, which vigorously refutes recent Japanese claims to the Kurile Islands. The Kuriles are historically Russian, runs the familiar argument, because the Russian ties with the islands are very old, dating from 1632, because the Russians brought civilization to the islands, because the inhabitants are bound in firm bonds of friendship with the Russians, because the Russians have protected them from imperialistic external enemies.

After a brief aberration from its course in 1956, Soviet historical writing has been returned to its place as a handmaiden of politics. The case was stated succinctly in a recent editorial admonition in *Voprosy Istorii* (No. 2, 1962) by the historian M. P. Kim: "Historical science," he said, "must make its own contribution to Communist construction—that is the main thing."

CZECH STALINISTS DIE HARD

By Victor A. Velen

FOR the first time since the Communist take-over in Czechoslovakia, liberalizing forces are emerging and making headway. In 1963, ten years after Stalin's death, one of the last bastions of classical Stalinism began cautiously to de-Stalinize, rehabilitating the ghosts of the Slansky trial and purging from the government some of those who were most responsible for Stalinist crimes. Up to the fall of 1963 the most significant event in this evolution was the dismissal, on September 20, of the Prime Minister, Viliam Siroky, an old-time Stalinist wheel in the Slovak Communist Party, along with a number of other members of the government who had been deeply compromised by their activities during the period of the "cult of personality." But others, primarily President Antonin Novotny himself, still held the reins of power and were consequently dragging their feet in implementing a process that ultimately was bound to cause their own downfall.

How far the process would go, spurred by internal economic and political unrest, depended on the interplay of a number of national and international political factors. One was the extent of the régime's control over developments at home. Specifically, what means of pressure or coercion could Novotny and his group still employ against the opposition, which had emerged into the open and had become an acknowledged fact? Another was to what extent the demands for a serious revision of Stalinism and the liquidation of its residues were, in addition to being a conflict between the intellectuals and the party, a conflict also between the Czech and Slovak Communist Party apparatuses. If the latter, it would indicate a more serious power struggle.

It appears that Novotny had this contingency very much in mind when he appointed another Slovak, Jozef Lenart, to succeed Siroky in the post of Prime Minister. Lenart is less well known than his predecessor and held no important position during the Stalinist period. He was graduated from a Moscow Central Committee cadre school in the 1950s, after Khrushchev had come to power, and should therefore be more acceptable to the Slovak Communist Party.

The Czech Communists, well-conditioned *apparatchiks*, have invariably been the first to follow the lead of their Soviet comrades and are among the most obedient of all the satellites. Yet Khrushchev must have worried at the continued presence of an unrepentant Stalinist in control of the country. While Novotny ostentatiously sided with Khrushchev in the Russo-Chinese ideological dispute, the unpopularity of his régime remained an embarrassing problem, as did the danger that the revolt of the Czech and Slovak intellectuals might undermine the stability of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia.¹

¹ A new consideration on the international scene is that the satellites are exercising a greater degree of autonomy. This was evident, for example, from the independent attitude assumed by the Rumanian Communist Party on the Chinese question. Despite Russia's geographical proximity, and the presence of Soviet troops, the Rumanian régime showed a lack of solidarity with the Soviet position. Russian insistence on maintaining the predominance of agriculture in the Rumanian economy to the detriment of heavy industry was the most obvious cause for Rumanian coolness.

By its structure and character the Novotny clique in Czechoslovakia, like that of Walter Ulbricht in East Germany and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in Rumania, belongs spiritually in the tough Chinese camp.² The Czechs and East Germans are, moreover, on the most exposed flank of the Soviet bloc, geographically and politically. Presumably, de-Stalinization could put them more securely on Khrushchev's side; but de-Stalinization in those two countries is fraught with danger. The instability of the Ulbricht régime is notorious, but the elimination of it could have unforeseeable consequences, as was demonstrated by the July 1953 uprising in Berlin. And whatever happens in Czechoslovakia is likely to affect East Germany, for the two are joined together like Siamese twins.

II

The problem of de-Stalinization in Czechoslovakia has hinged on the trial of Rudolf Slansky, former secretary general of the party and second most powerful man in the state, and his 13 co-defendants. According to the rules, it was the most perfect postwar Stalinist performance. Slansky's execution paved the way for the complete take-over of power by Klement Gottwald and his followers within the apparatus. (Novotny was a leading member of Gottwald's group and succeeded him as President of the Republic on the latter's death.)

Two weeks after Slansky and those tried with him were executed, on December 3, 1952, Karol Bacilek, Minister of National Security, publicly thanked Gottwald and members of his group for their help in bringing the trial to a successful conclusion: "With the great assistance of comrades Gottwald, Zapotocky, Dolansky, Kopecky and, most of all, of comrade Novotny, materials were acquired from the party apparatus and the various ministries. Of great value were materials from the Ministry of National Defense, gained with the active help of comrade Cepicka . . . and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where comrade Siroky personally aided in evaluating the information."³

In 1954, in the period of the thaw that followed Stalin's death, the Minister of the Interior, Rudolf Barak, a relatively new man who held no top party or government position during the Stalinist terror, and who therefore can be considered comparatively uninvolved, became the chairman of the commission for revision of the political trials (1948-1952). Presumably, the constitution of this commission was meant to usher in a new era and serve as a lever for the liquidation of the "cult of personality."

Novotny, however, steadfastly refused to consider any kind of revision of

² There is a certain analogy between the Rumanian and the Czech régimes, in that Slansky's counterparts in Rumania (Vasile Luca, Ana Pauker, etc.) were liquidated in about the same period (1952), permitting the final consolidation of the Gheorghiu-Dej group in power.

³ Speech quoted in *Rude Pravo*, December 18, 1952. Karol Bacilek, a veteran Communist *apparatchik*, held local party jobs in Slovakia before World War II. He spent the war in the Soviet Union and was parachuted into Slovakia in 1944. After the war he became the *eminence grise* of the Slovak Communist Party. Named Minister of National Security in 1952, he was later appointed head of the Slovak party. In that capacity he was responsible for the gradual elimination of Slovak autonomous institutions.

the Slansky verdict, and as a result the work of the commission was largely shelved.⁴ Damaging material, however, remained in the possession of Barak, who had become Minister of the Interior. In 1961 he and a group of his supporters judged that the situation was ripe for action. Novotny succeeded, however, in ousting him from his key position, and replaced him by his own nominee and supporter, Lubomir Strougal. Ostensibly, Barak was on the way out.

At a session of the Czech Communist Party Central Committee in November 1961, Novotny again rejected any "irresponsible and unjustified" demands for a revision of the Slansky trial. What followed is not clear. According to some sources, Barak and police troops supporting him were ready to move in at a given moment and arrest Novotny on a charge of "violating socialist legality." Novotny, however, outmaneuvered Barak, had the latter arrested on February 9, 1962, expelled from the Communist Party and charged with sedition, corruption and economic crimes.

Interestingly enough, in November 1961, three months prior to Barak's arrest, the Albanian Communist Party organ *Zeri i Popullit* suddenly unleashed a full-scale attack on Barak, calling him a spy and Khrushchev's agent, and predicting that he would be arrested and tried, thus revealing an inside line between the Albanian Communists and the Novotny group.

If we believe the Albanian Communists, who seem to have been well informed on the Barak case, it is not improbable that Khrushchev may have chosen Barak to effect a gradual change in Czechoslovakia from within the apparatus, with the ultimate aim of increasing the popularity of the Czech régime, which in the last few years has been in critical need of a larger popular basis. In any case, for as yet unexplained reasons, in the course of preparing for Barak's trial, the charges of sedition were dropped and only those of corruption and economic crimes retained. This providential circumstance most probably saved his life and prevented another trial on the Slansky model. Barak was tried in secret by a military court and sentenced to 15 years in prison for misappropriating state funds. Thus Novotny succeeded in eliminating the only member of his *équipe* who was not involved in the crimes of the Stalin period and barred any possibility that a general change would be forced from within the apparatus.

His victory was short-lived, however. The intensification of the Russo-Chinese conflict and worsening economic conditions in Czechoslovakia put new pressure on Novotny and made it in Khrushchev's interest that the rigid and unpopular Czech government undergo a transformation, even if gradual. Some pressure may have been applied. The alarming increase in food shortages in Czechoslovakia may be partly because the Soviet Union has not fulfilled its commitments for agricultural exports to that country. (Czechoslovakia was forced to buy 300,000 tons of Canadian wheat in 1961 and another 120,000 tons in 1963.) Novotny himself complained, at a meeting of the Central Committee on April 12, 1962, that socialist countries had failed to meet their export quotas.

But the failure of the Soviet Union to meet its export commitments to Czechoslovakia is by no means the most important reason for the country's

⁴ Some of those convicted were released from jail and began to reappear in public life during Barak's tenure of office, 1955-56, but formal rehabilitations were rare.

protracted agricultural crisis. This is rooted in the national economic planning and has affected the industrial sector of the economy as well. Novotny put his finger on a fundamental cause for shortages and the low standard of living when he revealed, in a remarkable interview with a correspondent of the *London Times*, that more than one-third of the national income was being reinvested. He admitted further that billions of crowns had been lost because of faulty planning.

Despite the internal economic difficulties, Czechoslovakia dispenses more development aid than any other member of the Soviet bloc except the Soviet Union itself. It spends more than all the other peoples' democracies combined in development aid and arms deliveries to the Middle East, the Far East and Cuba. This fact is widely advertised as "aid to brother countries." Naturally it is unpopular with people who must stand in a queue for hours waiting for their meat ration. The public demonstration in Prague on May 1, 1963, when several hundred people shouted anti-régime slogans, was a manifestation of wide discontent.

III

A separate problem and one that has acquired new force in the past year is the dissent voiced in Slovakia, where national aspirations and an anti-collectivist mentality have created opposition to the Prague régime from the outset. Also a more liberal spirit and a comradely enthusiasm pervaded the ranks of the Slovak Communist Party, partly because of the esprit de corps of the Slovak resistance, partly because the jump from an underdeveloped, agricultural land to a modern industrial state inspired a strong revolutionary order.

Following the Communist coup d'état in 1948, Slovak autonomous institutions and their leaders, officially labeled "bourgeois nationalists," were among the first victims of the purges. Nearly every Slovak Communist leader of the postwar ruling group was liquidated in the early days of the Czech Communist régime: Vladimir Clementis was hanged, Gustav Husak and Laco Novomesky were jailed, others were sent to concentration camps.⁵ The one exception was Karol Bacilek, then secretary general of the Slovak party. Bacilek, in fact, played the determining role in the liquidation of his "bourgeois nationalist" colleagues.

During 1963 pressure for de-Stalinization increased in Slovakia. It came

⁵ Dr. Vladimir Clementis was a well-known Slovak Communist intellectual and journalist. Before World War II he was considered the party's foremost foreign policy expert. He spent most of the war in London, and was made a member of the Czechoslovak State Council. After the war he became Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs under Jan Masaryk, and on the latter's death in March 1948 he succeeded him as Foreign Minister. He was arrested in 1951 on his return from a U.N. General Assembly session in New York. In 1952 he was tried as an accomplice of Slansky and as a "Slovak bourgeois nationalist," he was sentenced to death and on December 3 executed.

Gustav Husak was one of the leaders of the Slovak national uprising against the Germans in 1944. After the war he became chairman of the Slovak Board of Commissioners (regional government). He was arrested in 1952 on charges similar to those brought against Clementis and sentenced to life imprisonment. He was released in 1956.

Laco Novomesky, a leading Slovak poet, spent World War II in Slovakia. After the war he became Slovak Commissioner of Culture. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and was released about the same time as Husak.

not only from the intellectuals but also from within the Slovak Communist Party apparatus. At the Slovak writers' congress in April 1963, a demand was made for the speedy rehabilitation of "our dear friend and comrade" Vladimir Clementis. This was the first time that a member of the Slansky group had been referred to in public as "comrade." The speaker was Laco Novomesky, who had survived the purge and been readmitted to the writers' union. Significantly, the imminent arrest of Bacilek, who was directly responsible for the liquidation of Clementis, was already known at that time in Slovak party circles. The public announcement that Clementis and other members of the Slansky group (except Slansky himself) had been formally rehabilitated came in June, two days before the Berlin meeting between Khrushchev, Ulbricht and Novotny. It evidently had been under consideration for some time.

The writers' congress proved to be a forum for expressing general dissatisfaction with the Czech government. One of the writers, Vladimir Minac, called for basic changes in the moral atmosphere of the state. Man, he said in effect, does not live by bread alone, but "seeks things of a higher nature: truth, right, justice." He continued:

The presence or absence of these in the life of a society directly influences the moral atmosphere. . . . After the 20th Congress [of the Soviet Party] we wanted to create normal conditions for literary work; we wanted to, but we have not created them yet. Under the label of the struggle against revisionism, the fight has started again against thinking as such, against motion as such. . . . An elephant has been made out of a mosquito, and an elephant is here for the purpose of stamping on things.⁶

In Czechoslovakia as in the Soviet Union it has invariably been the writers and intellectuals who have expressed most openly the desire for a renovation of the basic tenets of society. Depending on the climate of the time, they have been suppressed or used as political tools, as the Yevtushenko case demonstrated.

An even more significant article appeared in *Pravda*, the organ of the C. P. in Slovakia, written by the editor, Ladislav Zajac. He said:

It is characteristic of the period of the cult [of personality] that Marxist science does not interest itself in the role of the masses or the problems of the trade unions. So many shortcomings in the work of the trade union organizations make for an erroneous and narrow theoretical interpretation of the mission of trade union organizations. . . . In socialism it is also the task of trade unions to take care of the vital interests, the social and cultural needs, of the workers and to *defend the inalienable rights of the workers* (italics mine).

In support of his thesis, Zajac dug up a quote from Lenin:

Our state is a workers' state with bureaucratic flaws. . . . Even in a state of this type, in which the trade unions should not have anything to defend, would it be possible to do without them for the defense of the material and spiritual interest of a one hundred percent organized proletariat? This is theoretically an absolutely erroneous opinion. Our present state is such that a one hundred percent organized proletariat has to defend itself and we have to use this workers' organization in defense of the workers from their own state as well as the defense of our state by the workers.

⁶ *Kulturny Zivot*, May 18, 1963.

In other words, the central organ of the C. P. of Slovakia reached the conclusion, supported by Lenin, that it was necessary and legitimate that the workers defend themselves against the all-powerful, bureaucratic "workers'" state. This was indeed something new in Marxist polemics.⁷

With criticism mounting in Slovakia, Novotny in April reluctantly sacrificed two old-line Stalinists from his *équipe*, Bacilek and Bruno Köhler, former secretary of the Central Committee. Very little publicity was given to the purge of these two men who, with the exception of Novotny himself, were the most obvious targets in any change in the direction of de-Stalinization. Bacilek, as we have seen, was Minister of National Security during the worst period of the Stalinist terror; in the same period, Köhler was chief of the party cadres and thus directly concerned with the liquidations.

About this time, too, the régime began to proceed slowly with a strange sort of dismantling of the Slansky verdict. The concept of a two-phased rehabilitation was established. Slansky was to be rehabilitated because the procedures and material used during his trial were "incorrect" and "a breach of socialist legality." On the other hand, he was not to be rehabilitated politically, having been a promoter of the now condemned cult of personality. This split conception of the Slansky case was clearly designed to provide a political avenue of escape for Novotny and other members of his ruling group. The official announcement that Slansky and his accomplices had been legally rehabilitated was made on August 22, 1963. By this decision, Slansky himself and a number of his co-defendants were not posthumously readmitted into the party, because of "serious infractions against socialist legality" and because they were promoters of the "cult."⁸

Apparently, the Central Committee had reached a decision during its plenary session on April 3 and 4, 1963, that it was time to admit that the grounds on which Slansky was hanged had not existed. This information was first circulated to important party members through channels and then fed to the public in small and easily assimilable doses. Thus the only paper to carry the most important part of the decision was a Slovak agricultural paper, *Rolnické Noviny*, which stated on May 28:

As is well known by now, the special commission of the CC CPCS (Central Committee of the Czech Communist Party) has established that neither the anti-state conspiratorial center nor the specific group of bourgeois nationalists ever existed, and that the charges on the basis of which the purported members of these so-called groups were tried and sentenced were fabricated.

Similarly, the information that Cestmir Cisar had been appointed secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, an important personnel

⁷ In line with this interpretation, the Slovak trade-union paper *Práca* (August 17, 1963) reported sympathetically on a strike in a carpentry plant, charging the management and trade-union bureaucracy with responsibility for lowering wages and for poor relations with the plant workers. This was the first mention of a strike since the Communists came to power in Czechoslovakia.

⁸ The official communiqué revealed that 481 cases were reviewed, but only about 70 names were listed as officially rehabilitated. A compilation shows that 3,357 persons were sentenced between 1948 and 1953 for alleged political or economic crimes (166 to death and 138 to life terms, and the rest to a total of 18,568 years in jail). Characteristically, no mention was made in the communiqué of material damages to the families of those who were executed or to those unjustly condemned to jail terms and later released.

change connected with the de-Stalinization, first appeared in a small musical review, *Hudební Rozhledy* (No. 9, 1963).

Apparently in response to pressure from left-wing intellectuals at home and abroad, the Czech Communists felt compelled to reestablish Kafka's position in Czech literature. He had previously been banned as a decadent, bourgeois writer. To determine Kafka's readmissibility, an international seminar met at Liblice Castle in Bohemia on May 27-28, 1963. In defending Kafka at this gathering, Professor Eduard Goldstücker (who had also been condemned but survived the purges of the cult period) declared: "Many men and women find their own problems and the image of their lives in Kafka. We cannot dismiss work of this genre, simply attaching the label of decadent to it." Possibly he was speaking from personal experience.

IV

Emboldened by the appearance of cracks in the armor of the régime, 44 Slovak journalists convened in Bratislava on May 27 and 28 and unanimously demanded an uncompromising stand in the continuation of the struggle against the remnants of the personality cult. What is more, they stood up to observe a moment of silence in honor of the memory of Clementis, André Simone (also hanged in the Slansky affair) and Ivan Horvath (who died after having been released from jail). A sharp personal attack against Prime Minister Siroky for his role in the Slansky trial was made by Miro Hysko, a well-known professor of journalism at the University of Bratislava. Taking advantage of the official admission that the "conspiratorial center" was a fabrication, Hysko revealed how it was invented and put into operation. Siroky, he stated, first developed a thesis that "bourgeois nationalism" had to exist in Slovakia under given conditions. He then sought likely names on whom the label "bourgeois nationalist" could be tagged to substantiate his thesis. Finally, the material was handed over to security organs which completed the "investigation." Hysko pointed out that certain passages of Siroky's "thesis" had been taken over and incorporated verbatim in the court indictments.

That such an attack should be made against a Prime Minister in office, and published in an official organ, was a fair indication of the climate in Slovakia.

The rising intensity of the criticism forced Novotny to answer. To clarify his position to the outside world, he granted an interview to a correspondent of the *London Times*, carried in that paper June 12, 1963. Hitherto reluctant to talk to foreign correspondents, Novotny discoursed on a number of crucial matters for a period of five hours.

"There are, I know," he said, "rumors in the West that Mr. Khrushchev and I do not agree . . . that I do not fully accept the liquidation of the cult of personality and that we in Czechoslovakia do not quite follow the decisions of the Soviet party's 20th Congress. That is all nonsense. I greatly esteem Mr. Khrushchev and his views. Two of those views especially will survive in the minds of the people—the idea of peaceful coexistence and the exposure of the cult of personality." As to de-Stalinization in Czechoslovakia, Novotny said that all persons who were unjustly condemned had been released. How-

ever, the President stated, this did not mean that the rehabilitation would also be political. Slansky and others were "bearers of the noxious ideas that led to the suppression of legality and to the distorted forms of justice." There can be rehabilitation where there was a miscarriage of justice; this aspect, he said, was then being considered again by the Supreme Court which would submit its findings. There would be no rehabilitation, he stressed, for "wrong political methods."

Novotny's insistence that Slansky—unlike Laszlo Rajk in Hungary and Traicho Kostov in Bulgaria, also promoters of the cult—would not be fully rehabilitated indicated that he did not, in fact, entirely agree with Khrushchev on the cult. Obviously, he was clinging to his last expedient in the struggle to maintain his own political integrity and power. Conceivably one of the reasons which made it possible for Novotny to procrastinate so long may have been the extreme unpopularity of Slansky. For since Slansky and some of his co-defendants were considered responsible for the Stalinist terror, their trial and execution met with popular approval.

In facing his critics at home, Novotny reverted to familiar Communist casuistry and thinly veiled threats. Speaking before a meeting of 3,000 Communist activists in the East Slovakian town of Kosice on June 12, he first replied to demands that the party speak the truth. "What does that mean?" he said. "Did the party not speak the truth earlier? Was the party not right? If the party had not been right, it could not have been the Communist Party. It could not have been the leading force." He accused his main critics, the writers and journalists, of giving de facto aid to the enemy. "Whether consciously or unconsciously," he said, "you are proclaiming what the reaction in the West needs to hear against us! You should at least realize this! Think! Is an abyss not being created between you and the party... are you not standing aside or even against the party?" This statement reveals Novotny for what he is—a Stalinist.

▼

As criticism of the Novotny régime continued unabated, the government evidently felt pressed to take more drastic measures, not against its critics, but to satisfy their demands for de-Stalinization and liberalization. On September 20, the Central Committee of the Czech Communist Party decided to dismiss Prime Minister Siroky, who had been under steady attack from the Slovak intellectuals, supported apparently by the Slovak C.P., for having been instrumental in engineering the Slansky trials and as the finger man in the liquidation of the "Slovak bourgeois nationalists."⁹ This move was in contradiction to Novotny's implicit defense of Siroky, as late as June, in a speech attacking Slovak intellectuals for their "irresponsible" attitude.

The immediate reaction of Khrushchev, who sent a congratulatory telegram to the newly appointed Prime Minister, Jozef Lenart, might suggest that the Soviet premier was *au courant* as to Novotny's action. In addition to Siroky, a number of other old party wheels who had been in the government all through the Stalinist period—Julius Duris, former Minister of Agriculture, Jaromir Dolansky, former Vice-Premier and the party's official

⁹ Another gesture toward liberalization was the release after 14 years in jail of Cardinal Josef Beran and four Czech bishops, on October 3, shortly after the dismissal of Siroky.

economist, and others—were dismissed in the government reshuffle. The reasons given were mild and not incriminating. Siroky was dismissed ostensibly because of “insufficient implementation of the party line in government activity, because of some mistakes in his political activities in the past, and due to poor health.” The reasons for the dismissal of the other members of the government were not given, and some of them were appointed to new, although subordinate, jobs.

Simultaneously with these moves, Novotny continued to attack the intellectuals, especially the journalists. In an important speech on his program, made three days after the government reshuffle, he said:

Some newspaper writers still usurp the right to criticize the correct and true opinions of others; they accuse those who react responsibly to our way of life, of dogmatism and allege that criticism is being silenced. . . . There are even some who would like to deny the leading role of the Communist Party in the name of some sort of cultural and journalistic freedom. . . . We will not change anything in the policies of the party, because their correctness is borne out by the development of socialist Czechoslovakia. . . . Our party will support any objective, constructive critical voice, but will sharply reject any attempt at criticism that is aimed at weakening the leading role of the party in the state and which would harm the unity of socialist society.¹⁰

This speech was clear notice that Novotny's line had not changed, and that the few concessions gained by the liberal elements were won only by steady and determined resistance. Although his own position was considerably weakened, his control over the Czech (as distinct from the Slovak) Communist Party apparatus nevertheless appeared intact. Whether he would be capable of maintaining his position for long, however, was a matter for speculation, in that his continuance in power did not depend entirely on internal developments.

Novotny's course in 1963 was to bargain his support for Khrushchev in the dispute with China in exchange for a free hand in carrying out de-Stalinization at home, according to his own interests and using his own methods. How long this jockeying could continue, in view of the rapidly changing international scene as well as the deteriorating state of the Czechoslovak economy, was most uncertain. To Novotny's advantage was the fact that no personality had emerged from within the party structure to challenge his authority. Only Barak, still in jail, or the new Prime Minister, Jozef Lenart, seemed possible candidates to replace him.

¹⁰ *Rude Pravo*, September 23, 1963. Novotny did not mention the dismissal of his Prime Minister—for “mistakes”—three days earlier.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Howard Linton, Asia; Richard H. Nolte, Middle East, North Africa; Joseph A. Ellis, Latin America; Pamela Day, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

THE RISE OF THE WEST: A HISTORY OF THE HUMAN COMMUNITY. BY WILLIAM H. McNEILL. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963, 829 p. \$12.50.

Although only the last 50-odd pages of this impressive work are concerned with the present century, Professor McNeill's ambitious and remarkably unified review of world history is altogether pertinent to present concerns. Neither a textbook nor an exercise in metahistory, it represents the effort of an intelligent and trained historian to encompass in a single narrative the development and diffusion of Western culture, techniques and social organization.

FOREIGN POLICIES IN A WORLD OF CHANGE. EDITED BY JOSEPH E. BLACK AND KENNETH W. THOMPSON. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 756 p. \$8.75.

This volume comprises substantial statements on the foreign policies of 24 nations, all (except for Nigeria and Communist China) prepared for the book by scholars or statesmen of the countries covered. Includes pieces on the U.S.S.R. and Jugoslavia.

LOOKING OUTWARD: YEARS OF CRISIS AT THE UNITED NATIONS. BY ADLAI E. STEVENSON. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 295 p. \$5.00.

A selection of Governor Stevenson's eloquent speeches in the years that he has been U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations. While he deals chiefly with international themes, there is also a section on American problems and a selection of playful miscellany.

THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE. BY GABRIELLA ROSNER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963, 294 p. \$6.75.

A comprehensive record of UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force), created in November 1956 to cope with the Suez crisis. Miss Rosner's account of the U.N.'s first "weapons-for-peace" venture includes discussion of the political situation which brought the force into being, the legal basis of this unprecedented operation, the powers and composition of the international force and, finally, a strong recommendation for a permanent international force.

THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE. BY ALLEN DULLES. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 277 p. \$4.95.

Drawing in part from his own extensive experience in diplomacy and intelligence, the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency has written his informed, sensible and quite unsensational observations on the gathering, organizing and evaluating of open and secret information.

NOTE—By special arrangement with World Affairs Book Center, readers of FOREIGN AFFAIRS may obtain, *post free*, any book published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, with check or money order, to Desk FA, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46 Street, New York 17, New York.

DIVERSITY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. EDITED BY ALEXANDER DALLIN AND OTHERS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963, 867 p. \$10.00 (Paper, \$3.60).

An extensive documentary record of the issues that have troubled and divided the international Communist movement since the autumn of 1961.

PEKING AND MOSCOW. BY KLAUS MEHNERT. New York: Putnam, 1963, 522 p. \$6.95.

An analysis of the cultural, historical and ideological differences between China and the U.S.S.R., together with clarification of their significance to the West.

THE NEW COLD WAR: MOSCOW v. PEKIN. BY EDWARD CRANKSHAW. Baltimore: Penguin, 1963, 167 p. 65 cents (Paper).

The *Observer's* correspondent on Soviet affairs, formerly attached to the British Military Mission in Moscow, uses Soviet and Chinese press sources and Communist Party policy documents to trace the development of the Sino-Soviet rift.

FUTURIBLES: STUDIES IN CONJECTURE. EDITED BY BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL. Geneva: Droz, 1963, 321 p.

Under the rather appalling title are a number of quite interesting efforts by serious authors to summarize the outlook for the next decade in their particular fields. Topics include British Constitutional evolution, the future (anxious) of Western Man, economic and social developments and the future of Black Africa.

PAGINE DI STORIA DIPLOMATICA CONTEMPORANEA. BY MARIO TOSCANO. Milan: Giuffrè, 1963, 2 v. L. 9000.

A valuable collection of studies by a leading Italian diplomatic historian, dealing with the origins and course of the First and Second World Wars.

INTERNATIONAL LAW, TRADE AND FINANCE: REALITIES AND PROSPECTS. BY STANLEY D. METZGER. Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.): Oceana Publications, 1963, 184 p. \$6.00.

A well-documented study of the steps by which "international tranquility" has been achieved through international agreements in the expanding field of commercial and economic transactions.

CHANGING LAW IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. EDITED BY J. N. D. ANDERSON. New York: Praeger, 1963, 292 p. \$7.50.

A collection of lectures given at the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London detailing various aspects of legal problems and problems arising from legal change in the new states. Of particular interest to the African specialist are the essays by Professor Anderson on Islamic law and by Professor Allott on legal development and economic growth.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THE ARMS DEBATE. BY ROBERT A. LEVINE. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 347 p. \$6.50.

Observing that, with respect to U.S. arms and military policy, "the fact of disagreement has been obvious, but who has been disagreeing with whom over what, and why, has not been," the author undertakes to sort out and analyze the intellectual content of the leading schools of thought. The work is both a valuable introduction to recent writing on the subject and a most interesting discussion of the divergent values and appraisals that seem to determine the various positions.

THE ABOLITION OF WAR. BY WALTER MILLIS AND JAMES REAL. New York: Macmillan, 1963, 217 p. \$4.50 (Paper, \$1.95).

The authors state in their opening sentence, "It is the contention of this book that the world has reached a point, no doubt for the first time in history, at which it is possible to think and talk seriously about the abolition of organized war." The book is an effort to do just that. It offers no panaceas, but is a significant contribution.

ON THE PREVENTION OF WAR. BY JOHN STRACHEY. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963, 334 p. \$5.95.

In this thoughtful essay the late British socialist author and politician discusses the stability of the international power balance, the prospects for disarmament in light of the intentions of the great powers, and the possibilities for safely coming through our perilous times.

LIMITED WAR IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. BY MORTON H. HALPERIN. New York: Wiley, 1963, 191 p. \$4.95 (Paper, \$2.95).

As the title indicates, Mr. Halperin is concerned with the use of or resistance to force in international affairs in a period of unlimited power. Based in part upon an examination of recent limited wars, it also offers some recommendations for an American "local-defense" strategy.

NUCLEAR AMBUSH: THE TEST-BAN TRAP. BY EARL H. VOSS. Chicago: Regnery, 1963, 612 p. \$6.50.

The author, a correspondent for the *Washington Sunday Star*, has written a quite extensive account, analysis and critique of the movement for a nuclear test ban and the negotiations relating to it. He discovers many inconsistencies in the American position on this subject and, as the title indicates, feels that we fell into several Soviet-laid traps along the way. The book was written before the test-ban treaty.

ORDEAL OF VICTORY. BY JOHN TERRAINE. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963, 508 p. \$6.95.

A massive and detailed study of Field Marshal Douglas Haig's role in the First World War. The author does much to clear Haig of the very considerable abuse to which he has been subjected; Lloyd George, on the other hand, appears in a most unattractive light.

AMERICAN STRATEGY IN WORLD WAR II: A RECONSIDERATION. BY KENT ROBERTS GREENFIELD. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963, 145 p. \$4.50.

In this brief volume the former Chief Historian of the Department of the Army and general editor of the *U.S. Army in World War II* presents some of his well-informed reflections and views on certain elements of grand strategy—the elements of coalition strategy, the degree of difference in U.S.–British strategies, F.D.R.'s role as a strategist, and the impact of air power.

THE TWO-OCEAN WAR. BY SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1963, 611 p. \$15.00.

The author of the magisterial, 15-volume *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* here offers a hefty, one-volume selection of the major campaigns and battles.

OUTER SPACE IN WORLD POLITICS. EDITED BY JOSEPH M. GOLDSSEN. New York: Praeger, 1963, 180 p. \$5.00 (Paper, \$1.95).

Essays by a number of men who have long been concerned with the subject.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH AND WORLD TRADE. BY ALFRED MAIZELS. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963, 563 p. \$14.00.

This massive and impressive study examines the relation between industrial production and international trade in manufactured goods since the beginning of the century. On the basis of his interesting findings Mr. Maizels suggests possibilities for the next few decades.

THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. BY LEON N. LINDBERG. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963, 367 p. \$7.75.

The author does well in his main purpose of helping to build a theory of international integration. Many readers will be more interested in its valuable analysis, much of it based on unpublished data, of how the European Economic Community worked during its first few years and who played what part in making key decisions.

PROBLEMS OF THE UNITED STATES AS WORLD TRADER AND BANKER. BY HAL B. LARY. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1963, 175 p. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, \$4.50.)

The author of one of the basic studies of the United States balance of payments during the inter-war period here traces postwar developments, assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the American position and puts the appraisals of the more recent troubles in a balanced perspective.

STUDIES IN UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL POLICY. EDITED BY WILLIAM B. KELLY, JR. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963, 262 p. \$7.50.

Harry Hawkins and John Leddy, who for long had key roles in shaping trade policy in the State Department, contribute the three central papers, on the successive Trade Agreements Acts, the escape clause and peril points, and agricultural problems. The editor writes on the period between 1922 and 1934 and Don Humphrey on the Common Market and British Commonwealth problems.

THE ROAD TO HUDDERSFIELD: A JOURNEY TO FIVE CONTINENTS. BY JAMES MORRIS. New York: Pantheon Books, 1963, 235 p. \$4.95.

One of the liveliest and most prolific of British foreign correspondents was commissioned by the World Bank to write this popular book with scenes laid in Washington, India, Thailand, Colombia, Ethiopia and the Mezzogiorno.

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS: PAPERS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY. BY LORD ROBBINS. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963, 230 p. \$6.00.

In this collection of papers the distinguished British political economist writes on a variety of fundamental problems—liberty, equality, art, order, international integration and the relation between economics and politics—as well as on some financial issues.

THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DISARMAMENT. BY THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963, 224 p. \$5.00.

The first part of this study assesses the effect of defense expenditure on the British economy as a whole and on specific industries. The second part estimates the consequences of alternative policies of re-deploying resources in the event of disarmament.

THE ECONOMICS OF SUCCESS. BY LUDWIG ERHARD. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1963, 412 p. \$6.50.

These speeches and articles, 1945-1962, tell a good deal about the new Chancellor's views of world affairs as well as his guiding economic principles.

ECONOMICS FOR DEVELOPMENT. BY STEPHEN ENKE. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1963, 616 p. \$11.65.

Intended as a text, this book emphasizes the need for more economics in development and stresses the role of private initiative.

The United States

THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS: MANDATE FOR CHANGE, 1953-1956. BY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER. Garden City: Doubleday, 1963, 650 p. \$6.95.

In this volume of memoirs former President Eisenhower covers his first Administration, from the initial suggestions of candidacy in the 1940s to his decision to run for reelection in 1956. Obviously a most important source for the domestic and foreign issues that confronted the United States in those years, it is also a remarkably effective personal statement of his views, outlook and style of action.

AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY DECISIONS: A BOOK OF CASE STUDIES. EDITED BY HAROLD STEIN. University: University of Alabama Press (in cooperation with the Inter-University Case Program), 1963, 705 p. \$9.50.

This massive volume comprises 11 case studies involving American civil-military decisions ranging from the Far Eastern crisis of 1931-32 to the decisions to rearm Germany and establish bases in Spain. The purpose of the study is to illustrate the processes by which such decisions, containing both military and civil issues, are arrived at.

DECISION-MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE: THE OLIVE BRANCH OR THE ARROWS. BY THEODORE C. SORENSEN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963, 94 p. \$3.50.

In these lectures the Special Counsel to the President puts forward his thoughtful observations on the factors and conditions that shape Presidential decisions.

NATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND FOREIGN POLICY. BY JAMES N. ROSENAU. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, 409 p. \$8.50.

A case study of the mobilization of public support, based on a questionnaire sent to the 1,067 national leaders (647 responded) who were convened by the White House in 1958 for a discussion of the requirements of U.S. foreign economic policy.

FULBRIGHT OF ARKANSAS. EDITED BY KARL E. MEYER. Washington: Robert B. Luce, 1963, 279 p. \$5.50.

A good selection of Senator Fulbright's important public speeches since 1940, on foreign and domestic policy.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES: THE LAST YEAR. BY ELEANOR LANSING DULLES. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963, 244 p. \$4.95.

Although devoted chiefly to Mr. Dulles' activities in 1958, the year before his death, this modest but illuminating and affectionate memoir by his sister, herself a member of the State Department at the time, also provides a number of insights into the late Secretary's background and earlier career.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL: EDUCATION OF A GENERAL, 1880-1939. BY FORREST C. POGUE. New York: Viking, 1963, 421 p. \$7.50.

The late General Marshall refused to write his memoirs but was eventually persuaded to give his papers to a research library. The present study, the first volume in an authoritative biography, has been prepared by the director of the George C. Marshall Research Center. Based, along with archival materials, upon a number of interviews, it covers Marshall's career up to the time when he became Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army in 1939. An important work.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940. BY WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 393 p. \$6.00 (Paper, \$2.45).

In this volume of the New American Nation Series, Professor Leuchtenburg has succeeded in presenting a brief, lively and very well-informed survey of the New Deal era, a major watershed in American history.

FROM WILSON TO ROOSEVELT: FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1913-1945. BY JEAN-BAPTISTE DUROSELLE. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 499 p. \$10.00.

A welcome translation of an important study of U.S. foreign policy in the period encompassing the two world wars, written by a leading French student.

FORGE OF DEMOCRACY: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. BY NEIL MACNEIL. New York: McKay, 1963, 496 p. \$6.75.

An exceptionally good description of the organization, operations and climate of the House—"Here, sir, the people govern"—by *Time* magazine's chief Congressional correspondent.

THE FAR RIGHT. BY DONALD JANSON AND BERNARD EISMANN. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963, 259 p. \$5.95.

A report on ultraconservative currents and personalities on the current American scene. The authors make a distinction between the Far Right and the Respectable Right.

RESOURCES IN AMERICA'S FUTURE: PATTERNS OF REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITIES, 1960-2000. BY HANS H. LANDSBERG AND OTHERS. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963, 1,017 p. \$15.00.

The core of this massive study is a set of projections of the demand and supply of natural resources—products and services as well as land, water and minerals—to the year 2000 for the United States.

The Western Hemisphere

THE POLICY QUESTION: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF CANADA'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. BY PEYTON V. LYON. Toronto: McClelland, 1963, 128 p. \$3.95.

Mr. Lyon, a professor of political science at the University of Western Ontario, defines Canada's potential role in the international scene and holds that the cure for Canada's increasing defeatism on this issue "is a more accurate appraisal of our diplomatic assets and opportunities."

THE CONSERVATIVE IN CANADA. BY GEORGE HOGAN. Toronto: McClelland, 1963, 130 p. \$3.50.

An active young member of the Progressive Conservative Party has written a brief history of Canadian conservatism and has analyzed the current attitudes and principles of members of this major political party.

THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL. EDITED BY WILLIAM MANGER. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963, 131 p. \$3.50.

These papers from a conference on Latin America at Georgetown University in June 1961 deal with the Alliance for Progress—its problems and prospects. Included in this study of hemispheric relations are commentaries by leading Latin American figures such as Rafael Caldera of Venezuela, Roberto de Oliveira Campos, Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, and Felipe Herrera, President of the Inter-American Development Bank.

THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. BY ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS AND A. J. THOMAS, JR. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963, 530 p. \$10.00.

A thoughtful and well-documented study on the origins and growth of the Pan American system, this work examines in detail the organizational structure and functions of the O.A.S.

THE LATIN-AMERICAN MIND. BY LEOPOLDO ZEA. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963, 308 p. \$5.95.

A competent and much-needed translation of "Dos Etapas del Pensamiento en Hispanoamérica" (1949), which traces the two most important philosophical currents moving nineteenth-century Latin America—romanticism and positivism. Leopoldo Zea has stature as a leading Mexican and Latin American philosopher, with a profound understanding of its cultural and philosophical thought. This is a valuable translation, for it enters into a relatively neglected area by bringing to an English-speaking audience an incisive and analytical examination of those intellectual considerations which have shaped political history in Latin America.

INVISIBLE LATIN AMERICA. BY SAMUEL SHAPIRO. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963, 180 p. \$3.95.

In this concise but useful study, an American university professor analyzes the traditional obstacles to Latin American progress and applies them to five representative countries—Guatemala, Peru, Venezuela, Cuba and Mexico. The Alliance for Progress is examined as it has affected Bolivia.

EVOLUTION OR CHAOS: DYNAMICS OF LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS. BY KARL M. SCHMITT AND DAVID D. BURKS. New York: Praeger, 1963, 308 p. \$6.50 (Paper, \$2.50).

In this comprehensive survey of political, social and economic institutions in Latin America, two discerning American professors relate political developments to hemispheric revolutionary pressures.

RED MACHETE: COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE AMERICAS. BY JOHN DONOVAN. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963, 310 p. \$3.95.

A surface study of Communist infiltration in Latin America, based primarily on travel experiences and "first-hand" contacts.

OPERATION AMERICA: THE COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY IN LATIN AMERICA. BY JULES DUBOIS. New York: Walker, 1963, 361 p. \$6.50.

A factual survey of Communists and Communism in Latin American countries rather than an explanation of the problem. The book was written by a respected Latin American journalist and is of particular value for those familiar with the region.

THE DILEMMA OF MEXICO'S DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLES OF THE

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS. BY RAYMOND VERNON. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 226 p. \$4.95.

In this careful analysis of contemporary Mexican economic development the author concludes that the bureaucratic Mexican government, because of its unwillingness to offend existing interests, is incapable of modifying an increasingly outdated agricultural policy.

THE MEXICAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: A CASE STUDY IN NATIONALIZATION. BY ANTONIO J. BERMÚDEZ. Stanford: Stanford University, Institute of Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies, 1963, 269 p. \$5.00.

Supported by charts and statistics, this detailed study traces the development of *Petróleos Mexicanos* during the period (1946-1958) when the author headed this nationalized oil industry. Of particular interest are those chapters dealing with the problems involved in nationalization and the recent development of this Mexican industry. The author, needless to say, views *Petróleos Mexicanos* most favorably.

MEXICO AND THE AMERICANS. BY DANIEL JAMES. New York: Praeger, 1963, 472 p. \$7.50.

A perceptive American journalist surveys the history of U.S.-Mexican relations, with particular emphasis upon Mexico's evolutionary development since the Revolution of 1910 and the impact this has had upon twentieth-century social revolutions.

MY WAR WITH COMMUNISM. BY MIGUEL YDÍGORAS FUENTES, AS TOLD TO MARIO ROSENTHAL. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1963, 238 p. \$5.00.

The former president of Guatemala, in exile since the spring of 1963, interestingly describes his years in office and the unceasing internal pressures from Castro's Cuba.

THE CUBAN DILEMMA. BY R. HART PHILLIPS. New York: Obolensky, 1963, 357 p. \$6.50.

Beginning where "Cuba: Island of Paradox" ended, this first-hand account of the Castro régime traces its consolidation of power and the domination of the revolution by Communism. Writing journalistically, Mrs. Phillips intersperses factual reporting with personal incidents and ends with strong observations on the inadequacy of United States policies toward Cuba and the need for U.S. military intervention. A provocative and always interesting book, published after Mrs. Phillips had left Cuba and had become head of *The New York Times* bureau in Miami.

CUBA: TRAGEDY IN OUR HEMISPHERE. BY MAURICE ZEITLIN AND ROBERT SCHEER. New York: Grove Press, 1963, 316 p. 95 cents (Paper).

Based on trips to Cuba and on interviews with Cubans, governmental documents, newspapers and magazine articles, this book examines U.S. policies toward Cuba and argues that the Cuban revolution has been misrepresented by the American press, that the majority of the Cuban people support and have benefited from the revolution and that continued "misunderstanding" of the revolution by the United States will have profound international consequences.

THE "CUBAN CRISIS" OF 1962. EDITED BY DAVID L. LARSON. Boston: Houghton, 1963, 333 p. \$2.75 (Paper).

A compilation, without commentary but with a chronology, of public statements and documents relating to the Soviet-U.S. confrontation over Cuba.

BRAZIL'S DEVELOPING NORTHEAST. By STEFAN H. ROBOCK. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1963, 213 p. \$3.50 (Paper, \$2.00).

As a focal point for determining the success or failure of the Alliance for Progress, the impoverished Northeast of Brazil is of increasing concern for the Western Hemisphere. In this thoughtful study the author traces governmental reforms during the Kubitschek administration which led to the establishment of a regional developmental agency, SUDENE (Superintendencia do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste) in 1959 and the implications of foreign aid and national programs for this region.

THE ECONOMIC GROWTH OF BRAZIL. By CELSO FURTADO. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963, 285 p. \$5.00.

This work surveys the development of the Brazilian economy from its earliest commercial origins and its impact upon the political life of the country. The present quest for industrialization is an effort to escape from the imbalances of the earlier sugar and coffee monocultures. (A translation of "Formação Econômica do Brasil," Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Fundo de Cultura, 1959.)

BRAZIL ON THE MOVE. By JOHN DOS PASSOS. Garden City: Doubleday, 1963, 205 p. \$3.95.

In these personal reflections based on travels in Brazil the distinguished American author expresses guarded optimism, sympathy and understanding.

CARIBBEAN POWER. By COLIN RICKARDS. London: Dobson, 1963, 247 p. 25/.

A London correspondent in the Caribbean gives interesting, lively, but abbreviated sketches of 23 leaders—some recently ousted.

Western Europe

DER FASCHISMUS IN SEINER EPOCHE: DIE ACTION FRANÇAISE—DER ITALIENISCHE FASCHISMUS—DER NATIONALSOZIALISMUS. By ERNST NOLTE. Munich: Piper, 1963, 633 p. DM. 35.

An ambitious attempt to analyze and describe the theory and practice of Fascism in France, Italy and Germany. Like Hannah Arendt's "Origins of Totalitarianism," Nolte's book has a tremendous sweep and is at once philosophical and historical. A thoughtful, important and uneven work.

A STUDY OF UNITED KINGDOM IMPORTS. By MAURICE FITZGERALD SCOTT. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963, 269 p. \$10.50.

Economic history is combined with econometrics in this detailed examination of the behavior of British imports, especially since the war.

THE MEMOIRS OF LORD CHANDOS: AN UNEXPECTED VIEW FROM THE SUMMIT. By OLIVER LYTTELTON, VISCOUNT CHANDOS. New York: New American Library, 1963, 430 p. \$7.50.

The very agreeable and intermittently important recollections of the former Oliver Lyttelton, who held various posts in Churchill's cabinets.

THE WAR AND COLONEL WARDEN. By GERALD PAWLE. New York: Knopf, 1963, 422 p. \$7.95.

An intimate account of Churchill in the war based on the recollections of Commander C. R. Thompson, his personal assistant from 1940 to 1945. No major revelations but an excellent close-up with much evidence of the steel core of Churchill's personality.

A STATE OF ENGLAND. BY ANTHONY HARTLEY. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963, 255 p. \$4.95.

A clever and restrained analysis of what is wrong with postwar Britain, especially with its intellectuals, by one of them.

YESTERDAY'S RULERS: THE MAKING OF THE BRITISH COLONIAL SERVICE. BY ROBERT HEUSSLER. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963, 260 p. \$5.75.

A fine contribution to an important and fascinating subject.

BRITAIN DIVIDED: THE EFFECT OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR ON BRITISH POLITICAL OPINION. BY K. W. WATKINS. New York: Nelson, 1963, 270 p. \$6.50.

In this scholarly study the author argues and demonstrates in detail that the Spanish Civil War had the most damaging and divisive effects on British political life.

THE EASTER REBELLION. BY MAX CAULFIELD. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963, 375 p. \$5.95.

A vivid and sympathetic reconstruction of the rising in Dublin by an Irish-born journalist now working in England.

COMMUNISM AND THE FRENCH LEFT. BY CHARLES A. MICAUD. New York: Praeger, 1963, 308 p. \$6.00.

The author analyzes the staying power of French Communism in the context of the peculiar weaknesses of French society and politics. Mr. Micaud, who wrote an earlier study "The French Right and Nazi Germany," is a close and knowledgeable observer of French politics.

THE FRENCH ARMY: A MILITARY-POLITICAL HISTORY. BY PAUL-MARIE DE LA GORCE. New York: Braziller, 1963, 568 p. \$10.00.

A balanced and comprehensive history of the French army from the Dreyfus Affair to the defeat in Algeria, with a welcome focus on the political milieu of the time. Translated from the French.

THE GENERALS WEAR CORK HATS: AN AMAZING ADVENTURE THAT MADE WORLD HISTORY. BY BEN LUCIEN BURMAN. New York: Taplinger, 1963, 257 p. \$5.00.

Breezy impressions of de Gaulle and his Free French in wartime Africa.

DIE ODER-NEISSE-LINIE IN DER DEUTSCHEN AUSSENPOLITIK. BY GEORG BLUHM. Freiburg: Rombach, 1963, 204 p. DM. 23.

An exceptionally thorough, judicious and honest discussion of the political and moral aspects of this explosive subject. The author, a political scientist in West Germany, reviews the Oder-Neisse Line in the context of world politics, and argues that the former German territories now constitute an indisputable, vital interest of the Polish nation, which the Germans must come to recognize. A major contribution.

REUNIFICATION AND WEST GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS. BY WERNER FELD. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963, 204 p. Gldrs. 18.

A political scientist analyzes Bonn's policy toward reunification in the larger context of its relations with the Soviet Union. A useful introduction to the tangled topic and its vast literature.

ZWISCHEN STABILITÄT UND KRISE: ETAPPEN DER DEUTSCHEN

POLITIK, 1955-1963. BY FRITZ RENÉ ALLEMAN. Munich: Piper, 1963, 309 p. DM. 9.80.

A collection of thoughtful, incisive essays on German politics from 1956 to 1962, written by the author of "Bonn Ist Nicht Weimar." He argues the same thesis, persuasively.

STRESEMANN AND THE POLITICS OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC. BY HENRY ASHBY TURNER, JR. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, 287 p. \$6.00.

A thorough, if narrowly conceived, study of Stresemann's gradual, reluctant conversion to republicanism and of his decisive role in German domestic politics, 1918-1929. The unpublished Stresemann *Nachlass* served as the principal source.

THE ORIGIN OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC. BY PETER H. MERKL. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 269 p. \$5.50.

A carefully researched history of the political origins of the Bonn Constitution.

BERLIN: SUCCESS OF A MISSION? BY GEOFFREY McDERMOTT. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 147 p. \$3.95.

The author was British Deputy Commandant in Berlin from July 1961 until his sudden dismissal from the Foreign Service a year later. This is his incisive and valuable account of his year in Berlin; it concludes with his plan to end the "Western allies' policy of waffle." He urges the recognition of East Germany, the transformation of Berlin into a state, and the admission of all three German states to the U.N. His plan has not been well received.

CITY ON LEAVE: A HISTORY OF BERLIN, 1945-1962. BY PHILIP WINDSOR. New York: Praeger, 1963, 275 p. \$6.50.

A brief but very useful account of the political and diplomatic aspects of the Berlin problem since the war. The policies of the Allies and of the Germans are discussed.

THE POLITICS OF ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY. BY NORMAN KOGAN. New York: Praeger, 1963, 178 p. \$5.00.

A useful study of "decision-making."

DIE VERBOTENE REVOLUTION: AUFSTIEG UND NIEDERGANG DER FALANGE. BY BERND NELLESSEN. Hamburg: Leibniz-Verlag, 1963, 216 p. DM. 14.80.

A thoughtful study of the Falange Movement before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. The author argues that Franco distorted and largely destroyed the original aims and ideals of the Falange.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

CHRUSCHTSCHOW UND DER WELTKOMMUNISMUS. BY RICHARD LÖWENTHAL. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963, 245 p. DM. 9.80.

Articles by a leading student of international Communism on major turns and crises in the movement since the death of Stalin.

REAL WAGES IN SOVIET RUSSIA SINCE 1928. BY JANET G. CHAPMAN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 395 p. \$12.00.

An important though quite technical study which undertakes to present and analyze the statistical data on the real wages of the Soviet worker since the beginning of the Five Year Plans.

IL MONDO SOVIETICO. BY LUCA PIETROMARCHI. Milan: Bompiani, 1963, 700 p. L. 4400.

An extended appraisal of the Soviet Union, its strengths and weaknesses and the East-West conflict, by an Italian career diplomat who served as Ambassador in Moscow from 1958 to 1961.

LA POLOGNE. BY STEFAN ROZMARYN. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1963, 363 p. Fr. 32.40.

A description of the political institutions of present-day Poland. The author is a professor at the University of Warsaw.

COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-48. BY PAUL E. ZINNER. New York: Praeger, 1963, 264 p. \$6.50.

A leading student of the politics and government of Eastern Europe here analyzes the development of Communist strategy and tactics in the Czechoslovak setting from the origins of the Party through the critical war years, to the seizure of power in 1948. An important contribution to the subject.

ALBANIA—CHINA'S BEACHHEAD IN EUROPE. BY HARRY HAMM. New York: Praeger, 1963, 176 p. \$4.95.

A German journalist's informative report on Albania and its place in current Communist controversy, based in part on a visit to the country in 1961.

GREECE AND THE GREAT POWERS 1944-1947: PRELUDE TO THE "TRUMAN DOCTRINE." BY STEPHEN G. XYDIS. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963, 758 p.

In this massive and scholarly study Dr. Xydis analyzes the course of Greece's relations with the great powers during the critical and darkening years from the country's liberation to the advent of the Truman Doctrine. Of particular value for its extensive use of Greek foreign policy materials, many of them unpublished.

YUGOSLAVIA AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE: A STUDY IN FRONTIERMAKING. BY IVO J. LEDERER. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963, 351 p. \$8.00.

This scholarly and balanced study of Yugoslav territorial issues at the end of World War I and in the peacemaking is a welcome addition to the studies treating the experiences of the various nations at the Versailles settlement. Bordering seven states, Yugoslavia's frontiers presented a particularly knotty issue, but Professor Lederer, making good use of new Yugoslav archival sources, has done much to clarify the picture.

The Middle East

THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA. BY MANFRED HALPERN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, 431 p. \$8.50.

A major attempt to apply the categories of political science to the thoroughgoing transformation of Middle Eastern and North African society now in process. All the more so in view of the size of his task, the author's experience, grasp and unhurried scholarship command respect.

THE MILITARY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. EDITED BY SYDNEY NETTLETON FISHER. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963, 138 p. \$4.75.

Eight essays dealing with the role of the military in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Israel and the area in general by well-known authorities.

THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST. EDITED BY RICHARD H. NOLTE. New York: Atherton Press, 1963, 218 p. \$5.95.

A colligation of interpretive essays dealing from a variety of points of view with the Middle East at large and the problems of Westernizing change.

MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS. NUMBER THREE. EDITED BY ALBERT HOURANI. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963, 184 p. \$4.25.

This third volume in a continuing series contains first-rate scholarly essays by M. Kerr (on Arab notions of democracy), A. K. S. Lambton (Persian political societies 1906-11), J. Abun-Nasr (the Salafiyya movement in Morocco), A. Jwaideh (the land system of lower Iraq) and A. L. Tibawi (American missionaries in Beirut). This is a St. Antony's Paper, No. 16.

MIDDLE EAST OIL CRISES AND WESTERN EUROPE'S ENERGY SUPPLIES. BY HAROLD LUBELL. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963, 233 p. \$8.75.

A detailed analysis certain to be useful to those concerned with oil and its role in Western security. The author notes the 70 percent dependence of the NATO countries on Middle Eastern oil exports and argues that the danger of an interrupted oil flow is great enough to justify stockpiling and a vigorous effort to develop alternative sources of energy.

BRITAIN'S MOMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1914-1956. BY ELIZABETH MONROE. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963, 254 p. \$5.00.

The author combines originality, personal experience and first-class scholarship in her study of Britain's period of supremacy in the Middle East, and the result is history at its best.

THE ARABS: A COMPACT HISTORY. BY FRANCESCO GABRIELI. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1963, 215 p. \$4.95.

This well-done translation presents for the general reader a panoramic view of the Arabs in history from pre-Islamic times up to the present by an Italian scholar.

IRAN: A SHORT POLITICAL GUIDE. BY JOHN MARLOWE. New York: Praeger, 1963, 144 p. \$5.00.

A brisk and well-wrought history of contemporary Iran notable for its compression, scope and authority.

THE FIRST TURKISH REPUBLIC. BY RICHARD D. ROBINSON. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 367 p. \$5.95.

An interpretive history in which the author's long experience and intimate knowledge of modern Turkey are brought to bear on the theme that the evolution of Turkey from Atatürk until the military takeover in 1960 can be viewed as an instructive test case of accelerated development under Western-oriented leadership.

THE TURKISH REVOLUTION 1960-1961: ASPECTS OF MILITARY POLITICS. BY WALTER F. WEIKER. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1963, 172 p. \$2.50 (Paper).

A study in detail of the political problems involved in the 1960-61 military takeover and the implications for U.S. development policies. May usefully be read in conjunction with "The First Turkish Republic," noted above.

EGYPT IN REVOLUTION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS. BY CHARLES ISSAWI. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1963, 343 p. \$7.20.

This is the third consummation of the author's decennial effort to present an economic study of Egypt; he promises not to attempt a fourth. Unless the rapid transformation of Egypt toward "socialist, co-operative democracy" should suddenly cease, however, he should be persuaded to change his mind. Meanwhile, the present volume seems likely to remain the best and most complete treatment of the Egyptian economy in print, of prime interest to students of economic development as well as those concerned with the contemporary Middle East.

EGYPT: YESTERDAY AND TODAY. BY GEORGIANA G. STEVENS. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963, 234 p. \$3.95.

A well-done introductory handbook, condensed but balanced, comprehensive and up-to-date, by a veteran observer.

South and Southeast Asia

SOUTHEAST ASIA IN UNITED STATES POLICY. BY RUSSELL H. FIFIELD. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1963, 488 p. \$6.50 (Paper, \$2.95).

A penetrating examination of the evolving situation in Southeast Asia with suggestions for developing and implementing a rationale for American policy in that area. Professor Fifield, long a specialist in Asian studies and former government official, predicts marked changes in American outlook on Asia and success in American aims.

POLITICS IN SOUTHERN ASIA. EDITED BY SAUL ROSE. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963, 386 p. \$10.00.

Sixteen papers presented at a St. Antony's College symposium on the political evolution of each country in the region from Pakistan to the Philippines, by area specialists drawn from different disciplines.

HIMALAYAN BATTLEGROUND: SINO-INDIAN RIVALRY IN LADAKH. BY MARGARET W. FISHER AND OTHERS. New York: Praeger, 1963, 205 p. \$6.00.

Evaluation of the claims and counterclaims concerning the Sino-Indian border controversy, by specialists at the Center for South Asia Studies at the University of California's Institute of International Studies.

INDIA: A WORLD IN TRANSITION. BY BEATRICE PITNEY LAMB. New York: Praeger, 1963, 374 p. \$6.50 (Paper, \$2.50).

A comprehensive, objective survey of contemporary India, produced through scholarly research and numerous trips to India from 1949 to 1962.

PAKISTAN. BY IAN STEPHENS. New York: Praeger, 1963, 288 p. \$6.95.

A former editor of the *Indian Statesman* (1942-1951) and Historian to the Pakistan Army (1957-1960) uses his personal observations and experiences, as well as previously unpublished materials, to write about the creation of Pakistan, the emergence of the new state, the Kashmir dispute and other Indo-Pakistani problems.

U NU OF BURMA. BY RICHARD BUTWELL. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963, 301 p. \$7.50.

An evaluation, based largely on interviews and documents not earlier available, of U Nu and his important role in the governing of Burma (1948-1962) by a professor at the University of Illinois. Full notes, bibliography and index.

MALAYA. BY J. M. GULLICK. New York: Praeger, 1963, 256 p. \$6.95.

An account of the making of a modern nation out of different elements and a study of a modern society comprising three major communities, based on first-hand observations of a former Malayan civil service officer.

TREACHEROUS RIVER: A STUDY OF RURAL CHINESE IN NORTH MALAYA. BY WILLIAM H. NEWELL. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1962, 233 p. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, distributor, \$6.40.)

A sociologist's account of an agricultural community in Malaya where 38 percent of the population are Chinese who are economically dominant and who consider themselves as part of the larger Chinese society.

THE EMERGENCE OF MALAYSIA. BY RONALD MCKIE. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963, 310 p. \$4.95.

A journalistic account of Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, of the problems of the newly created Malaysia as a member of the British Commonwealth, and of the possibility of a Malaysia-Indonesia-Philippines confederation.

INDONESIA. EDITED BY RUTH T. McVEY. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1963, 600 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, \$12.00.)

A survey of Indonesian culture, history, economics, politics and social structure by ten top scholars on the area.

THE TWO VIET-NAMS: A POLITICAL AND MILITARY ANALYSIS. BY BERNARD B. FALL. New York: Praeger, 1963, 493 p. \$7.95.

A leading Viet Nam specialist analyzes both zones of that divided country, pointing out weaknesses and strengths in each and comparing their governmental and economic institutions as they actually operate. He concludes with several alternatives for Viet Nam's future.

THE LAST CONFUCIAN. BY DENIS WARNER. New York: Macmillan, 1963, 274 p. \$5.95.

An analytical assessment of American efforts to curb Communism in Southeast Asia, with emphasis on Viet Nam and Ngo Dinh Diem (the "Last Confucian").

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

TOWARD ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN ASIA. BY DAVID WIGHTMAN. New Haven: Yale University Press (for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1963, 400 p. \$7.50.

A historical appraisal of the first 15 years of ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) which describes and analyzes the purposes, structure, functions and problems of the organization, by a University of Birmingham senior lecturer in international economic history.

THE RED CHINA LOBBY. BY FORREST DAVIS AND ROBERT A. HUNTER. New York: Fleet, 1963, 287 p. \$4.95.

Through an examination of Sino-American relations during the last century, the authors, both journalists and both recently deceased, argue against the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Admiral Radford, in a foreword, concurs.

CHINESE COMMUNISM: SELECTED DOCUMENTS. EDITED BY DAN N. JACOBS AND HANS H. BAERWALD. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 242 p. \$1.95 (Paper).

A collection of documents, with commentaries, on Sino-Soviet relations, 1957-1962, and their historical origins.

DIE VOLKSREPUBLIK CHINA UND DAS RECHT NATIONALER MINDERHEITEN. BY EDGAR TOMSON. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1963, 201 p. DM. 42.

A valuable collection of 49 official documents, translated from Chinese and Russian sources, on laws governing the national minority groups in the People's Republic of China, with a 36-page, two-column bibliography.

AMERICANS AND CHINESE: A HISTORICAL ESSAY AND A BIBLIOGRAPHY. BY KWANG-CHING LIU. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 211 p. \$4.50.

A Harvard historian surveys the impact of Americans in China and Chinese in America in 40 pages, and appends a 152-page bibliography which forms a uniquely useful guide for the study of modern China and Sino-American relations.

THE MODERN HISTORY OF JAPAN. BY W. G. BEASLEY. New York: Praeger, 1963, 352 p. \$7.50.

A well-known University of London historian on Japan writes of the country from the early nineteenth century to the present, with particular emphasis on political, social and economic factors.

THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOUR IN MODERN JAPANESE POLITICS. BY MASAO MARUYAMA. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 344 p. \$6.75.

Nine essays on ultranationalism, Fascism and other political issues written by an eminent political scientist at Tokyo University. Translated from the Japanese.

DIMENSIONS OF JAPAN: A COLLECTION OF REPORTS WRITTEN FOR THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES FIELD STAFF. BY LAWRENCE OLSON. New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1963, 403 p. \$6.50.

The political, economic and social aspects of postwar Japan by A.U.F.'s representative in Japan since 1955. National and international issues are discussed and the author concludes that Japan's leaders are more concerned with national power than with public welfare.

THE POLITICS OF KOREAN NATIONALISM. BY CHONG-SIK LEE. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963, 342 p. \$6.50.

A chronicle of Korea's struggle for independence from the fourteenth century to 1945, from Korean, Chinese and Japanese sources, by a professor at the University of Pennsylvania.

MILITARY ADVISORS IN KOREA: KMAG IN PEACE AND WAR. BY MAJOR ROBERT K. SAWYER. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962, 216 p. \$3.50.

The first volume in a new Army Historical Series on the experiences of American military assistance groups "working . . . to strengthen the defense of free nations all over the world." Major Sawyer describes the problems, successes and weakness of the KMAG organization.

NORTH KOREA TODAY. EDITED BY ROBERT A. SCALAPINO. New York: Praeger, 1963, 141 p. \$4.00.

A collection of articles, first appearing in a special issue of *The China Quarterly*, on the political, economic, legal, military and educational aspects of North Korea, based largely on Korean and Japanese sources.

AUSTRALIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1956-1960. EDITED BY GORDON GREENWOOD AND NORMAN HARPER. Vancouver: Publications Centre, University of British

Columbia (for the Australian Institute of International Affairs), 1963, 430 p. \$8.50.

A second volume covering the period from the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company to the civil war in Laos, showing Australia's attempt to work out the implications of these changes for her position in Southeast Asia.

Africa

AFRICAN AFFAIRS. NUMBER TWO. EDITED BY KENNETH KIRKWOOD. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963, 129 p. \$4.25.

Léopold Senghor, Terence Ranger and Carl Rosberg are included among the distinguished contributors to this second volume of St. Antony's Papers concerned with African affairs. The articles are disparate in subject matter and written by men of a variety of academic disciplines, but they are linked in excellence.

AFRICAN STUDIES IN INCOME AND WEALTH. EDITED BY L. H. SAMUELS. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963, 433 p. \$10.00.

Papers from a Conference of the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth held in Addis Ababa in January 1961 to exchange information on conceptual and practical problems of national income accounting in Africa. The papers are technical and primarily of interest to the development economist.

MANAGING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA. EDITED BY WARREN H. HAUSMAN. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963, 253 p. \$4.50.

A collection of papers presented at an evaluation conference for M.I.T. fellows who had been working with problems of economic development in various parts of Africa. The papers vary widely in quality but raise many of the problems which are encountered by those assisting with economic development.

AFRICA IN THE UNITED NATIONS. BY THOMAS HOVET, JR. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963, 336 p. \$8.50.

A detailed analysis of the voting records of the African states in the United Nations and of voting records on African issues. Little attempt is made to analyze factors outside the United Nations which influence the voting although some treatment is given to Pan-African conferences.

LE GROUPE AFRO-ASIATIQUE DANS LE CADRE DES NATIONS UNIES. BY SAMAAH BOUTROS FARAJALLAH. Geneva: Droz, 1963, 511 p. Swiss Fr. 40.

An analysis of the formation and structure of the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations based on documentary sources and taking into account national political events which affect the attitudes and actions of the group.

AFRICA AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD. EDITED BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI. Stanford: Stanford University Press (for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace), 1963, 272 p. \$5.00.

A collection of essays based primarily on Communist source materials which presents the various programs in Africa of the Communist states. The articles treat the political, social and economic aspects of Communist policy toward Africa and the concluding chapter by the editor gives a succinct and provocative summation.

AFRICA MUST UNITE. BY KWAME NKRUMAH. New York: Praeger, 1963, 229 p. \$5.95.

The President of Ghana uses the case of Ghana to exemplify the problems facing a new African state and puts forward suggestions for the future of Pan-Africanism.

AFRICA UNBOUND: REFLECTIONS OF AN AFRICAN STATESMAN. BY ALEX QUAISSON-SACKY. New York: Praeger, 1963, 174 p. \$4.95 (Paper, \$1.95).

The Ghanaian Ambassador to the United Nations gives a short political history of the freeing of the African states and of their role in the United Nations.

POLITICS AND LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA. BY JULIUS LEWIN. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963, 115 p. \$2.95.

The collected essays of a South African lawyer and lecturer on race relations who comes to the conclusion that "a government determined at all costs to enforce apartheid in the teeth of all legal or practical difficulties will abandon the rule of law itself" but who, for a variety of political and economic factors, does not foresee a revolution in the Republic.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA. BY RUTH FIRST. Baltimore: Penguin, 1963, 269 p. \$1.25 (Paper).

A journalistic treatment of South West Africa which details the history of the territory to the end of 1962. The author had access to both the White and the African population but only to limited documents in South Africa.

LUMUMBA'S CONGO: ROOTS OF CONFLICT. BY WASHINGTON OKUMU. New York: Obolensky, 1963, 250 p. \$3.95.

A Kenyan political economist gives a background treatment from 1885 and analyzes the Congo crisis. He emphasizes that independence can be won only through struggle and the reader gains insight into how an African views the colonial experience in retrospect. Both past colonialism and neo-colonialism are protested; the partisan note is balanced by Rupert Emerson's introduction.

THE POLITICS OF PARTNERSHIP. BY PATRICK KEATLEY. Baltimore: Penguin, 1963, 527 p. \$1.95 (Paper).

A political history of the Federation which indicates the author's fear for the future in Southern Rhodesia. A journalistic, general work for the lay reader, valuable in that it carries events to the spring of 1963 although not through the split in the African nationalist movement in Southern Rhodesia.

THE NIGERIAN FEDERAL ELECTION 1959. BY K. W. J. POSE. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research), 1963, 518 p. \$7.20.

An election study which entails examination of political, administrative and judicial structures in Nigeria. Invaluable local details for the Nigerian specialist although somewhat weak in methodology.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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AFRICA

AGRICULTURAL development schemes in sub-Saharan Africa; a bibliography. Washington, Library of Congress, 1963. 189 p. \$1.25.

AFRICA briefing. Hearing, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Feb. 27, 1963. Washington, 1963. 20 p.

AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURAL Trade and Development Assistance Act of 1954 and amendments, compiled by G. G. Udell. Washington, 1962. 30 p. 15¢.

POSSIBILITIES of increasing world food production, by W. H. Pawley. Rome, FAO, 1963. 231 p. (Freedom from Hunger Campaign Basic Studies Series, 10.) \$2.50.

ATOMIC ENERGY

ATOMIC energy act of 1946 and amendments, compiled by G. G. Udell. Washington, 1962. 195 p. 55¢.

EUROPEAN Nuclear Energy Agency: Statute of the Agency; Convention on Security Control; European Nuclear Energy Tribunal; acts relating to joint undertakings (Eurochemic, Halden, Dragon). Paris, OECD, 1963. 191 p.

4th INTER-AMERICAN Symposium on the Peaceful Application of Nuclear Energy, Mexico City, April 9-13, 1962. Washington, Pan American Union, 1962. 2 v. \$7.00.

COMMERCIAL POLICY AND TRADE

EMERGENCY Tariff Laws of 1921 and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements act of 1934 with all amendments, compiled by G. G. Udell. Washington, 1962. 82 p. 30¢.

EXPROPRIATION of American-owned property by foreign governments in the twentieth century. Report, prepared by the Legislative Reference Service for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Jl. 19, 1963. Washington, 1963. 41 p. (Com. Print.)

SUGAR prices. Hearings, Committee on Finance, Senate, May 29-Je. 6, 1963. Washington, 1963. 122 p.

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FURTHER documents relating to the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament; the Seventeenth General Assembly of the U.N. and the Session in Geneva from Nov. 26, 1962 to Dec. 20, 1962. London, 1963. 210 p. (Cmnd. 1958.) 11s.6d.

TOWARD a strategy of peace, by John F. Kennedy. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1963. 17 p. (Publications, 17.) 15¢.

A STEP towards peace. Report to the people on the nuclear test ban treaty, by President John F. Kennedy. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1963. 20 p. (Publications, 16.) 20¢.

EASTERN EUROPE

EDUCATION in Czechoslovakia, by N. Apanasewicz and S. M. Rosen. Washington, Office of Education, 1963. 40 p. (Bulletin 1963, No. 27.) 20¢.

DOKUMENTE zur Aussenpolitik der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. Bd. IX: Vom 1. Jan. bis zum 31. Dez. 1961. Berlin, Rütten & Loening, 1962. 591 p. DM. 6.80.

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2d Sess., Dec. 4, 1962. Washington, 1962. 744 p. (Jt. Com. Print.)

POLYTECHNICAL education in the USSR, ed. by S. G. Shapovalenko. Paris, UNESCO, 1963. 433 p. (Monographs on Education, 3.) \$3.50.

FAR EAST AND ASIA

STUDY mission to Southeast Asia, Nov.-Dec., 1962. Report by Senators McGee, Church and Moss, Committees on Appropriations, Foreign Relations and Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, Apr. 11, 1963. Washington, 1963. 17 p. (S. Doc. 12.)

SOCIAL research and problems of rural development in Southeast Asia; proceedings of a seminar . . . in Saigon (Viet-Nam), 18 to 26 March, 1960, ed. by Vu Quoc Thuc. Paris, UNESCO, 1963. 268 p.

PACIFICA Foundation. Hearings, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act . . . , Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, Jan. 10-25, 1963. Washington, 1963. 3 pts.

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FINANCIAL POLICY AND EXCHANGE

INTERNATIONAL flow of long-term capital and official donations, 1959-1961. N.Y., 1963. 66 p. (63.II.D.2.) 75¢.

INTERNATIONAL banks. Hearing, Committee on Banking and Currency, House, on H.R. 7405 and H.R. 7406, Jl. 11, 1963. Washington, 1963. 237 p.

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RECENT changes in monetary policy and balance-of-payments problems. Hearings, Committee on Banking and Currency, House, Jl. 22-26, 1963. Washington, 1963. 412 p.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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